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I. Introduction 
Nepal has previously not been associated with radical, militant Hindu nationalist groups, 
unlike its neighbor India where the rise of the Hindu right to mainstream politics has been 
much discussed ever since the late 1980s and early 90s. However, after the developments 
that led to the end of King Gyanendra’s short authoritarian rule and a peace agreement with 
the Maoist insurgents following a ten-year-long civil war in 2006, Nepal suddenly 
witnessed the emergence of these forces into the public arena. These Hindu nationalist 
groups were reacting to a declaration made by the interim government that changed Nepal 
from a Hindu Kingdom first into a secular constitutional monarchy and later in 2008 into a 
secular republic. Ever since 2006, groups supporting a return to a Hindu kingdom or nation 
have been arranging protest marches and threatening a change into the relatively peaceful 
inter-religious relations of the country. This thesis examines the reactions these groups have 
had to secularism and how the present situation can be expected to affect the relations 
between different religious communities in Nepal.  
While the militancy and aggressiveness of these groups has largely been a new 
phenomenon in Nepal, the Hindu nationalists of India have had a historical relationship 
with the Nepalese polity that extends all the way to the 1940s when the autocratic Rana 
regime of Nepal and the Indian Hindu nationalist party Hindu Mahasabha forged a 
mutually beneficial relationship in opposition to secular forces in both countries. These ties 
became more pronounced with the coup of King Mahendra in the 1960s when the king 
actively sought the support of the Indian Hindu nationalist organizations, also known as the 
Sangh Parivar, to gain legitimacy for his rule. Later in the 1990s Nepalese branches of 
these organizations were launched in the country as a response to the state relaxing its 
policy towards conversions - the fear of which has always been at the heart of the Hindu 
nationalist ideology. This ideology, also known as Hindutva, has its roots in India in the 
19th century Hindu socio-religious movements and the 1920s – a time when it developed 
more specifically as a political response to both the secular nationalism of the Congress 
Party, most prominently spearheaded by Jawaharlal Nehru, and the Khilafat movement of 
the Muslims. The core of the ideology lies in a majoritarian concept of a Hindu rashtra or 
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nation that excludes all groups that adhere to religions that have their origins outside of 
South Asia, meaning of course mainly Muslims and Christians. The Bharatiya Janata Party, 
a political front of the Hindutva forces, rose to power in India in the 1990s, and 
subsequently the tremendous popularity of the Hindutva ideology, termed the “saffron 
wave”, was followed by some of the worst incidents of communal violence since 
independence. These violent incidents are often provoked by the Sangh Parivar activists, 
and in some cases they have even been preplanned and actively tolerated by a BJP-led state 
government. In Nepal the Hindu nationalism promoted by the state was, however, in the 
beginning quite different from the Hindutva ideology, as it centered on rigid casteism, 
which the Hindutva ideology at least claims to oppose. Ever since the 1960s there has been 
a constant rapprochement towards Hindutva from the side of the Nepalese state. This 
Hindutva-ization of the Nepalese polity did not, however, lead to the kind of a saffron wave 
or mass mobilization at the grassroots level that has been witnessed in India.   
While a great deal has been written about nationalism in Nepal, much of the work has 
concentrated mainly on the relation between the state and minority ethnic groups, also 
known as the Janajatis (for example, Gellner, Pfaff-Czarnecka and Whelpton 2008). The 
Hindu bias of the state has also been the center of some studies (for example, P.R. Sharma 
2004; S. Sharma 2002; Toffin 2006), but the state’s tie-up to the Indian Hindutva 
organizations has received very little scholarly attention. The Hindu and minority 
mobilization around a debate about secularism in 1990 has been well documented (Hoftun, 
Reaper and Whelpton 1999; Bouillier 1997), but a deeper study on the general phenomenon 
of Hindutva in Nepal has been missing. The aim of this thesis is to attempt to fill this gap 
by firstly, examining the history of the relations between the Nepalese state and the Sangh 
Parivar, and secondly, by looking at the Hindutva rhetoric and strategies that emerge in the 
new secular context with regard to the Muslims, Christians and other minorities. The main 
purpose is to try and examine whether a mass mobilization in the name of Hindutva has the 
potential to take place in Nepal now in a political climate where the traditional state-
propagated nationalism has been challenged by minority groups.  
The main research questions are as follows: 
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• How is the Hindu right reacting to secularism in Nepal? 
• Can the popularity of the Hindutva ideology be expected to rise significantly, thus 
leading to an increase in religious violence? 
In addition, the following smaller questions will be addressed 
• What consequences do the Hindu nationalists see secularism having for the inter-
religious relations in Nepal? 
• What potential threats to Hinduism are identified in the Nepalese context?  
• How is a Hindu Rashtra legitimized in a multi-ethnic, -religious and –cultural 
country?  
• How will the Hindutva groups attempt to mobilize the Nepalese people? 
My hypotheses were that the Hindu nationalists feel threatened by the fall of the Hindu 
Kingdom and they are now turning more radical in their rhetoric and activities. They see 
“foreign” religions such as Islam and Christianity as a threat to Hinduism because they fear 
that the followers of these religions will increase their proselytizing activities.  Hence, they 
are turning to intimidation through violence and propaganda, which has the potential to 
harm the inter-religious relations in the country. 
This thesis is divided into three main parts. The first part traces the history of Hindu 
nationalism both in India and in Nepal, all the way to the present. Nepalese history is given 
more attention, and the analysis goes more into detail about political developments and 
minority assertions. The second part deals with the reaction to Nepalese secularism, both on 
the rhetorical and practical level. At last, the third part examines the way propaganda is 
used to construct an idea of threatening Others versus a Hindu majority. 
Research Methods 
I started my research by consulting secondary literature on Hindutva, Nepali nationalism 
and religious minorities. I concentrated first mainly on extracting the differences and 
similarities between the Hindu nationalist experiences of India and Nepal. This helped me 
in placing much of the data I later gathered from my interviews into the right perspective 
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and proved to be quite central to many of the observations and arguments that developed. 
Hence, a comparison between the Indian and Nepalese contexts forms a crucial part of my 
work.    
My field visit to Nepal lasted about two months from 14th of February 2011 to 12th of April 
2011, and during this time I conducted altogether 21 interviews in Kathmandu and Birgunj. 
Because the southern border region to India, known as Terai (also Tarai), is considered the 
area where the Hindutva groups of Nepal are most active, I thought it important to visit also 
this area even though these groups are also well represented in Kathmandu. I chose Birgunj 
mainly because many Hindu protests have taken place there in the past. I also managed to 
make contacts that helped me in accessing the field better there than for example in 
Nepalgunj, another Terai town known for its Hindutva activism. My visit to Birgunj was, 
however, extremely short compared to the time I spent in Kathmandu, and in retrospect a 
longer stay in the Terai would, of course, have wielded much more information, especially 
with regard to the Madheshi movement that has become central to the political tactics of the 
Hindutva groups.  
I interviewed mainly leaders of various Hindutva-oriented organizations and political 
parties, such as the Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh, Shiv Sena Nepal, the World Hindu 
Federation and Nepal Janata Party, all with close contacts to the Indian Sangh Parivar. I 
also interviewed leaders of minority religious organizations and members of the Inter-
religious Council, an organization which aims to promote interfaith dialogue and peace in 
Nepal. I also managed to gain access to an education center run by the Hindu Swayamsevak 
Sangh for the ethnic minorities, or Janajatis, of Nepal in Kathmandu where I was able 
observe a shakha, a daily training session. I briefly conducted participant observation there.  
 I used semi-structured interviews, consisting of mainly open-ended questions, and codified 
and analyzed them with the help of grounded theory, as described by Bernard and Ryan 
(2010). Even though I formulated a hypothesis at the start of my research, I did not apply it 
to the interview analysis. I felt that the grounded theory method which lets “understanding 
emerge from the close study of texts” suited the topic of my interviews better than a 
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deductive method (ibid.288). Most of the interviews were conducted in English, but some 
of them, mainly those that took place in Birgunj, were carried out either partly or 
completely in Hindi. I had an interpreter available to help me in both formulating my 
questions and making sure everything was understood. The recorded interviews were later 
transcribed and translated into English by myself, at times using the help of a native 
speaker.  
What leads to Hindutva’s rise? 
The central question for this thesis is to analyze whether the present conditions in Nepal 
provide a framework in which the popularity of the Hindutva ideology can be expected to 
rise significantly among the public, thus leading to an increase in inter-religious violence. 
The reasons that have led to the rise of Hindu nationalism in India have been a topic of 
some scholarly debate, with some attributing it to being a natural outcome of the 
organizational strategies adopted by the Hindutva organizations and the utilization of new 
political tactics (Jaffrelot 1996; Basu et al. 1993), while others see it as drawing on a 
religious nationalism that has always been present in other forms of Indian nationalisms 
(van der Veer 1994).  Chetan Bhatt (2001) also sees Hindutva’s rise partly in this religious 
light, as he argues that while it must be seen as a response to various processes of 
globalization, it has also “unraveled older, if now seemingly provisional, certainties about 
the meanings of secularism and secular nationalism for national populations living under, 
and immediately amenable to the charm of religions” (ibid. 209). This religious explanation 
might in fact fit the Nepalese context, where Nepali nationalism was from the beginning 
defined by Hindu religion, Hindu king and the Nepali language. Nevertheless, as this 
understanding of nationalism has now become challenged and the Hindu kingdom has 
fallen, it is not entirely sufficient for the analysis of the current situation. Simply the use of 
organizational strategies does not seem to be able provide a fertile ground for the growth of 
Hindu nationalism either, as the Hindutva organizations have been active in Nepal already 
since 1960s and especially since the 1990s. The use of new political strategies, on the other 
hand, seems to be something that one can see at least having been attempted in Nepal ever 
since the 1990s and especially after the declaration of secularism in 2006. The Hindutva 
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groups of Nepal have clearly adopted a rhetoric that has been more aggressive towards 
minorities and has aimed to mobilize the Hindus to keep Nepal a Hindu country. But what 
has led the Hindutva groups to adopt these strategies? 
T.B. Hansen (1999) describes the success of Hindu nationalism in the following way:  
“Hindu nationalism represents a “conservative revolution”, premised upon and yet reacting against 
a broader democratic transformation of both the political field and the public culture in postcolonial 
India. The intensification of political mobilization among the lower castes and the minorities has, 
along with the rise of ambiguous desires of consumerism in everyday life, exposure to global 
cultural and economic flows, and so on, fractured social imaginings and notions of order and 
hierarchy, not least within the large middle class and dominant communities in contemporary India. 
I argue that it was the desire for recognition within an increasingly global horizon, and the 
simultaneous anxieties of being encroached upon by the Muslims, the plebeians, and the poor that 
over the last decade have prompted millions of Hindus to respond to the call for Hindutva at the 
polls and in the streets, and to embrace Hindu nationalist promises of order, discipline and 
collective strength” (Hansen 1999: 4-5). 
When looking at the situation in Nepal from the 1990s onwards, the emergence of minority 
assertions is something that has clearly challenged the traditional, state propagated version 
of nationalism. There were mass demonstrations for secularism, and even though the 
Hindutva forces gained the upper hand in this struggle, the religious minorities were able to 
get some of their demands through, such as the release of religious prisoners. This was all 
followed by an increase in communal violence in the Terai and the launching of various 
Hindutva organizations and parties in Nepal. Simultaneously, the Hindutva rhetoric turned 
more aggressive towards the minorities (S. Sharma 2004). A similar development can be 
observed in the post-2006 environment: the Hindutva rhetoric has in fact turned more 
aggressive than ever before, and militant terrorist groups targeting mosques and churches 
have emerged.  
Arjun Appadurai’s (2006) concept of “predatory identities” could also fit into the Nepalese 
Hindu nationalist context: 
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“I define as predatory those identities whose social construction and mobilization require the 
extinction of other, proximate social categories, defined as threats to the very existence of some 
group, defined as a we. Predatory identities emerge, periodically, out of pairs of identities, 
sometimes sets that are larger than two, which have long histories of close contact, mixture and 
some degree of mutual stereotyping. Occasional violence may or may not be part of these histories, 
but some degree of contrastive identification is always involved. One of these pairs or sets of 
identities often turns predatory by mobilizing an understanding of itself as a threatened majority.” 
(Appadurai 2006: 51)   
Appadurai in fact uses the example of Hindutva, although in the Indian context. He notes 
how a constructed idea of a Hindu majority is used to hide the fact that the upper castes, the 
ones who in reality benefit the most from such constructs, are, in fact, themselves a 
minority. Simultaneously, the contrasted minority, in India’s case mostly the Muslims, is 
linked to larger global movements, identities and networks, in order to claim that they are 
backed by much more powerful forces. The small minorities are, thus, made to seem like 
secret agents of these global forces in their countries (ibid. 110). Appadurai also draws 
attention to how the increasing assertiveness of cultural minorities for the recognition of 
their rights inside different nation states led to the rise of majoritarian or predatory 
identities in the 1990s. The growing assertiveness of cultural and religious minorities is of 
course something that can be seen in Nepal, ever since the 1990s. The current situation of 
Nepal might, in fact, present exactly the kind of situation that both Hansen and Appadurai 
describe: the increasing mobilization of minorities that threatens the constructed majority’s 
dominant position, either in reality or in imagination.    
Majorities and Minorities in Nepal 
The categories of majorities and minorities are modern constructs, emerging in history 
simultaneously with census data and the systematic calculation of populations. In Nepal’s 
case the terms “minority” and “majority” become somewhat problematic, since there is no 
single ethnic or caste group that could be said to construct the absolute majority in the 
country. In fact, all groups could be argued to be minorities, depending what definition is 
used. The 2001 census of Nepal lists 100 caste and ethnic groups, 92 languages and dialects 
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and 9 religions in the country. The easiest way to classify the people of Nepal is to divide 
them between first Pahari (Hill) and Madheshi (Plains), secondly between Janajati (ethnic) 
and Jat (Hindu caste) and lastly within the Jat (Hindu caste) between lower caste and upper 
caste. Historically it has been the upper caste Hill (Pahari) elite, the Bahun and Chettri 
castes making up about 28.54 percent of the population, who have held the power in Nepal. 
Nevertheless, the main criterion for what constructs the majority in Nepal has always been 
the Nepali language and Hindu religion (Hachhethu 2003a). When looking at the situation 
from this angle, the Pahari Jats make up about 48.61 percent, where as the entire Hindu 
population, including also the non-Nepali speaking Madheshis inhabiting the Terai region 
close to India, is quoted as 80.6 percent in the 2001 census.  
The Madheshi and Pahari caste Hindus are ethnically closely related, both being of Indo-
Aryan descent, and linguistically Nepali and the languages spoken by the Madheshis 
(mainly Maithili, Bhojpuri and Awadhi – closely related to Hindi) are also quite similar, 
both belonging to the Indo-Aryan group. Nevertheless, due to the historically dominant 
status of Nepali speakers, a conflict exists between the Madheshis and Paharis. The 
Janajatis on the other hand are both ethnically and linguistically sharply differentiated from 
these Indo-Aryan groups, being mostly of Tibeto-Burman descent, resulting in what Lawoti 
(2005) calls a “racial/physical difference conflict”. 
The religious minorities are principally found among all these historically marginalized 
groups. The Buddhists, constructing the largest religious minority of Nepal, make up about 
10.7 percent of the population. They are often found among the Janajati groups. Muslims, 
the second largest religious minority with 4.2 percent, mainly inhabit the Terai region. 
Kirant, an animistic religion practiced by the Janajati Kiranti group, is the third largest 
minority religion with 3.6 percent. Christians are in the 2001 census one of the smallest 
groups with only 0.4 percent. They are often of Janajati origin. It must be noted, however, 
that the census data produced by the government of Nepal has been contested by most 
groups, in particular the minorities by saying that it attempts to exaggerate the percentage 
of Hindus. In the 2001 census the percentage of Hindus has in fact decreased from the 86.5 
percent recorded in 1991. This, according to Lawoti (2005) is due to the increasing identity 
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assertions of minorities, and also to the fact that groups that have previously been included 
under Hindus have been added as their own category (ibid. 87-90). 
In this thesis I have chosen to use the terms majority and minority out of practical reasons. 
With ethnic minorities I mean the Janajatis, the mainly Tibeto-Burman groups of Nepal. 
When referring to religious minorities, all religions other than Hindu are meant. Hinduism, 
comprising extremely varied and pluralistic religious practices and traditions, is of course 
hard to define in similar terms to most other religions. Also, since there is a great deal of 
overlapping between different religious practices in Nepal, mainly Buddhism and 
Hinduism, it can be difficult to draw clear lines between these two. With these difficulties 
in mind, the term Hindu, as used in this thesis, refers more to self-identification and less to 
the categorization in official data. 
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II. Analysis 
1. History 
1.1. History of Hindutva 
1.1.1. Arya Samaj 
The development of Hindutva as a political ideology in British India ran parallel to the 
formation of secularly oriented Indian nationalism, as spearheaded by Jawaharlal Nehru 
of the Indian National Congress, and Muslim separatism. The ideological roots of 
Hindu nationalism can be traced back to the 19th century socio-religious movements 
that were emerging in India simultaneously to resistance to British colonial rule. As 
Christian missionary activities had significantly increased in India and Hinduism was 
systematically being vilified by both the missionaries and the colonial forces, some 
Hindu Brahmins started to feel their religion was being attacked by the British (Jaffrelot 
1996: 12-14). The fear that the Hindu society was being undermined made these upper 
caste Hindus feel that their religion and society needed to be reformed in order to resist 
these perceived threats. The movements that were born out of this feeling were 
simultaneously trying to save what they understood to be the core of Hinduism, mostly 
defined in Brahministic terms, and trying to adapt to Western modernity (ibid.). The 
most important one of these movements for the development of Hindu nationalism was 
the Arya Samaj, a militant organization that is often described as neo-Hindu, but 
according to Bhatt (2001) such a label ends up emphasizing its religious dimension too 
much over its political implications. Indeed, by the turn of the century movements such 
as Arya Samaj had contributed to the formation of a particular strand of nationalism so 
much that Hinduism and nationalism became synonymous for some (ibid.16).  
Arya Samaj was founded by Dayananda Saraswati (1824-1883) in 1875 in Bombay and 
in 1877 in Lahore partly on the intellectual foundations laid by Brahmo Samaj, a 
reformist organization started in 1828 by Ram Mohan Roy in Bengal. Dayananda drew 
heavily on European Orientalists’ writings on the ancient Hindu society, in particular 
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the ones glorifying a Golden Age of Vedic Aryanism. In these writings India was often 
described as the original homeland of humanity and the cradle of civilization, and the 
speakers of Indo-European languages were thought to construct a single Aryan race. 
This idea of a Golden Age was extremely important to the Hindu reformers and 
nationalists because it could be used to create a contrast with the current weak condition 
the Hindus supposedly found themselves in and hence to call the society to restore itself 
to its former glory. This glorious Aryan past was crucial in invoking ethnic pride in the 
Hindus (Jaffrelot 1996: 16).  
While emphasizing the superiority of the Vedic Hinduism of the past, Dayananda was 
simultaneously busy constructing a new version of Hinduism that could better resist the 
threat of conversions. In doing so, Dayananda partly accepted Western criticism, but at 
the same time he tried to argue that none of the “evils” associated with societal 
practices or forms of worship had been present in the Vedic times, and thus the 
Hinduism practiced now was simply a degeneration of the authentic religion of the 
Aryans. Dayananda indeed tried to prove that the ancient Aryans had worshipped an 
abstract “Absolute” rather than multiple gods (Jaffrelot 1996: 14). Another important 
ideological construction was the view that the Aryan society had been egalitarian. 
Dayananda did not deny the existence of the caste system in the Vedic age, but instead 
he saw it as “merit based division of labor” rather than hierarchical relations based on 
heritage (Jaffrelot 2007: 9). The Arya Samaj even came up with a reconversion ritual 
known as shuddhi, which was used to convert individuals and groups “back” to 
Hinduism (or Vedic Aryanism, as the Arya Samaj saw it) – mainly meaning Muslims 
whose ancestors had been Hindus, or lower castes who had converted to Christianity 
(Bhatt 2001: 20). All of this was done for the purpose of countering the Christian threat, 
and in doing so the Arya Samaj in fact ended up emulating some aspects of Christianity 
and Western culture, although there was a clear attempt to find a justification for this in 
the history (Jaffrelot 1996: 16).   
Even though the Arya Samaj was not a political organization by definition, its ideology 
was used for political purposes. Many concepts that would later be strongly associated 
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with Hindutva were already present in Arya Samaj, such as a militant form of patriotic 
nationalism and intolerance towards “foreign” religions, i.e. Islam and Christianity. 
Paradoxically, stigmatization of both Islam and Christianity went hand in hand with 
their emulation, a tactic that is fundamental to Hindutva even today (ibid. 17).  
Dayananda and Arya Samaj were therefore extremely influential to the later 
development of the Hindu nationalist movement and they laid the foundations for 
Hindutva to take its concrete shape in the 1920s. 
1.1.2. The Hindu Mahasabha and V.D. Savarkar 
The first Hindu nationalist party, the Hindu Sabha, which would later turn into Hindu 
Mahasabha, was founded in 1906 in Lahore by a group of Arya Samajists 
simultaneously to the founding of the All India Muslim League in Dacca (today 
Dhaka). Both the Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha aimed to promote the 
interests of their specific communities, while the Congress Party adopted a more 
inclusive stance and defined the Indian nation as consisting of all communities, despite 
the fact that it was often seen as a primarily Hindu party, especially by the Muslims. 
The Hindu Mahasabha on the other hand was much more sympathetic to a German 
understanding of ethnic nationalism as the basis for a nation-state (Jaffrelot 1996: 19). 
At first, despite these differences, the Mahasabha worked as a pressure group inside the 
Congress party. The main reason behind the formation of this Hindu front was the fact 
that the British administration was seen to be giving in to Muslim demands, for 
example by granting the Muslims separate electorates in 1909 which increased their 
representation. In the beginning the Mahasabha had opposed all kinds of communal 
representation, but especially from 1920s onwards it started to see its role as the 
defender of the communal interests of the Hindus (Bhatt 2001: 60).  
The 1920s were a time when Hindu nationalism with a coherent ideology based on 
Hindu supremacy and nationhood were crystallized. This period coincided with Muslim 
mobilization in the form of the Khilafat movement which was based on the Muslims’ 
outrage at the British who were at war with the Ottoman Empire, and thus by sending 
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Indians to the frontier they forced Muslims to fight Muslim power (Bhatt 2001: 46). 
Mahatma Gandhi’s support of the Khilafat movement infuriated the Hindu nationalists, 
who at this point were still a minor force and largely external to the overall 
independence struggle. The Khilafat protests were directed against the British, but in 
some cases they also turned against Hindus which led to a cycle of inter-communal 
violence. All of this contributed to the inferiority complex of the Hindu nationalists. 
The Hindu Mahasabha hence decided to launch a movement they called Hindu 
Sanghathan (unity), which stood on a firmer ideological ground than the Hindu 
nationalist movement had before (Jaffrelot 1996: 19-20). All these developments led to 
further radicalization of the Hindu nationalist discourse, especially with regard to 
Muslims.  
Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (1883-1966), who would become the president of the 
Hindu Mahasabha, wrote an influential book titled Hindutva – Who is a Hindu in 1923, 
which became the cornerstone of the Hindu nationalist ideology as it is known today. 
Due to Savarkar’s involvement in anti-British terrorist activities he was jailed for many 
years and it was during this time that he developed his concept of Hindutva, commonly 
translated as Hindu-ness from the Sanskrit suffix -tva. Savarkar was in fact profoundly 
influenced by the writings of Giuseppe Mazzini, and it was Mazzini’s vision of a 
modern Italian nation-state that inspired Savarkar’s idea of a culturally homogenous 
and strong Hindu nation. The main concern of Savarkar was to demonstrate the coming 
together of Indian culture and territory (Hansen 1999: 77-8). For Savarkar, it was the 
idea of a common Hindu-ness that defined the unity of the Indian nation, but this 
Hindu-ness was first and foremost related to Hindu identity rather than the religion 
itself. Savarkar in fact declared himself to be an atheist (Jaffrelot 2007: 14-15). 
Hindutva, for Savarkar, is something that “embraces all the departments of thought and 
activity of the whole Being of our Hindu race” and of which Hinduism is only a fraction 
(Savarkar 2003: 4). This idea of a single Hindu race was also central to Savarkar, as he 
repeatedly stated that the inheritance of Hindu blood was the most important 
characteristic of Hindutva. This led Savarkar to defend the caste system, which he saw 
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as a proof of the racial unity of Hindus (Bhatt 2001: 94-5). As Jaffrelot (1996) explains, 
while Savarkar’s Hindutva does have “racial” overtones, it does not fit into the classical 
understanding of racism. Instead, it represents a special kind of racism that is more 
interested in cultural unity than racial purity (ibid. 55-8).  
In Savarkar’s view, only Hindus can have claim to the nation of India because they are 
in the majority and their civilization is the oldest. While he saw that Muslims and 
Christians of Indian origin also share the territory and “race” with the Hindus, the fact 
that they had adopted a different religion had made them also culturally different. 
Hindus, hence, constitute a single nation and the Muslims another, within but not of 
India (Bhatt 2001: 96-7). The Hindu Rashtra (nation) of Savarkar was defined in 
cultural and geographical terms as akhand Bharat (undivided India), including all the 
areas of the Indian Subcontinent south of the Himalayas, including also Burma. This 
shows that Hindutva first and foremost rests on the idea of a common culture rather 
than biological race. The communities of other cultures can live in the Hindu nation, but 
only as long as they accept the Hindutva culture and keep their religious practices and 
symbols hidden in the privacy of their homes. The Muslims and Christians will always 
be outsiders to the national culture and their conversion back to Hinduism should be 
encouraged. Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists are accepted as sects of Hinduism and do not 
fall into this category. It is worth noting, however, that in his early writings Savarkar 
was quite hostile towards Buddhism because of its universalism and rejection of 
violence. Later, however, he nominally accepted Buddhists into the fold of Hindutva, 
and this is today the stance adopted by Hindu nationalists, mainly because of the 
religion’s Indian origins (Bhatt 2001: 90). Indeed, the main criterion for determining 
who is considered a Hindu and who is not was the idea of pitrubhoomi, the holy land, 
which meant the geographical location of myths and sacred sites (Hansen 1999: 78). 
For the Muslims and Christians these are of course mainly found in the Middle East. 
The division is hence clear: only religions and traditions that can be considered to have 
Indian roots will have a place in the Hindu Rashtra – outsiders will be tolerated but not 
accepted into the mainstream.  
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Savarkar’s hostility towards Muslims is very clear in his writings. The Muslims are 
presented as a threat to the Hindu nation due to their pan-Islamism, i.e. their alleged 
loyalty first to Islam and only then to India, and also because the Muslims seemed more 
organized than the divided Hindus. Indeed, Savarkar’s entire book is based on the 
assumption that pan-Islamism threatens the Hindus (Jaffrelot 1996: 25). Savarkar, 
hence, calls the Hindus to unite and resist the threat of these “pan-isms” or 
extraterritorial loyalties that allegedly result from the fact that Christians and Muslims 
have their holy lands outside of India (Hansen 1999: 79). The Hindu Mahasabha under 
Savarkar’s leadership went as far as approving Nazism, and Savarkar himself compared 
the alleged anti-nationalism of Muslims of India to the Jews of Germany, in order to 
highlight the illegitimacy of their presence in a Hindu nation (Casolari 2000: 223-4).  
All these communal and Hindu supremacist ideas entertained by the Hindu Mahasabha 
became too radical for the Congress Party in 1937 when the ties between the two were 
cut. From then on, the Mahasabha became an independent political party, but it did not 
gain any representation until independence and started to disappear from the political 
arena. At the same time a different development was happening inside Hindu 
nationalism with the formation of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), an 
organization that would become the most successful Hindutva outfit to date. 
1.1.3. Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and the Sangh Parivar 
Rashrtiya Swayamsevak Sangh (national volunteer organization), more commonly 
known as the RSS, was founded in Nagpur in 1925 by K.B. Hedgewar (1889-1940), 
whose political mentor was B.S. Moonje, a former president of the Hindu Mahasabha. 
Hedgewar was heavily influenced by the writings of Savarkar, and the RSS was on the 
one hand designed to promote the Hindutva principles in the Indian society and on the 
other to “infuse new physical strength” into the Hindus (Jaffrelot 2007: 16). The RSS 
became the most successful and important Hindutva organization after independence 
with millions of members (or swayamsevaks, volunteers, as they are called in Hindi) 
and today it in fact claims to be the largest voluntary organization in the world (Bhatt 
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2001: 113). The organization, however, is paramilitary by its nature and it borrowed 
substantially from extreme European nationalisms, in particular Hitler’s Nazism and 
Mussolini’s fascism, something which has often led to the organization itself being 
described as fascist. B.S. Moonje’s trip to Italy to meet Mussolini and the impact this 
left on him has been well documented (Casolari 2000), and both he and M.S. Golwalkar 
(1906-1973), the organization’s second and most prominent leader, openly admired 
Hitler when the atrocities committed in Nazi Germany were already partly known. 
Golwalkar in fact drew almost exclusively on German sources in his book We or Our 
Nationhood Defined, written in 1939, and he saw the Germans “purging” their country 
of Jews as a manifestation of “Race pride at its highest” (quoted in Jaffrelot 1996: 55). 
Today the RSS tries to deny this by either claiming that Golwalkar knew nothing of the 
Holocaust, or that the book was not even written by him, but by Savarkar’s brother 
(Nussbaum 2007:160). 
The borrowing of fascist ideas and practices happened in the guise of reinterpreting 
traditionally Indian institutions and values, for example asceticism and akhara, a 
weightlifting and body-building tradition commonly associated with the god Hanuman, 
as Jaffrelot (1996) points out (ibid. 34-5). The RSS’s aim was from the beginning the 
creation of a unified, aggressive and strong force which could remedy the perceived 
weakness of the Hindus. The underlying idea behind the functioning of the RSS is to 
work at the grassroots level, establish shakhas (branch offices) in towns and villages all 
over the country and train young Hindu men in martial arts and Hindutva ideology. The 
concentration thus rests heavily on “character building” of the youth. In the beginning 
the organization did not attract many lower caste members due to the Sanskritized and 
Brahminical culture it promoted. Nevertheless, it tried to present itself as an “egalitarian 
vanguard of the Hindu Rashtra”, while it simultaneously continued to believe the ideal 
society was based on the traditional varna system (Jaffrelot 1996: 45-7.)  
The RSS has had an extremely controversial image in India ever since independence, 
mainly due to the fact that the organization was accused of having been involved in the 
assassination of Mahatma Gandhi in 1948. The assassinator, Nathuram Godse, had in 
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fact been an RSS swayamsevak, but had left the organization because he was 
disappointed with its lack of involvement in politics (ibid. 86-7).  The RSS was 
nevertheless temporarily banned because of all this, while the Hindu Mahasabha, from 
where all the masterminds behind Gandhi’s killing hailed, was allowed to continue 
unhindered. It was because of the Gandhi controversy that the members of RSS soon 
started discussing the possibility of launching a wing that would represent them at the 
parliamentary level (Jaffrelot 2007: 17). Even though the Mahasabha was not banned, 
its public image suffered greatly because of the link-up to the assassination, and this 
decreased the party’s support significantly (Bhatt 2001: 110).  
As the violence that followed the Partition of India and the creation of Pakistan as a 
separate homeland for Muslims had led Nehru to reaffirm his commitment to secular 
nationalism as a way of protecting the rights of the minorities, the Hindu nationalists 
felt the political void left by the Mahasabha needed to be filled (Bhatt 2001: 151-2). 
Therefore, many Mahasabha members joined the RSS which had now been acquitted of 
the assassination charges, and the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, a political wing of the RSS, 
was formed in 1951. This party would later mold into the Bharatiya Janata Party, the 
Indian People’s Party (henceforth the BJP).The RSS had in fact only been allowed to 
continue after it accepted several conditions, mainly the renouncement of violence and 
recognition of the Indian constitution. This is when arguments about the inherent 
tolerance of Hindus and the true secularism of the Hindu Rashtra started. Golwalkar 
was clearly desperate to make the RSS legal again and he modified his earlier, more 
aggressive views (ibid. 146). From now on, he saw the RSS’s role in politics as that of a 
Raj guru, a traditional Brahmin advisor to a Hindu king (Jaffrelot 1996: 115). 
In addition to founding a political front for the RSS, many different branches of the 
organization were also launched in the years after independence, for example a 
students’ wing, a women’s branch (Rashtriya Sevika Samiti) and even a trade union. 
The aim was to penetrate all aspects of Indian public life by infusing Hindu nationalist 
values into them (Jaffrelot 1996: 114). This is how, by creating various branches and 
targeted groups, the Sangh Parivar (the family of associations) started to take form, and 
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the initial aspiration to only work at the grassroots level was increasingly left behind 
during the 1970s and 80s. An important addition to this family was the Vishwa Hindu 
Parishad (VHP), the World Council of Hindus, the main aim of which was to bring a 
centralized structure to the unorganized model of Hinduism and to unify all Hindus, 
with the underlying motivation of resisting conversions (Jaffrelot 1996: 193-202). The 
VHP has been at the forefront of many Hindu nationalist campaigns and has been 
implicated for its involvement in various violent incidents ever since it was founded. 
Bajrang Dal, a militant youth organization of the VHP, has gained a reputation for 
being particularly violent and radical. All of these organizations are autonomous to a 
certain extent, although they share the basic ideology of the RSS. Especially the BJP 
has been trying to distance itself from some of the ideological stances and strategies 
taken by the core organization, which has in recent years led to conflict inside the 
Sangh Parivar (Hansen 1999: 224-5).  
1.1.4. Hindutva’s Rise to Political Mainstream 
From the 1980s onwards the formerly marginalized Hindutva ideology has risen to the 
political mainstream in the guise of the BJP, and Hindu nationalist discourse has 
become commonplace in India. All this happened simultaneously to various political 
developments in India, some of the most significant ones being the increasing 
mobilization of the lower castes and farmers which started to threaten the traditionally 
dominating sections of the society, and the Congress Party’s attempts to appeal to 
Hindu nationalist voters (Hansen 1999). The BJP in fact presented itself as a party 
committed to modernization, nationalism and national integration, but also to what it 
saw as “positive secularism”, based on the assumption that Hinduism is not a religion 
but a culture and can hence be nothing but secular. Nevertheless, the Hindu nationalists 
simultaneously heavily criticized the secularism practiced by the Congress, as they saw 
it as special treatment or appeasement of minorities (Bhatt 2001: 168-9).  Much of the 
BJP’s rise can also be attributed to several events that the Sangh Parivar exploited in 
order to convince the public that Hinduism was “under siege”. These events included 
the Shah Bano case, a Supreme Court ruling about a Muslim woman’s right to alimony 
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that Rajiv Gandhi overturned in 1985 in the face of mass protests from the Muslim 
community who saw the ruling as infringing the Muslim personal law (India still to date 
does not have uniform personal code, but instead several ones), and the mass 
conversions of Dalits (untouchables) to Islam in Tamil Nadu.  
In addition, the Sangh Parivar decided to launch several popular campaigns in the 80s 
and early 90s, one of them being VHP’s Ekamata Yagna (“sacrifice for unity”) which 
was a ritual procession around India (interestingly starting off from Nepal), symbolizing 
the unity of all Hindus. Another such campaign was the Ramjanmabhoomi movement 
for rebuilding the temple of Ram in Ayodhya in a place where a medieval mosque, the 
Babri Masjid, stood. The Hindu nationalists claimed that the mosque had been built on 
the ruins of a temple that allegedly marked the birthplace of the god Ram. In 1990 L.K. 
Advani, the second leader of the BJP, decided to launch a rath yatra, a procession 
where he traveled around India in a jeep that was decorated as Ram’s chariot, ending 
the journey in Ayodhya with the aim of diverting attention from the emerging caste 
based mobilizations and concentrating on emphasizing the idea of Hindu unity 
(Jaffrelot 1996: 431). Most of these processions had a distinctively anti-Muslim 
character to them as they symbolically excluded Muslims from the concept of Hindu 
India, and communal violence often followed in their wake (van der Veer 1996: 260). 
In 1992 the long campaign for rebuilding the Ram temple culminated in the demolition 
of the Babri Masjid by Sangh Parivar cadres, which led to massive communal violence, 
Muslim outrage all over the Subcontinent and a subsequent (although again temporary) 
ban of the RSS. After the Babri Masjid demolition the BJP was forced to adopt a more 
moderate stance in some ways. The party rose to power in 1998 and it started to 
advocate economic liberalization, in contradiction to RSS philosophy (Bhatt 2001: 176-
7). Nevertheless, while the rhetoric of some of the national leaders of the BJP may have 
become somewhat diluted, the RSS remains behind the scenes and many of the BJP’s 
important figures are swayamsevaks.  
The rise of the BJP to national mainstream coincided with two of the worst instances of 
communal violence in the history of independent India, with the Muslim minority 
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bearing the brunt of Hindutva wrath. The first large-scale attacks were in the aftermath 
of the Babri Masjid demolition and the second serious incidence was witnessed in 2002 
in the state of Gujarat. There is sufficient evidence to conclude that the Gujarat violence 
that resulted in the deaths of at least 2,000 Muslims was largely pre-meditated and even 
state sponsored (for example Spodek 2010; Nussbaum 2007). The police did little to 
stop the attacks on Muslims, and Hindutva leaders were making inflammatory 
statements. The Gujarat state government, led by Narendra Modi of the BJP, and many 
of the national BJP leaders saw the mass murders and rapes as “action-reaction”, 
referring to an incident in Godhra where a train carriage full of kar sevaks (Sangh 
Parivar activists) had burst in flames, killing 59 passengers after a confrontation with 
Muslims. The BJP’s Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the Prime Minister of India at the time, in 
fact stated that “The subsequent events (the massacres of Muslims) were no doubt 
condemnable, but who lit the fire?” (Quoted in Spodek 2010: 350) There is, however, 
evidence that the fire might even have been accidental (ibid. 351). The most significant 
aspect of the Gujarat pogrom is that ten years later Narendra Modi, who is widely 
accused of having instructed the police not to interfere in the violence, is still the Chief 
Minister of Gujarat and very few of the masterminds behind the violence have been 
convicted. In 2004 the BJP was voted out of power from the union government, but it is 
still in majority in many states, including Gujarat, and forms the biggest opposition 
party at the national level.    
1.2. Hindu Nationalism in Nepal 
1.2.1. Prithvi Narayan Shah and the asali Hindustan 
Unlike India with its experiences of foreign rule (first Muslim and subsequently 
colonial) and post-Independence secularism, Nepal’s history up until recently was 
characterized by a Hindu king’s reign over a Hindu state. It was indeed this Hindu-ness 
that was used to define Nepal as a unified kingdom when the people inhabiting the 
eastern areas of Nepal were first brought under the rule of a single monarch, Prithvi 
Narayan Shah (1723-1775) of the Gorkha kingdom in the late 18th century. Before this 
military conquest, the area that now comprises Nepal was made up of 48 smaller 
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kingdoms of different ethnic groups. Nepal has long been a multi-ethnic area with 
various groups of mainly Tibeto-Burman and Indo-Aryan decent practicing different 
religions and speaking a myriad of languages. It is hard to date when all the ethnic 
groups arrived in the region, but it is quite clear that many of the Tibeto-Burman groups 
were there before the Nepali-speaking Indo-Aryans (Whelpton 2008: 11). The Indo-
Aryans that settled in the Nepalese Hills were mainly high caste migrants from 
Northern India who were fleeing the Muslim conquest of the Ganges plains. They 
brought with them a form of Hinduism that Sharma (1992) calls “defensive Hinduism” 
due to the fact that their entry into the Hills was motivated by a will to protect their 
religion (ibid. 267). This defensive Hinduism set the tone for the politics of Nepal for 
the centuries to come as the Hindu rulers conquered more and more areas and finally 
united all the scattered kingdoms. By the time of Prithvi Narayan Shah’s death the 
kingdom of Gorkha comprised all of what is today Eastern Nepal and parts of Sikkim. 
Later in 1816 a border was drawn to the south after a war with the British colonial 
forces. The Gorkha conquest was therefore not only the point in history where the 
foundations for a unified state of Nepal were laid, but also the beginning of Hindu high 
caste Nepali speakers’ rule over other ethnic and religious groups.   
What Prithvi Narayan Shah, the first king from the Shah dynasty, came to be perhaps 
best known for, is his description of Nepal as the asali Hindustan, the real or genuine 
land of Hindus. The reason why Prithvi saw his kingdom as somehow more genuinely 
or purely Hindu than India can be put down to the fact that India was being ruled by 
non-Hindus at the time. Already before the Gorkha conquest, the inhabitants of the 
Hills referred to the Ganges plains as “Muglan”, a land ruled and defiled by the Muslim 
Moguls (Sharma 2002: 24). It is clear, therefore, that the Hindu-ness of the state was of 
immense importance to the unifier of Nepal. This Hindu-ness was in part nurtured by an 
alliance between the kings and the Brahmin priests who played an important role as 
advisors on secular matters. They interpreted the dharmashastras (texts relating to 
religious and legal duties in Hinduism), and this created a symbiotic relationship 
between the rulers and the priests in Nepal - something that would continue all the way 
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into the 21st century (ibid.).  In this way the Hindu way of governance was continued in 
Nepal, while in India the Hindu kingdoms fell first to Muslim rulers and then to the 
British. Many Hindu nationalists today like to see the Gorkha conquest particularly in 
this religious light and refer to Prithvi as the “savior of Hinduism” (Bouillier 1997: 92). 
This Hindu character of the state and more importantly of the monarch himself was the 
source of legitimacy for the Shah rulers. In Hindu tradition, the king is seen to derive 
his authority from a divine source, which in turn makes him “a sovereign lord, a 
protector of territory and subjects, a guardian of moral order, an upholder of traditions, 
and the source of all spiritual and temporal power” (P.R. Sharma 2008: 475). In this 
sense, the king also exercised ritual authority in a socio-religious realm in addition to 
the authority his political powers granted him. Hence, the Hindu-ness of the king was of 
immense importance for the purity and order of this realm. As the Maratha kingdom in 
India fell to the British in 1817, the Gorkhalis became the only independent Hindu 
rulers in the Subcontinent, and this greatly increased the importance of this former 
periphery in a spiritual sense. Suddenly, the Gorkha kingdom was the “terrestrial center 
of the universe” in the realm of Hinduism (Burghart 1984: 104-6). This conception of 
Nepal as the last Hindu kingdom in the world was from now on central to the self-
identification of the state.      
Since the rulers gained their legitimacy from Hinduism, it is no surprise, then, that the 
Hinduization of the conquered people in Nepal became “the raison d’être of the 
Gorkhali state”, as Harka Gurung puts it (2008: 501). The process of spreading 
Hinduism to all corners of the kingdom intensified in the period after the unification of 
the state, and it was done for the single purpose of homogenizing the cultural and 
religious diversity prevalent in the area. The idea was to construct a pan-Gorkhali 
identity, defined by the Nepali language and the Hill version of Hinduism, something 
which was specifically used to create a difference to the Hinduism practiced in the 
plains of India (Dastider 2007: 16-17). There is, however, quite a lot of disagreement 
among scholars as to whether this Hinduization was as aggressive as some make it out 
to be, or whether it happened more in a melting-pot manner (Hachhethu 2003a). 
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Nevertheless, the construction of a homogenous Nepali identity was to continue hand in 
hand with further isolation and imposed casteism in the Rana period that followed in 
the 19th century.  
1.2.2. The Ranas and the Muluki Ain 
The transition to the autocratic rule of the Ranas happened in 1846 as Jang Bahadur 
Rana (1816-1877) rose to the Prime Minister’s position, took himself the title of 
“maharaja” and put the royal Shah family under house arrest. The Rana period lasted 
over a hundred years and was characterized by hereditary, dictatorial Prime Minister’s 
rule (although by title the Ranas were also monarchs) and rigidly imposed casteism - a 
step that now followed the Hinduization process started in the previous century 
(Hachhethu 2003a: 223). This casteism was enforced by introducing a set of 
hierarchical laws based on the Hindu caste system in 1854. The rationale behind 
creating this kind of a legal codex, known as the Muluki Ain, was most probably to 
further unify and integrate the different ethnicities, but in practice the laws, of course, 
only served to create more and more sharp inequalities among the people. As 
Hachhethu puts it, the legal code “translated diversity into inequality” (ibid.).   
The Muluki Ain indeed worked as a kind of division of the Nepalese society by 
ascribing all the different ethnic and religious groups a place in the Hindu caste system. 
Punishments were awarded on the basis of caste status – lower castes receiving harsher 
punishments than higher ones. The Muluki Ain divided the people into four varnas and 
36 jats, ranging from the pure highest castes to the impure untouchables. The Muslims, 
for example, were ascribed the status of the second lowest, impure, but still touchable 
Sudra caste. The Tibeto-Burman ethnic groups were mostly placed in the middle, in the 
Matwali caste, although some groups like the Magars were considered equal to the 
Chetris (Kshatriyas), the second highest warrior caste. The highest ranking was of 
course reserved for the Bahun (Brahmin) priestly caste. In this way, the laws at the 
same time brought the entire Nepalese society under a single legal system based on 
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orthodox Hindu notions and also consolidated the power of the ruling class over its 
subjects. 
Since casteism became so central to the homogenization efforts and the entire 
legitimacy of the Ranas, the Hindu reform movements that were gaining popularity in 
Northern India at the time were actively prevented from entering Nepal. Among these 
reform movements was, of course, the predecessor of the Hindutva ideology, Arya 
Samaj, which opposed the traditional view of the caste system. An office of the 
organization was opened in Kathmandu by Madhav Raj Joshi in 1896, but Joshi was 
quickly put behind bars, beaten publicly and forced into exile into Darjeeling. A similar 
fate awaited others who later tried to launch the organization under the Ranas, with one 
of these Arya Samajists even ending up hanged in 1941. This illustrates firstly the 
importance that maintaining the caste system carried for the polity, and secondly the 
fear the Ranas felt towards anything that might weaken their rule (Toffin 2006: 232). In 
this way, Nepal resisted the developments that were taking place inside Hinduism in 
India and further asserted its identity as a more pure Hindu country than its neighbor 
India.  
The purity of Hindu Nepal was further underlined by imposing a ban on cow slaughter 
and prohibiting foreigners from entering the country, especially Christian missionaries. 
Jang Bahadur Rana himself wrote that “We have our own country, a Hindu Rajya, 
where laws prescribe the cows shall not be slaughtered; nor women and Brahmins be 
sentenced to capital punishment… In this age of Kali this is the only country where 
Hindus rule.” (Quoted in Sharma 2002: 25) Protecting cows and Brahmins was, thus, 
seen as central to the purity of the state. The importance of the holy cow to the rulers of 
the country is already apparent in the etymology of the word Gorkha which is derived 
from the Sanskrit word goraksha meaning a cow protector. In fact, the name of the state 
was only changed from Gorkha into Nepal (a Newari word formerly describing only the 
Kathmandu Valley) by the Ranas in 1909 (Gellner 2008: 5). Axel Michaels (2008) 
argues that the cow was often used as a symbol to promote Hinduization and national 
integration, but at the same time enforcing the ban on cow slaughter very strictly “could 
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(and, in fact did) endanger Nepal’s political cohesion” (ibid. 81). As some of the 
Tibeto-Burman groups and Muslims traditionally eat beef, a complete ban could have 
worked against the rulers’ interest by turning these groups against them. Hence, keeping 
Nepal “pure” and untouched by outside influences (whether Hindu reformist or 
Christian) and thus maintaining national unity were the first and foremost priorities of 
the Ranas.  As mentioned, the Ranas did not allow foreigners to enter the country, and 
along with this came a ban on conversions – a law that came to be the most important 
symbol of the Hindu-ness of the state (S. Sharma 2002: 30).  
A movement to topple the autocracy of the Ranas started to gain momentum towards 
the 1950s, especially among the Nepalese who had gone to India to study. As it 
happened, the Ranas could certainly prevent foreigners from entering Nepal, but they 
could not stop the Nepalese from leaving the country and being influenced by the 
movements and ideologies that had become popular in India. In the mid-40s India was 
on the verge of independence and the Congress-led movement naturally inspired the 
Nepalese who wished to see an end to the oppression practiced by the Ranas. Many 
Nepalese even took part in the Indian Independence struggle (Gellner 2007: 52).  
Simultaneously, as it started to become clear that it would be the secular Congress 
leading the independent India in future, the Ranas started to feel insecure. They had 
consistently sided with the British Raj, aided them in trying to oppress the 
independence movement and they knew now that they would not find a friendly ally in 
Nehru’s future government. Hence, the Ranas turned to the Hindu Mahasabha. B.S. 
Moonje and V.D. Savarkar of the Mahasabha had indeed already approached the 
Nepalese rulers and a set of Indian princes to form an alliance in 1938 (Copland 2002: 
221). The following year Juddha Shamsher J.B. Rana had visited Northern India and 
the Mahasabha’s newspaper the Hindu Outlook had praised the maharaja to the skies by 
calling him a “powerful, popular and gracious Ruler with the true spirit of ‘Hindutva’ 
invigorating his veins” (quoted in Michaels 2008: 93). Subsequently the Mahasabha’s 
press became the Ranas’ avenue to present their views in India. In 1945 the Ranas even 
hosted B.S. Moonje in Kathmandu where he was allowed to hold a series of lectures at 
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the Trichandra College (Joshi and Rose 1966: 61). Thus, the relationship between the 
pro-Hindutva forces of India and the Nepalese rulers had been initiated. 
1.2.3. The Panchayat Era and the Turn Towards Hindutva 
The newly developed alliance between Nepal and the Hindu nationalists of India was 
briefly stalled when King Tribhuvan (1906-1955), a direct descendant of Prithvi 
Narayan Shah, decided to side with secular forces in order to overthrow the Ranas. He 
fled to India in 1950 from his house arrest in Kathmandu where the kings had remained 
all throughout the Rana rule. The Nepalese people who had chosen to go into exile to 
India had started political parties there, the Nepali Congress being the most important 
one of them. After maneuvering an armed coup with the Nepalese parties in India the 
king returned to Kathmandu in 1951. The elite protest movement against the Ranas was 
mainly based in the new democratic values that the exiled Nepalese had acquired in 
India, but it also drew on the Arya Samaj ideology, especially on questions about 
equality and social justice (Whelpton 2005: 79).  
The overthrow of the Ranas hence brought the Shah dynasty back in power and opened 
the country up to outside influences. The following decade was a time of power 
struggles and quickly changing governments. The interim constitution of 1951 still, 
however, rested the supreme executive powers with the king, and it was only in 1959 
after general elections that the first democratic constitution of Nepal was promulgated. 
This decade of democratic experiments also saw ethnic and cultural assertions coming 
to the fore, and religious minorities started to organize themselves - albeit only for the 
short period of time that democracy was to last in Nepal (Dastider 2007: 143-5). It was 
Tribhuvan’s son Mahendra (1920-1972) who a few years after his father’s mysterious 
death dismissed the elected government and took full control in 1960. Claiming that 
parliamentary democracy was alien to Nepal, he promulgated a new constitution in 
1962 which made Nepal a party-less “Panchayat democracy”. This system was based 
on town and village councils from which a Rashtriya Panchayat (national legislature) 
was chosen. This legislature had, however, little power over the king’s decisions, and 
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the entire system was in practice designed so that power could be exercised from above 
(Hoftun 1993: 14).  
The new constitution of Mahendra defined the country for the first time as a 
monarchical Hindu state, something which had not been explicitly mentioned before. 
The Hindu-ness of Nepal was thus reinvigorated and the nascent pluralism of the past 
decade was deliberately stalled. Still, at the same time the old caste-based Muluki Ain 
from the 19th century was done away with and replaced by a new one in 1963. In order 
to secure his support the king was forced to take a progressive stance and remove all 
legal recognition of caste and laws based on it (P.R. Sharma 2004: 165). This marked 
the beginning of promoting a slightly reformed type of Hinduism by the state 
(Hachhethu 2003b), even though this development was largely superficial. It is quite 
clear that Mahendra was reluctant to make these changes into the law, and from now on 
instead of talking about caste, the state became the defender of “local traditions”, 
something which in a roundabout way referred to the caste system all the same 
(Burghart 1994: 5). Also, even though the constitution now recognized Nepal as a 
nation of “…the Nepali people, irrespective of religion, race, caste or tribe” (quoted in 
Sharma 2002: 26) and “unity in diversity” became the standard rhetoric of the nation, a 
strong Hindu bias continued to dominate the politics. For example, the killing of cows 
was punishable with up to 12 years of imprisonment (Höfer 2004: 188). The unity the 
regime was talking about seemed to only be achievable through suppression of the 
differences and promotion of the culture of the ruling elite, as had been the case before 
(Pfaff-Czarnecka 2008: 434). In other words, the power remained concentrated in the 
hands of the high caste Paharis whose culture, language and religious practices were to 
be emulated by others.  
The old tradition of seeking legitimacy from Hindu nationalism was thus continued by 
Mahendra, albeit in a new form which now no longer saw the socio-religious Hindu 
movements of India as a threat but rather as possible allies. The new seemingly 
egalitarian position of the palace was indeed taken in much the same ambiguous fashion 
as by the Sangh Parivar, whose discourse rejects casteism, but simultaneously promotes 
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a highly Sanskritized and Brahminical version of Hinduism. The purpose of this is to 
consolidate the Hindu society rather than to reform it in an egalitarian spirit (Hansen 
1999: 121-2).1 As Hachhethu (2003b) points out, Hindu nationalism was always 
promoted by the kings when they had little public support, and it was indeed in the 
Panchayat era that Nepal was vigorously advertized as “the world’s only Hindu state”. 
The logic behind this was twofold: firstly, to differentiate Nepal from the newly secular 
India and, secondly, to cultivate support from the neighboring country’s Hindu 
nationalists, especially the RSS and the VHP (Gurung 2008: 505). One of Mahedra’s 
greatest fears was the threat posed by a possible alliance between the secular forces in 
both countries and he undoubtedly felt compelled to find a strong support network from 
across the border to secure his stay in power (Hachhethu 2003b). This is where the 
Indian Hindutva organizations proved to be the perfect solution, and strong ties were 
created between them and the palace. And indeed, Tulsi Giri, the first prime minister 
that King Mahendra appointed, was a former RSS volunteer (Dahal 2006). The 
relationship between the Nepalese monarch and the Sangh Parivar of India was 
mutually beneficial: the king let the organizations now spread their networks into Nepal 
and the Sangh Parivar in turn vowed to protect the monarchy.  The Hindu nationalists 
of India have indeed long been looking to Nepal as a fulfillment of their own dreams of 
creating a Hindu Rashtra (nation) and drew great consolation from the fact that such a 
state was in fact in existence right across the border (P.R. Sharma 2004: 295). Nepal is 
often also seen as a part of the greater or undivided India, akhand bharat, by the Indian 
Hindu nationalists, which further explains their agenda in Nepal.  
Even though Hindutva had now officially entered Nepal, the Sangh Parivar’s influence 
in the country seems to have largely remained limited to the palace. The Indian 
organizations did not feel the need to start a massive campaign to mobilize the Nepalese 
                                                            
1The upper caste bias of Hindutva is of course already apparent in the history of the ideology, but a good 
example of it in recent times is also the visibility of the Sangh Parivar in the 1990 protests opposing the 
implementation of the Mandal Commission Report which recommended that the reservations enshrined in the 
Indian Constitution for Scheduled Castes in public sector employment and higher education should also be 
extended to “other backward classes” (OBCs). This would have significantly increased the percentage of 
lower castes in these fields that had traditionally been the stronghold of upper castes (Bhatt 2001: 171, Basu et 
al. 1993: 89).  
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public because Hinduism seemed protected under the king’s rule. On the other hand the 
Sangh Parivar was also not yet as powerful in India in the 60s as it would come to be 
from the 80s onwards. The 80s was a time when the situation in Nepal also started to 
change. Mahendra’s son Birendra had become the king in 1972, and it was after heavy 
student protests erupted in the year 1979 against the Panchayat rule that King Birendra 
was forced to agree to hold a referendum and let the people decide between multi-party 
democracy and an amended Panchayat constitution. Even though the slightly reformed 
Panchayat system narrowly won, the ruling class was undoubtedly starting to feel less 
secure in its position. As a result, there was a sudden increase in projects undertaken by 
the Nepalese palace that were designed to “reinvigorate” Hinduism and to secure the 
position of the monarchy. One of these projects was Queen Aishwarya’s Sanatana 
Dharma Seva Samiti, an organization which officially aimed to expand and redefine 
Hinduism but which in practice only propagated a highly orthodox and ritualistic form 
of the religion (Sharma 1992: 274). Another such organization was the Pashupati Area 
Development Trust (PADT) where the queen was acting as the chairperson. The most 
important one was, however, the Vishwa Hindu Mahasangh or the World Hindu 
Federation (WHF), which the king founded in 1981 with the support of the Indian RSS. 
This organization was supposed to be a global federation of all the Hindu organizations 
in the world, but in practice it turned out to be completely dependent on its Indian 
counterpart, the VHP (Jha 2007b).  In 1988 the WHF and VHP crowned King Birendra 
the Vishwa Hindu Samrat, the Emperor of all the Hindus of the world, which seemed to 
be an attempt to extend his symbolic legitimacy across Nepal’s borders.   
Despite this increase in Hindutva-oriented projects and the deepening relations between 
the palace and the Indian Sangh Parivar, the organizations’ presence at the grassroots 
level in Nepal remained quite small. Hence, most of the Hindu nationalists’ activities in 
the 1980s had only symbolic value and were simply aimed at securing the position of 
the monarchy. This was in stark contrast to the RSS’s campaign in India where the 
society was being organized from the ground up with an attempt to penetrate all areas 
of public life in order to establish a Hindu Rashtra. The organizations’ presence in 
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Nepal started to only increase in the 1990s as a popular movement overthrew the 
Panchayat regime and suddenly the Hindu attribute of the country came heavily under 
question.  
1.2.4. From the People’s Movement to a People’s War 
The reasons why public resistance to the Panchayat regime began to mount towards the 
end of the 1980s were many but much of it was based on economic factors (Whelpton 
2005: 109). India had imposed a trade embargo on Nepal in 1989 and there was 
growing discontent at the government’s inability to solve the situation. The opposition 
parties seized this opportunity to launch a protest movement to topple the Panchayat, 
drawing inspiration from the simultaneous revolutions in Eastern Europe (Hoftun 1993: 
16). The 1990s saw ethnic politics and questions about religion entering public debate 
for the first time, but the mass uprising that overthrew the Panchayat in 1990 and forced 
the king to give up much of his power was not particularly religiously or ethnically 
motivated. The demonstrations that had started in February 1990 were mainly led by 
students and party supporters, demanding an end to the ban on political parties. The 
opposition parties did not, however, direct the protests against the king himself, but the 
Panchayat system which guaranteed the monarch his absolute power. In this way, the 
symbolic value the king held for the unity of the country could be left untouched, and it 
was only his political powers that came under question (ibid. 15). As a result of the 
heavy protests that later came to be known as the People’s Movement, King Birendra 
had to finally end the Panchayat system and legalize political parties in April of the 
same year.  
As the interim government was being formed, questions about language, ethnicity and 
suddenly also religion came to the fore. There had been a gradual growth of ethnic and 
religious consciousness and a growing opposition to the Hindu state in the last years of 
the Panchayat when the reforms had permitted some space for such sentiments. Now in 
the post-revolution power vacuum these sentiments translated into several violent 
incidents and the formation of numerous ethnic and regional parties (ibid. 23). This is 
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also when the Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), the political mouthpiece of the pro-
Hindu kingdom forces made up of mainly former Panchayat-era politicians, was 
formed, along with the Shiv Sena Nepal, a militant right wing Hindutva party operating 
much in the same fashion as its Indian counterpart in the state of Maharashtra23. As the 
drafting of the new constitution drew closer, the religious sentiments started to boil 
over. The main question was the status of the country: would the new democratic 
constitution define Nepal as a secular state or would it remain Hindu? The country 
faced mass demonstrations both for secularism and against it in the months leading to 
the promulgation of the constitution. For the first time the voices of religious minorities 
such as Muslims and Christians were also heard, and the Buddhists emerged as an 
independent force separate from the Hindus. The minorities wanted the state to be 
secular, and much to the shock of the Hindus the Buddhists also joined the Muslims and 
Christians in these demands. The Buddhist resistance to the Hindu state was based on 
the fact that also they had been persecuted by the state, especially during the Rana rule, 
for not being Hindu. This was something the Hindu majority was, and still is, quite 
ignorant about (Sharma 2002: 32). The demands of the religious minorities greatly 
unnerved the more conservative Hindus, especially the Hindutva-oriented ones (Hoftun, 
Reaper and Whelpton 1999: 312-13).   
The issue was, however, not simply secularism, but also religious freedom. The mass 
mobilization in the name of religion started when the small Nepalese Christian 
community held a public meeting in Kathmandu and demanded the release of religious 
prisoners and the declaration of a secular state. The Communists and many members of 
the interim cabinet agreed that Nepal should, in fact, no longer be a Hindu state and 
proceeded to release the prisoners. The response from the orthodox Hindu community 
was strong. The release was seen by the World Hindu Federation as having “hurt the 
                                                            
2 The Indian Shiv Sena, a particularly violent and “thuggish” Maharashtra-based political party, is distinct 
from the Sangh Parivar, although it endorses the Hindu nationalist ideology and has formed an alliance with 
the BJP. 
3 Later in 1999 the party split into two factions: the original Shiv Sena Nepal led by Arun Subedi and Nepal 
Shiv Sena led by Kiran Singh Budhathoki. The latter has retained links with the Maharashtrian party, while 
the Subedi-led one denies any such connections.  
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feelings of 95% of the Nepalese people” (ibid. 314) and Achyut Raj Regmi, one of the 
founding members of the WHF, even threatened to place himself in front of the gates of 
the Pashupatinath temple and start a hunger strike (Bouillier 1997: 92). Many outraged 
statements were made, and around five to six thousand people took part in a protest 
march opposing secularism. The next day, 25-30,000 Buddhists demonstrated in favor 
of secularism, which again took the Hindus by complete surprise. At this point, most of 
the political parties were starting to seriously consider adopting secularism. However, 
the pro-Hindutva forces were not going to give in so easily:  in August L.K. Advani, the 
leader of the Hindutva-oriented BJP from India, came to Nepal to pressure the interim 
government to keep Nepal a Hindu state (Hoftun, Reaper and Whelpton 1999: 315). In 
November, after much debate, King Birendra announced the new constitution, which 
defined Nepal as “a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual (---) Hindu, constitutional monarchical 
kingdom” (quoted in Hutt 1991: 1035). It prohibited discrimination and granted the 
freedom to practice one’s religion, but simultaneously it illegalized conversions and 
made no mention of Nepal also being a multi-religious state. Hence, the Hindutva 
forces had gained the upper hand. Linguistic and ethnic concerns went also largely 
unheard, as the Constitution Recommendations Commission had considered taking up 
such issues as “unfortunate” and discarded them as “peripheral” (Hutt 1991: 1028). 
Although now a constitutional monarchy, confusion about the king’s role vis-à-vis the 
government also continued, and rumors about a planned coup were circulating from 
time to time.  
Even though the Sangh Parivar affiliated forces had won this round, it seems they were 
no longer feeling quite as secure as before. After all, the king no longer had absolute 
power and the mass demonstrations had proved that quite a powerful opposition to a 
Hindu Rashtra was in fact in existence. It was perhaps because of these concerns that a 
Nepalese branch of the RSS was launched in 1992 under the name of Hindu 
Swayamsevak Sangh (HSS).4 Various other Hindutva-affiliated organizations also 
sprung up and several WHF conferences were held in the 1990s. Achyut Raj Regmi 
                                                            
4 This is not only the name given to the Nepalese branch but also to the branches of the RSS based in 
Diaspora communities abroad, for example in the US (Nussbaum 2007: 305). 
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proposed in one of these meetings that Nepal should be declared a “Conversion 
Exclusion Zone” (Bouillier 1997:95). The “Christian threat” started to appear more 
frequently in the speeches held by the pro-Hindutva forces: for example Ashok Singhal, 
the President of both the VHP and the WHF’s Indian chapter at the time, remarked on 
his visit to Nepal how the country was becoming a victim of Christian aggression in the 
guise of NGO activities (S. Sharma 2004: 131). Achyut Raj Regmi even admitted to 
having threatened the director of the United Mission in Nepal by warning him of “the 
force of the stick” of his Hindu cadres (Bouillier 1997: 95). The Hindutva-rhetoric was 
now clearly becoming both louder and more hostile in Nepal. This period also 
coincided with the Ram Janmabhoomi movement led by the BJP party and the rest of 
the Sangh Parivar in India which had led to the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992 
in Ayodhya, not far from the Nepalese border. As the RSS was subsequently banned in 
India, many Hindu extremists crossed the border into the Nepalese Terai (S. Sharma 
2004: 119-120). These developments planted the seeds for a slow rise in Hindu 
extremist sentiments in Nepal – especially in the Terai region.     
Meanwhile, dissatisfaction was growing among those left out of the constitution 
drafting process, namely the ethnic and regional parties and a previously unknown 
extreme faction of the Communists, the Communist Party of Nepal –Maoist (CPN-
Maoist), led by Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) and Baburam Bhattarai. This small 
party had boycotted the 1994 elections because the Election Commission had not 
recognized their faction (Lawoti 2005:46-49). In 1996 the Maoist party gave the 
Congress -led government a list of 40 demands, listing concerns like poverty, 
discrimination and the domination of foreign capital in Nepal, but the most important 
issues on their agenda were clearly ethnic/linguistic equality and secularism. The party 
threatened the state with civil war if these demands were not met and indeed, soon after 
the Maoists launched a “People’s War” against the government and monarchy which 
would in the course of the next ten years claim the lives of more than 16,000 people.  
1.2.5. Towards the End of Monarchy 
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Five years after the beginning of the People’s War the Nepalese were in for a tragedy 
that shook the entire nation. The Maoist conflict had kept on intensifying towards the 
beginning of the 21st century and the “People’s Army” had gathered a large support 
base from some of the ethnic minorities and Dalits. Although being one of the only 
parties that addressed the concerns of these groups, the Maoist leadership was mainly 
high caste Pahari and the party also enjoyed a considerable amount of support among 
college students (Lawoti 2005: 44). The People’s Army was waging a guerilla war 
towards the capital with the aim of establishing a communist state and toppling the 
monarchy. In the midst of this, the news about the royal massacre on the 1st of June 
2001 brought ever increasing feelings of instability into the country. It is difficult to 
establish what exactly took place at the family dinner in the Narayanhiti Palace because 
no post-mortem investigations were conducted and the palace strictly controlled all the 
information that was given to the media. Nevertheless, according to the official story 
King Birendra, Queen Aishwarya and seven other members of the royal family were 
shot dead by the crown prince Dipendra due to what is said to have been disagreement 
about the prince’s choice of a fiancée (Whelpton 2005: 211-216). Dipendra also 
apparently shot himself to the head and he later died in the hospital. Curiously, the 
king’s brother Gyanendra had been out of town on that evening and his son Paras 
survived the shooting spree with only minor injuries while King Birendra’s immediate 
family was entirely wiped out. As it was the brother Gyanendra who was crowned the 
next king, it is perhaps not surprising that many had a hard time accepting the official 
version of the story, and various conspiracy theories started to circulate. 
The royal massacre changed the public’s relation to the institution of monarchy for 
good. Gyanendra had always been seen as a hardliner inside the palace, and it is said 
that he had been trying to urge his brother not to give into the demands of the pro-
democracy protestors in 1990 (ibid. 215). In addition, the fact that Gyanendra’s 
ascendance to the throne was not exactly in line with tradition, he now clearly faced a 
legitimacy problem. Hence, Gyanendra proceeded to use the same old tactic of actively 
promoting Hindu nationalism and sought the support of the Indian Hindutva 
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organizations (Hachhethu 2003b). Indeed, Gyanendra made numerous visits to religious 
places in India and cultivated a close relationship with the WHF, the chairman of which 
happened to be his personal aide-de-camp Bharat Keshari Simha (Toffin 2006: 231). 
Gyanendra was also crowned the Emperor of all Hindus by the WHF, like his brother 
before him.   
In 2002, only a year after ascending the throne, Gyanendra started to gradually take 
over power from the government by dismissing the prime minister and assuming 
executive powers. This obviously resulted in a confrontation with the major political 
parties like the Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal, United Marxist Leninist 
(UML) that had previously been in favor of maintaining constitutional monarchy 
(Hachhethu n.d.: 10). After 2002, the traditional religious legitimacy of the king came 
increasingly under attack from almost all sides (Toffin 2006: 233). As a response to this 
the 7th World Hindu Conference held by the WHF in 2003 in the Indian town of 
Gorakhpur passed a resolution to protect the monarchy of Nepal (Hachhethu 2003). It 
was in 2005 that Gyanendra proceeded to take full control of the government, declared 
emergency and started to rule the country in an absolutist and authoritarian manner. The 
human rights situation deteriorated in the country rapidly as control over media, forced 
disappearances and custodial killings became commonplace (ICG 2005). The WHF and 
the Indian VHP were of course quick to jump to Gyanendra’s support, while the 
international community strongly condemned the coup (Jha 2005). Later the chairman 
of WHF and aide-de-camp of the king, Bharat Keshari Simha, received a large amount 
of funding from the palace to organize a rally with sadhus (Hindu holy men) preaching 
to the public that democracy is against the principles of Hinduism. It was in the 
backdrop of all this that most political parties (the royalist parties like RPP being the 
obvious exceptions) started demanding secularism again (Toffin 2006: 231). The parties 
had undoubtedly grown weary of the nexus between the palace and the Hindutva forces.  
Gyanendra’s politics and a ruthless crackdown on the Maoist insurgents pushed the 
parties to form a Seven-Party Alliance (SPA), from which the RPP was absent, and start 
direct negotiations with the CPN-(Maoist) leaders a year after the coup. This resulted in 
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an agreement, and the two forces launched a popular movement to restore democracy, 
which later came to be known as the Jana Andolan II, or the Second People’s 
Movement. From the 9th of April 2006 the streets were filled with millions of 
demonstrators all over the country for 19 days, and subsequently Gyanendra was forced 
to capitulate and restore the parliament. The king was then stripped of his 
administrative powers and the country was quickly declared secular on the 18th of May 
2006. Hindu monarchy, hence, had come to be seen as the biggest obstacle to 
democracy in Nepal, both by the political parties as also by the majority of the people 
(Hachhethu, Kumar and Subedi 2008: 2-3). In November a Comprehensive Peace 
Accord was signed between the SPA and the CPN-(Maoist) which finally ended the 
decade old conflict. The fate of the monarchy was decided after Constituent Assembly 
(CA) elections in 2008 in which the Maoists quite unexpectedly won the largest amount 
of seats. Nepal was declared a secular republic and Gyanendra was forced to vacate the 
Narayanhiti palace. Despite many cries for help by the Nepalese Hindutva forces, even 
the Indian Sangh Parivar that had been weakened by an electoral defeat in 2004 could 
not come to the Hindu monarchy’s rescue.  
At the time of the writing, four years have passed since the elections, and the CA has 
failed to promulgate a new constitution, having extended the deadline several times. 
New elections have been called for November 2012, the CA has been dissolved and the 
country seems to find itself in a serious political crisis. During the past four years there 
were frequent resignations by Prime Ministers, the Maoists left the government and 
returned again and split into factions and emerged again unified under the name of 
Unified Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist (UCPN-M). Overall, the peace appeared 
fragile, although there was some progress made recently in initiating the integration of 
the Maoist combatants into the Nepalese Army. One of the issues that was significantly 
slowing down the constitution writing process and in the end was the reason for the 
CA’s failure is a debate about federalism and more precisely on how and if the state 
should be restructured (ICG 2011: 1). Ethnicity or identity-based federalism is bitterly 
opposed by royalists and other formerly dominating groups who seem intimidated by 
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the demands made by many Janajati groups and Madheshis who have been at the 
forefront of demanding greater representation in the state apparatus. The Madheshi 
question especially has been a topic of much debate after an interim constitution was 
promulgated in 2007 and heavy protests erupted in the Terai, forcing the government to 
amend it. The present political chaos has once again stalled the constitution writing 
process, and might create a favorable climate for the royalists and other pro-Hindu 
nationalist forces.  
1.2.6. Exclusion and Inter-religious Harmony 
Ever since the 1990s the image of Nepal as an ethnically and religiously harmonious 
state has become tarnished. The mobilization that was witnessed in the name of 
secularism in the months leading to the promulgation of the 1990’s constitution spoke 
volumes of the religious minorities’ underlying resentment towards the dominant 
position of Hinduism, and the Maoist insurgency had a strong ethnic and caste 
dimension to it. The carefully constructed mono-cultural Nepali nationalism based on 
the Nepali language and Hindu religion became hence challenged by minorities who 
started to assert their own individual identities, based on ethnicity, religion and culture. 
Minorities’ assertiveness becomes a problem for nationalist narratives, because it 
undermines a nation’s claim to being a homogenous whole (Appadurai 2006). As 
Lawoti (2005) points out, the Maoist insurgency highlights the fact that political 
exclusion can lead to violent conflict. Excluded groups are especially prone to violence 
in an open society where they are able to voice their demands, but due to a highly 
centralized nature of the government they are unable to affect any changes into their 
situation. This was the scenario in the post-1990s Nepal (ibid. 39-40). In addition to 
ignoring ethnic and regional grievances, the constitution of 1990 also failed to fully 
address the concerns the religious minorities had voiced during the pro-secularism 
protests, and it continued to describe Nepal as a Hindu state. Nevertheless, the state’s 
stance towards religious minorities changed slightly, as religious prisoners were 
released and the law that illegalized conversions was by and large no longer 
implemented.  The representation of the minorities in the parliament also improved, 
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although not significantly, as for example the amount of Muslim representatives 
changed from the Panchayat era’s 1.4% to 2.3% in the 1991 elections (Dastider 1995: 
89). Although the changes were small, the pro-Hindutva forces started to feel their 
dominating position had become questioned and they now started to feel insecure for 
the first time.  
 According to Sudhindra Sharma (2004), the years after the promulgation of the 1990’s 
constitution saw all religious communities increasingly turning away from syncretistic 
and tolerant practices and towards what they considered to be the essential teachings of 
their religions. In the case of Hinduism this meant an increasing popularity of Hindutva 
and the launching of various organizations affiliated with the Indian Sangh Parivar, as 
has been discussed. The Nepalese Buddhists who had mainly followed the Mahayana 
and Tantric traditions started to increasingly turn towards Theravada, and the Muslims 
became more attracted to literal and more conservative interpretations of Islam (ibid. 
107-8). Attitudes clearly hardened among the religious communities, and while all these 
developments must also be viewed each in their global contexts, it could be said that 
they were also pronouncements of increasing inter-religious tensions. What also 
undoubtedly greatly contributed to this trend was the fact that the Hindutva rhetoric of 
the World Hindu Federation was becoming more aggressive, and the Sangh Parivar 
affiliated groups were now actively working towards gaining a stronger foothold in the 
country. The developments among the religious communities of Nepal in the post-
1990s climate have not been studied enough to be able to draw conclusions about their 
exact reasons. Nevertheless, the hardening of sentiments among minority religions 
could in part have been a response to the provocative stance of the Sangh Parivar, at 
least among the Muslims. In India the anti-Muslim campaign of the Hindu right in the 
1980s and the many ensuing communal riots caused an increasing number of angered 
Muslims to turn to radicalism (Hansen 1999: 152).   
Tellingly, the post-1990 period coincided with an increase in Hindu-Muslim violence in 
the Terai region of Nepal (Dastider 1995). There were several instances of riots, and 
especially the town of Nepalgunj gained a reputation for having become extremely 
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communalized. Many of the riots came in the heels of the Babri Masjid demolition in 
Ayodhya and the subsequent influx of Sangh Parivar cadres into the Terai, which 
started to polarize the inter-religious relations in the border region. The World Hindu 
Federation had been turning more hostile towards the minorities after 1990, and in the 
wake of the Ayodhya incident many of its leaders traveled to the towns bordering India 
such as Nepalgunj and Birgunj and made provocative statements towards Muslims (S. 
Sharma 2004: 120). The years 1992, 1994 and 1995 saw the most serious incidents of 
Hindu-Muslim riots in the Terai and the involvement of Hindutva organizations, such 
as Shiv Sena Nepal and the WHF in the riots further polarized the situation. What was 
significant in the 1995 riots was the fact that the RPP and even the Nepali Congress 
chose to get involved in the communal tensions by making statements that sided with 
the Hindu community (Dastider 2007: 163). This increase in confrontation between the 
dominant Hindus and the minority religions was on the one hand clearly the result of 
deliberate provocation by Hindutva groups whose presence in the country grew 
significantly in the 1990s, and on the other hand it also indicated the majority’s 
difficulties in tolerating the increased mobilization of the minorities (Dastider 2007: 
157). The democratic periods when the minorities have been able to assert their 
demands indeed seem to clearly coincide with an increase in Hindutva mobilization and 
communal violence: the brief period of democracy in the late 1950s also saw some 
incidents of Hindu-Muslim riots in the Terai region.  
The year 2004 saw another incidence of Hindutva provocation in the form of an attack 
on the Muslim population in Kathmandu. Following the execution of Nepalese migrant 
workers taken hostage in Iraq by a group of militants, angry mobs attacked and set fire 
to Muslim organizations, businesses and the Jama mosque in the capital in what is 
considered high-security area close to the royal palace and army headquarters. The 
police was seen to be idling nearby, reluctant to act (Varadarajan 2004). It is not 
entirely clear what happened here because a credible investigation was never held, but 
the involvement of Hindutva elements in the incident is quite clear, especially since the 
attacks resembled the ones often seen arranged by for example the Shiv Sena, a militant 
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Hindu nationalist party in India. Silent approval from the palace also seems to be a 
possibility (Jha 2007b). After all, this was a time when demands for secularism were 
being raised again and the popularity of monarchy was extremely low.  This was the 
first time Muslims were targeted in the Kathmandu Valley and it differed from previous 
instances of Hindu-Muslim violence in the Terai in a sense that it seemed to clearly 
have been preplanned. Ashok Singhal, the president of the Indian VHP had indeed 
written a provocative letter to the king a day after the killing of hostages took place and 
had claimed that the executions had been “particularly brutal because the victims were 
Hindus” (Varadarajan 2004). It was reported that some leaders of the Pashupati Sena, 
yet another extremist Hindutva organization, were openly boasting about their 
involvement in the attacks, and a leader of the Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh was in fact 
arrested in connection to the violence (ibid.).  
As Dastider (2007) argues, as long as the Muslim minority kept a low profile and did 
not object to their inferior status in the society, communal violence was rare. However, 
as soon as the minority community has started to show signs of assertiveness, the Hindu 
majoritarian state and society have responded aggressively, “pressing home the point 
that (---) the religious minorities must remember that the Hindu upper-caste groups will 
always dominate because of the country’s declared status as a ‘Hindu Kingdom’” (ibid. 
164). The increase in ethnic and religious minorities’ assertiveness has indeed 
challenged the Hindu-Nepali definitions of nationalism and has led to the Hindutva 
groups becoming more aggressive. What Arjun Appadurai (2006) calls “predatory 
identities” seems to be of importance here: when the majority identity is mobilized to 
feel its dominating status is threatened, it turns predatory. In other words, the majority 
starts fearing it may turn into a minority and feels it must exterminate this threat.  
Religious violence has indeed been at its lowest in Nepal during the times of absolute 
monarchy when the minorities have been forced to contend to their second-class status 
in the society. Hence, while there may have been a relative absence of communal 
violence in the past, this does not mean that a potential for a religious conflict does not 
exist. The peaceful relations between religious communities in the past can largely be 
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put down to the authoritarian and feudal rule that Nepal has experienced, and the fact 
that the kings systematically prevented conflicts from escalating (Dastider 1995: 107). 
The entrance of extremist organizations to the Terai (both Hindu and Muslim) in the 
wake of the Babri Masjid demolition has greatly contributed to the polarization of the 
communal sentiments in the area. As Nepal has now been declared secular and the 
interim government is trying to build a more inclusive state, the Hindutva groups feel 
the Hindu majority’s status is more threatened than ever before. The next chapter deals 
with the Sangh Parivar’s reaction to the declaration and their attempts at mobilizing the 
Nepalese masses.      
2. The Reaction 
2.1.Saffron Backlash 
2.1.1. Hindu Demonstrations in Nepal 
Prior to 2008 the Sangh Parivar still clearly thought it could somehow salvage the 
world’s only Hindu kingdom. As the declaration to make Nepal a secular state was 
announced on the 18th of May 2006, protests began first as rather small in Kathmandu 
and a few days later they flared up in the south of the country in bigger numbers. 
Birganj, a border town to India, saw a complete shutdown for two days as around 6,000 
Hindu demonstrators took to the streets demanding a return to Hindu Kingdom 
(Haviland: 2006a). The demonstrators were seen waving tridents and saffron flags and 
carrying pictures of the god Ram – symbols that have come to be strongly associated 
with the Sangh Parivar of India, especially after the Ramjanmabhoomi movement in the 
1990s. Still, the demonstrations were perhaps not as intense as the Sangh Parivar 
leaders would have hoped. They could not create any considerable pressure towards the 
government and it was only in the Terai region that the number of protestors exceeded 
thousands.  
Nevertheless, the Hindu right of Nepal attacked the government in strong words: Shiv 
Sena Nepal leader Arun Subedi said: “If Nepal is not a Hindu Kingdom, then there is no 
Nepal. We are entering into a holy war” (Haviland 2006b). Subedi also pointed out that 
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secularism could worsen the Hindus’ relations with the minority religions. Many others 
also started to paint pictures of religious unrests. Chintamani Yogi, the principal of 
Hindu Vidyapeeth school feared that “Under secular Nepal missionary activities could 
flare up and age-old harmony among various religious groups in the country could be 
endangered” (Dahal 2006). Some comments were outright aggressive. A young person 
attending a Hindu rally said to the BBC: “In secularism it will be very difficult for them 
(minorities). The churches will be destroyed, the mosques will be destroyed.” He added 
that “the people who are very much (of a) religious mind, they will spontaneously blow 
up these churches and mosques. The fight between the religious communities … is not 
going to stop. It has been ignited” (Haviland 2006b.). The rhetoric of the Hindutva 
forces had clearly now reached a new level of hostility towards the religious minorities.   
Although now a secular and a “multiethnic, multilingual, multi-religious and 
multicultural” state, and thus exhibiting a clear departure from the previous 
constitutions’ Hindu bias, the interim constitution still retains the clause that grants each 
person a right to practice his or her religion, but only “as handed down to him or her 
from ancient times”. It also adds that “no person shall be entitled to convert another 
person from one religion to another, and no person shall act or behave in a manner 
which may infringe upon the religion of others” (UNDP 2008: 12). These are indeed 
clauses that have remained unchanged ever since the first Panchayat Constitution of 
Mahendra and they are also something that the pro-Hindutva forces have always 
insisted on retaining. It is, however, true that this law has by and large not been 
implemented since 1990s and jail sentences have been extremely rare, so in practice the 
declaration of secularism simply meant that the last sign of Nepal’s Hindu-ness was 
now removed. Thus it seems that much of the protests were against the removal of a 
single word that for some contained the symbolic identity of the country and that for 
others meant state protection against the enemies of Hinduism against whom a holy war 
now needed to be declared. As Sudhindra Sharma (2002) argues, the constitution of 
1990 already made Nepal a de facto secular state, because the only Hindu institution 
safeguarded by the state was Hindu kingship (ibid. 35). At the time of the protests the 
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future status of monarchy was also still undecided. This is perhaps why many suspected 
the involvement of royalists and Sangh Parivar activists from across the border in 
staging the protests.  This may, indeed, be true but at the same time there is no denying 
the fact that it was not just the monarchists and hardliner Hindus who were unhappy 
about Nepal’s Hindu status being gone, or the manner in which it went.  Some people 
felt that even though adopting secularism had been the correct decision, it had been a 
hasty one and should have been left for the Constituent Assembly (Dahal 2006). This 
would clearly have been a more democratic move. 
An extensive survey conducted by International IDEA suggests that in 2004, 66 percent 
of the “commoners” (i.e. people who were not members of the parliament) were indeed 
in favor of a Hindu state. In 2007 this percentage was 61. Even though the survey 
shows a slight trend in an increasing support for secularism, the numbers still quite 
clearly point that the majority of the Nepalese are in favor of a Hindu Rashtra. Perhaps 
surprisingly, the support was especially high among the Madheshis and unlike among 
most other groups, it seems to be on the increase: in 2004 74 percent of the Madheshi 
caste Hindus favored a Hindu Rashtra and in 2007 the percentage had grown to 85. 
Another group obviously highly in favor a Hindu state is the Pahari caste Hindus, 
although even among them the support had dropped from 73 to 66 percent. 
Unsurprisingly, the Hill ethnic groups and religious minorities make up the portion of 
the society that is most in favor of secularism (Hachhethu, Kumar and Subedi 2008: 85-
6). All in all, this and other similar studies prove that the protests against secularism in 
2006 cannot be shrugged off as simply having been staged by the royalists or the Sangh 
Parivar. It is clear that in addition to the Hill caste Hindus, especially among the 
Madheshis, an overwhelming majority of the people would have wanted the state to 
remain Hindu. The Sangh Parivar and the royalists were, of course, well represented 
among the protestors and probably even arranged them, but a great deal of moderate 
Hindus were also equally disappointed by the government’s decision. Of course, a 
simple preference for a Hindu state does not mean an endorsement of the entire 
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Hindutva ideology, but this sentiment is certainly something the Hindu right of Nepal 
tries to exploit now.  
2.1.2.  The Sangh Parivar across the Border 
It was not just in Nepal that Hindu groups were outraged over the new secular status of 
the country. As expected, the Sangh Parivar of India reacted with strong words. Mohan 
Bhagwat, the general secretary of the RSS, lamented the fate of Nepal and its symbolic 
identity and said that “now the people of Nepal will have to maintain eternal vigilance 
to safeguard it (Hindu identity)” (Dahal 2006). Uma Bharti, a prominent former BJP 
member of parliament, now a Bharatiya Janshakti Party leader, stated that the 
declaration would have “far-reaching” consequences both for Nepal and India and that 
“in the present parlance, secularism is equated with minority appeasement”, which 
according to her would lead to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism (OneIndiaNews: 
2006). These statements were echoed by a BJP member of parliament from Uttar 
Pradesh, Yogi Adityanath. At a protest march led by him in the border town of Sonauli, 
he was reported saying that a secular Nepal would bring India under the threat of ISI 
(the Pakistani intelligence agency) and the Nepalese Maoists (Hindustan Times 2006). 
Adityanath’s interest in Nepal’s affairs seems to go much deeper than simple worry for 
India’s security, however. Also acting as the head priest of the Gorakhnath math, a 
Hindu monastery close to the Nepalese border with traditional relations to the royal 
family of Nepal and a long history of involvement with the Hindu Mahasabha5, 
Adityanath is known for his active links to Nepalese Hindutva organizations (Jha 
2007a). Not only is he the national president of the Indian chapter of WHF and listed as 
an advisor of the Shiv Sena Nepal’s journal “Dharmayuddha” (translatable as holy war 
or war of righteousness), but he has also organized several conferences where the 
secular status of Nepal has been discussed. These conferences were attended by a large 
delegation from Nepal, including Bharat Keshari Simha of the WHF, Arun Subedi of 
                                                            
5 The Gorakhnath math is an important center of the Kanpatha Yogis (a tradition to which Yogi Adityanath 
also belongs) who are followers of Guru Gorakhnath. These Yogis are said to have provided assistance to 
Prithvi Narayan Shah in his conquest, and the Shah kings consider Gorakhnath their parton saint (Bouillier 
1986). 
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Shiv Sena Nepal and others with close links to the palace and various Hindutva 
organizations, such as Madhav Bhattarai, the Raj guru of the king and Swami 
Prapannacharya. In April 2008, shortly before monarchy was completely abolished in 
Nepal, Adityanath gathered Hindu leaders from 39 countries to draw up a strategy for a 
“movement to save the monarchy from extinction and also to restore Hindutva pride in 
the neighboring nation” (A. Singh 2008). Another aim of the meeting was to unite the 
scattered Hindu organizations of Nepal. It was in the next meeting with WHF at the end 
of April in Balrampur that Bharat Keshari Simha hinted on the conclusions they had 
come to: “If Maoists can take up arms, why can’t religious people like us?” (S. Singh 
2008) 
Yogi Adityanath, who owns another math in the Nawalparasi district of the Nepalese 
Terai, has become an extremely controversial, yet powerful personality with a large 
support base in Uttar Pradesh (UP) (Srivastava 2007). In the past few years, he has been 
accused of instigating over 20 communal riots, financing Hindutva terrorists and 
turning the region around Gorakhpur into a “communal cauldron” by provoking 
massive Hindu-Muslim violence. Several criminal complaints have been filed against 
him, but the police seem either unable or unwilling to take action (Mohan 2009). Much 
of Adityanath’s power is based on an organization he has founded, the Hindu Yuva 
Vahini, or Hindu Youth Organization, which is reportedly made up of mainly 
unemployed youngsters and petty criminals who can easily be mobilized for riots. The 
youngsters chant slogans like “UP mein rahana hoga to Yogi Yogi kahana hoga” (If 
you want to stay in UP you must say Yogi, Yogi). Adityanath himself described his 
influence on these cadres to the Tehelka magazine in the following way: “When I 
speak, thousands listen. When I ask them to rise and protect our religion, they obey. If I 
ask for blood, they will give me blood”. He has openly declared that his plan is to 
“eliminate the Muslim population in UP” by turning the state into another Gujarat, 
while he himself aspires to become “the next Narendra Modi” (ibid.), the controversial 
BJP Chief Minister widely accused to be at least partly responsible for the 2002 pogrom 
where over 2,000 Muslims were killed. Indeed, the region around Gorakhpur has 
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witnessed several incidents of provoked riots and attacks against the Muslim population 
in recent years. It is Adityanath’s aggressive anti-Muslim rhetoric and the powerful, 
Hindu Youth Organization-based following that make him a dangerous force to be 
reckoned with – at least within India. However, as the border between India and Nepal 
is open, and many of the residents in the adjoining areas hold dual citizenship, 
Adityanath and the rest of the Sangh Parivar are certainly capable of affecting the 
politics and communal sentiments also on the Nepalese side. 
The conferences held in India highlight the fact that the Hindu right of Nepal is hardly 
ever alone in what it does. An Indian element seems to be frequently involved and 
strong backing is provided to their Nepalese allies by the Sangh Parivar forces. The 
strategies of the Nepalese Hindutva groups are also clearly formulated in close 
cooperation with their Indian counterparts. The Nepalese Hindu right is somewhat 
ambiguous about these connections and often refers to them as simply “moral support” 
or “sympathizing”. Nevertheless, the HSS admitted that the “RSS helps HSS (---). We 
learn from them. Indian RSS members sometimes visit, Mohan Bhagwat was just here” 
(Interview 6. Govinda Sah). Vijay Prakash of the WHF in fact said in an informal 
conversation that the HSS is “provided by the BJP” and gets “hundred percent support” 
from the party, implying financial assistance. According to him, these connections are 
not something either party would like to openly declare. Especially in Nepal admitting 
to too many Indian connections could be interpreted as being anti-national – something 
which of course would not suit these Hindu nationalists at all.  
2.1.3.  Bomb Blasts and Violent Attacks 
Already a year before Simha’s hints about taking up arms against the state, a previously 
unknown pro- Hindu kingdom group called the Nepal Defence Army (NDA) had 
claimed responsibility over a series of fatal bomb blasts. The group seems to be mainly 
based in the Terai region, and it is held responsible for many acts of violence, including 
the murder of a Christian priest in Eastern Nepal, an attack on a mosque in Morang 
district and a bomb blast in a church in Lalitpur, all in the years following secularism 
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(Timsina 2010). The NDA claims to be made up of 1,200 former soldiers and police 
officers, among them also former Maoists, who are now fighting for the restoration of 
Hindu kingdom and allegedly also training suicide bombers in al-Qaida style (Sarkar 
2007a). It is, however, highly unlikely that the organization would have so many active 
members, and many have suspected it to be largely a “one man show”. The NDA is, 
however, also suspected of having ties to the Indian Sangh Parivar, although some RSS 
activists have dismissed the NDA as insignificant (ICG: 2007: 10).  In 2009, following 
an attack on a church in the capital, the NDA’s leader, Ram Prasad Mainali or 
“Parivartan” (translating as “change”) was captured by the police and the attacks seized 
for a while. Mainali himself said in an interview that he was being supported by 
militant Hindu organizations from India (The Times of India 2011). In March 2011 the 
NDA resurfaced, despite Mainali having been put behind bars, and several followers of 
his were captured planning a series of bomb blasts against Christian buildings in 
Kathmandu (Parajuli 2011). In November 2011 leaflets of the NDA were left at the 
venue of a bomb blast in front of the headquarters of United Mission to Nepal.  The 
NDA has repeatedly asked Christians to leave Nepal and threatened them with more 
violence if their conversion activities do not end (Timsina 2010).  
Nepal Defence Army is not the only terrorist organization that has emerged in Nepal in 
the aftermath of secularism. Ranbir Sena (also Ranvir or Ranabir), another Terai-based 
outfit, has claimed responsibility over several bomb blasts in the country in recent 
years. The group originates in the Indian state of Bihar, where it has been active since 
the 1970s as a militia of upper caste landowners attacking and murdering members of 
the landless lower castes and Maoist supporters (Mathema 2011: 22-3). Ranbir Sena has 
been listed as a terrorist organization and banned by the government of India. It is 
believed that the outfit enjoys support by some royalists in Nepal, in much the same 
way as the NDA. In fact, Ranbir Sena’s activities in Nepal have concentrated on 
terrorizing the public and demanding a return to a Hindu kingdom, whereas in India it 
has made the headlines on the grounds of targeted killings of Dalits and other members 
of lower castes. In Nepal, the group was first thought to be only active in the Terai 
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region, but in May 2008, just after the government had adopted the resolution to declare 
Nepal a republic, Ranbir Sena bombed the Birendra International Convention Center in 
Kathmandu – the venue chosen for the ceremonial ending of the monarchy. On 27th of 
December 2008 there was a bomb blast in front of the Tribhuvan International Airport 
in Kathmandu and on the following day a bomb went off in the Durbar High School 
area of the city. Ranbir Sena’s leader, Bhagirath Singh, said in an interview to Avenues 
TV that the bombings were a warning to the government and the Maoists, who had “not 
responded seriously to demands for the withdrawal of the constitutional provision 
declaring Nepal a secular state” (quoted in CSW 2009).  
Coinciding with these attacks there was yet another incident of Hindu-Muslim violence 
in the Kapilavastu region of Terai in 2007. The violence erupted as a response to the 
assassination of Mohammed Abdul Moit Khan, a politician with strong links to the 
palace and a connection to the killing of 12 Maoists in 2005 after Gyanendra had 
assumed direct rule (Sarkar 2007b). The assassination caused the supporters of Khan to 
resort to looting and arson that spread to the neighboring districts and took on a 
sectarian character. What had first been a primarily Madheshi-Pahari political conflict 
now became a Hindu-Muslim one. Violent mobs attacked mosques, and many Muslims 
fled to India as the government failed to contain the violence. Many called this the 
worst communal riot in the history of the country and concluded that the new secular 
transitional government did not have the power to keep the violent communal forces in 
check (Timsina 2010).  
In the past two years two prominent Nepalese Muslims have also been assassinated in 
the capital amidst accusations that the government has not done enough to investigate 
the killings. In 2010 Jamim Shah, a media personality, was shot dead in Kathmandu by 
two masked men who the Nepalese police suspected belonged to the Chhota Rajan 
criminal gang which is active in India. Shah had been accused of having links to 
Pakistan’s ISI and the Mumbai underworld by Indian officials, which raised doubts of 
the involvement of both the Indian and Nepalese police in the assassination. Shah 
himself had denied all the accusations against him (BBC 2010). In September 2011 
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Faizan Ahmad, the chairman of Nepal Islami Sangh, was also gunned down in similar 
style in the capital in broad daylight close to the police headquarters. The Islami Sangh 
is mainly active in charity work. The Muslim organizations of Nepal have accused the 
Nepalese police of having allowed the killing to happen and of being slow to take 
action. The government’s probe into the assassination claims the same criminal gang as 
in Shah’s case was behind the murder. The Muslim community has objected to the 
probe in strong words and accuses the government of trying to portray Ahmad as an 
agent of Pakistani terrorist groups (The Kathmandu Post 2012). It has also been 
reported that the government was under immense pressure not to take the probe forward 
(Ghimire 2011). Ahmad’s murder has caused a great deal of fear and anger amongst 
Muslims in Nepal, who staged many protests across the country following the incident. 
The assassinators of both Ahmad and Shah have still not been captured, and the 
government’s slowness to take action points to a spreading culture of impunity and 
unaccountability (Shneiderman and Turin 2012: 143). Such incidents, of course, raise 
the Muslims’ doubts about the government’s ability and willingness to protect their 
rights.   
It is relatively clear that not only has religious violence increased, but its nature has also 
significantly changed in recent years, especially since secularism in 2006. Bombings 
and assassinations targeting not only Muslims but this time also Christians, have 
appeared alongside communal riots, and the violence has now made its way into the 
capital area as well. While groups like the NDA and Ranbir Sena may represent a very 
marginal section of the society and enjoy extremely limited public support, they can 
certainly create a great deal of fear among the minorities with their actions. It seems 
that most of these violent acts have been carried out by extremist fringe groups of 
Hindu kingdom supporters who at least claim to have connections to Indian Hindutva 
organizations. Whether these groups are being supported by the Sangh Parivar, or its 
allies in Nepal (including the former king, Gyanendra), is unclear. It is, however, telling 
that these groups have emerged simultaneously with some Hindu leaders’ comments 
about religious unrests. Such acts of terrorism targeting religious minorities are a 
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completely new phenomenon in Nepal and point to a new level of radicalism among 
groups that advocate a return to a Hindu kingdom. 
The motives behind the two Muslim leaders’ assassinations are also far from being 
clear, but it seems that their alleged connections to Pakistani organizations might have 
been a factor. The Indian media has long been pointing its finger to the Terai region 
where it is believed that Pakistan’s ISI is active in planning an offensive against India, 
using the Nepalese Muslims as cover (S. Sharma 1995). This is something that the 
Hindu nationalists have of course also repeatedly claimed, especially now that Nepal 
has been declared secular. Whether these incidents are a sign of the government’s 
unwillingness to protect the minorities’ rights or not, the fact that the state does not 
seem to be seriously trying to catch the culprits behind the assassinations is a 
discouraging sign for the religious minorities. Imran Ansari, the President of Millat-e-
Islamiya Nepal saw the dominating Hindu identity of the political leaders as a possible 
reason for the inaction: “The more mosques come up, the more they (Hindu extremists) 
will try to instigate violence. Hopefully there will be enough political will that will not 
let them cause much more harm. (---) Congress, the Maoists, UML, they are still Hindu-
minded deep in their hearts. The more the other communities are being seen to have 
gained, the more violent the Hindu extremists will try to get” (Interview 8.).  
A fear that the government does not protect the minorities from violence can in fact 
lead to increasing support for a return to a Hindu kingdom, as Ansari also pointed out: 
“Right now many people keep revisiting their thoughts and think that maybe the king 
was indeed good (---). The monarchy probably had some substance. There was no 
violence against Muslims while the king was there. Now Muslims are being targeted so 
maybe the king indeed was better in that sense” (ibid.). Such a development can, in fact, 
already be seen in the survey conducted by International IDEA: in 2004, 16 % of the 
Muslims supported a Hindu state, whereas in 2007 this support had risen to 21 %. A 
similar trend can also be seen among the Christians (Hachhethu, Kumar and Subedi 
2008: 86). Of course, one of the worst incidents of targeted violence against Muslims 
happened in 2004 in Kathmandu when King Gyanendra was still very much in power. 
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Still, as Dastider (2007) points out, there is a common belief among the Muslim 
community that the state will not respond favorably if the Muslims start demanding 
their rights, and this has caused them to often think that it is better to remain loyal to the 
king (ibid. 159). This is, of course, exactly what the extremist Hindutva groups would 
like to achieve through their violent actions.   
2.2.Rhetorical Tactics of the Hindu Right 
2.2.1 Hindu Rashtra as the Reason for Religious Harmony 
So far, the more mainstream Hindutva organizations like the WHF and the HSS have 
distanced themselves from the attacks of the NDA and Ranbir Sena and have refrained 
from openly advocating violence in public (Simha’s comments aside). Nevertheless, the 
comments made by many of the leaders and members of these organizations leave 
much to be hoped for in terms of completely condemning the use of violence. The 
Hindu right of Nepal has now come to adopt various tactics from the Indian Sangh 
Parivar and one of these tactics has been the use of fear-inciting rhetoric by speaking in 
veiled threats about the religious minorities. The main argument of the pro-Hindutva 
forces in both countries is that if Nepal is not a Hindu state, something terrible will 
happen. Behind this claim is an idea that a conflict will break out between the religious 
communities because the secular government will allow Hinduism to be threatened, and 
the Hindus will thus need to rise to protect it. Still, however, the violent attacks 
committed as a response to these perceived threats are not seen to be the reason for the 
religious unrests, but rather a natural reaction that cannot or should not be prevented. 
The only thing able to halt these supposedly inevitable attacks is the establishment of a 
Hindu Rashtra. This logic guides all of the Hindutva organizations’ statements. Madhav 
Bhattarai, the President of Rashtriya Dharma Sabha  (National Religious Council) and a 
former Raj guru of King Gyanendra said in an interview: “In future there will be many 
incidents. Bomb blasts et cetera. If Nepal is not a Hindu Kingdom or a Hindu Rashtra, 
there will be a religious war or conflict. This will take place for sure”. When asked 
about the reasons behind the bombings targeting religious minorities, he answered that 
“the church bomb was the result of secularism” (Interview 13.). Similarly, Govinda Sah 
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of the Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh and Nepal Janata Party said that “Muslims are trying 
to interrupt cultural practices. The people who were behind the bombings were only 
trying to protect their religion. No one can remain silent when such things happen. 
Hindus have a right to action. It will happen more in the future if Christians and 
Muslims continue their activities. They should be stopped” (Interview 5. Govinda Sah).  
The blame is, hence, invariably placed on both the secular government that supposedly 
fails to protect Hinduism and the minority religions whose activities are seen to be 
either disturbing the Hindus, interrupting their cultural practices or simply making them 
feel insecure. This, in turn, somehow forces a violent response out of the threatened 
Hindus. The issue that emerged in every single interview with Nepalese Hindutva 
activists was the threat posed by Christian missionary activities. The activities of 
Muslims, however, did not receive the amount of attention that they usually do in the 
statements made by the Indian Sangh Parivar. Nevertheless, the Pakistani ISI, terrorism 
and madrassas allegedly built by illegal Bangladeshi immigrants were often enough 
identified among the elements potentially disturbing inter-religious peace in Nepal. The 
Hindu character of the state is seen as an answer to such problems: “Hindu parties will 
come to power and will stop terrorism. (---) In a Hindu Rashtra it would be very easy to 
stop their activities”, Govinda Sah said (Interview 6.). It was, however, difficult to get a 
clear answer to how exactly the Hindu state would proceed to put an end to Islamist 
terrorism and missionary activities, or why a country identifying itself as Hindu should 
prove to be more successful in this task than a secular one.  
The answer seems to lie in the Sangh Parivar’s desire for a strong government that 
would keep the disturbing behavior of the minorities in check. Madhav Bhattarai’s 
answer gives a clear example of this: “In a secular country, there will be more 
conversion and terrorism (---) In Hindu rashtra there will be no such activities. It 
tolerates religions. Government rule would be strong, it would stop such activities” 
(Interview 13.). Arthashastra, an ancient Sanskrit text on statecraft seen as central to the 
Sangh Parivar’s Hindu rashtra –model gives us a clue on how such a state might operate 
in practice. According to Basu et al. (1993) the text “recommends a police state under a 
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single despotic head” (ibid. 66) with “a highly organized surveillance system, complete 
monarchical and bureaucratic controls and monopolies” (ibid.78) – something which 
certainly sounds familiar in the Nepalese context. This makes it clear that the simple 
addition of the word “Hindu” into the constitution and in a sense a return to the 1990s 
would not be enough to satisfy most of the Hindutva advocates. The HSS in particular 
is advocating a complete restructuring of the state “according to Hindu philosophy” 
(Interview 6.) and sees that the Hindu state of the past did not do enough to “implement 
the Hindutva principles” (Kharel and Mulmi 2011). In this light Bhattarai’s 
simultaneous remark about the religious tolerance of a state that puts an end to 
conversions seems quite contradictory and out of place. The Hindu state has, however, 
in the Hindu nationalists’ view always protected the rights of the minorities. Indeed, a 
plenty of examples of religious harmony during the Hindu Kingdom were cited in the 
interviews, such as the king letting the Muslim community build their mosque in front 
of the royal palace. At the same time, many interviewees pointed out how the demands 
of these communities to build more madrassas or burial grounds are now making the 
Hindus feel insecure. The guiding logic behind this is, of course, that of control: in a 
Hindu state the Hindus can decide how much breathing space they want to give to the 
Muslims and Christians, whereas in a secular state this power is lost.  
The Hindu-ness of the state is thus presented as the only thing able to guarantee inter-
religious peace and harmony. Religious harmony, however, is not understood to mean 
the same thing as religious equality, but rather control over the religious minorities’ 
activities. If the Hindus lose this control, the peace and harmony prevalent in Nepal are 
also lost because the minorities can now do as they please and the Hindus cannot be 
expected to tolerate this. At the same time, the common Hindutva rhetoric of 
emphasizing the tolerance and peacefulness of Hinduism is used to justify their rule 
over other religious groups that supposedly lack these attributes. As Basu et al. (1993) 
describe, this rhetoric tries to brand all the followers of Christianity and Islam as 
intolerant, violent and expansionist, with the intention of presenting them as dangers 
that need to be resisted (ibid. 74). In this way, the Hindutva forces can put forward an 
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image of themselves as simply defenders of tolerance and peace. Furthermore, in the 
Nepalese context peacefulness is made out to be a specifically Nepalese characteristic, 
something which sets them apart from the “more violent” Indians. When the communal 
trouble of secular India is contrasted with the inter-religious peace that resided under 
the Hindu Kingdom of Nepal, the Hindutva forces again aim to blame secularism for 
the conflicts between religious communities. They warn that Nepal could now turn into 
India, as if secularism alone would be responsible for unleashing the alleged menacing 
potential of the minority religions. Insisting that a violent response is justified - or at 
least understandable - the Hindu right tries to place the blame for the violence and 
conflict on others.  
Meanwhile, some interviewees were paradoxically even ready to admit that their own 
actions might provoke conflicts. A good example of this is Govinda Sah’s comment: 
“An incident like Babri Masjid could also happen in Nepal. For instance, in my village 
the Christians keep going to Hindu wedding ceremonies, give them money and tell 
them to marry according to Christian tradition, to wear white and so on. White is the 
color of the widows in our culture. We will go and demolish a church if their activities 
don’t stop”. When asked if this would not anger the Christians and lead to conflict 
rather than promote inter-religious peace, the answer was: “In a state of conversion we 
are ready for conflict. Hindus have suffered already great losses. We are ready to die for 
our religion. We are not extremists. It is only a reaction to their activities. There is an 
extent to tolerance” (Interview 6.). Hence, while the Hindus are made out to be 
inherently tolerant, this tolerance seems to come to an abrupt end when faced with the 
activities of Christians and Muslims. In this way the Hindutva rhetoric often blames the 
minorities for forcing the Hindus to turn intolerant (Mukta 2000: 450). On the other 
hand, Basu et al. (1993) point out that the tolerance the Hindutva rhetoric attributes to 
the Hindus seems to go so far that it attempts to stamp out all that is branded intolerant, 
just to be secure (ibid. 75). Thus, resisting Muslims and Christians is, in fact, not 
always seen to be intolerant in the eyes of the Hindutva advocates, but a way of 
securing the survival of real tolerance, which can only exist in a Hindu nation. 
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The groups that have used violence against the minority religious communities after 
2006 have simultaneously been voicing threats to the political parties behind the 
decision to declare Nepal a secular country. The idea is clearly to attempt to provoke 
religious unrests in order to pressurize the government to make Nepal a Hindu Rashtra 
again and simultaneously to intimidate the minorities. While the violent acts have been 
committed by fringe groups with no clear evidence of contacts to the WHF or the HSS, 
most of the Hindutva leaders have tried to rationalize the violence and some have even 
condoned it. If nothing more, these groups are at least ideologically closely tied 
together and use the same Hindu supremacist rhetoric. In a Hindu rashtra, the religious 
minorities’ demands do not matter because they are not seen to be genuinely Nepalese: 
“Christians aur musalman baahar se aayen hain, to unka kya matlab?” (Christians and 
Muslims have come from outside, so what is the meaning of them?6), as Swami 
Prapannacharya puts it (Interview 7.). Similarly, Khem Raj Keshav Sharma of the 
Sanatan Dharma Seva Samiti had already in the 1980s questioned the minorities’ 
entitlement to equal rights in a Hindu state: “(---) it is not right for such a country to 
adopt a ‘policy of equality towards all religions’, nor to give them the same 
opportunities as the Hindus, in my opinion” (quoted in P.R. Sharma 2004: 294). Hence, 
while the Hindu right argues that the Hindu-ness of the state was the reason for inter-
religious harmony in Nepal, what it understands under religious harmony is actually 
based on ideas of domination and control, rather than equality and freedom of religion. 
The secular government is seen as a conspirator in destroying this imposed harmony, as 
it gives too many freedoms to communities whose inherent nature is believed to be to 
disturb and threaten the Hindus. 
2.2.2 Nepalese Secularism as Conspiracy 
If the Hindutva advocates see the Hindu kingdom as the reason for the inter-religious 
harmony of Nepal, and secularism is seen to cause Hinduism to be threatened, the 
declaration itself must have been a plot to weaken the Hindus.  As already pointed out, 
the negative reaction to secularism did not only come from the Hindu hardliners, but 
                                                            
6 My translation from Hindi. 
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also from other sections of the society. Many moderate Hindus, especially high caste 
Paharis and Madheshis felt that there was no need to make Nepal secular because the 
state had always protected the rights of religious minorities. This view obviously bases 
itself on the fact that there had been a relative absence of large scale communal 
violence in Nepal in the past, but at the same time it fails to take into account the 
feelings of alienation that labeling the state as “Hindu” caused in ethnic and religious 
minorities. It also ignores the fact that the Hindu bias of the state led to the state 
promoting Hinduism over other religions. Does this mean that the Hindutva rhetoric has 
a sympathetic audience in the middle class Hindus, then? For the most part, the reasons 
for wanting to keep Nepal a Hindu state seem to be quite different from those of the 
Hindutva advocates’. In a study conducted by the Asia Foundation and Interdisciplinary 
Analysts in 2007, only 5 percent of the people who had answered they would like Nepal 
to be a Hindu state chose the answer “If not Hindu, it will invite conflicts in the name of 
religion” as the rationale for their opinion. The overwhelming majority chose answers 
that justified retaining the Hindu state because it was “part of tradition” (60 %) or 
Nepal’s identification worldwide (29 %) (Sen and Sharma 2007: 46). The Hindutva 
proponents’ logic about secularism causing religious conflicts, hence, escapes the vast 
majority of the people of Nepal, even those who may agree with them on some points. 
It is also interesting to note that the leaders of minority religious communities all said in 
the interviews that inter-religious relations have improved in Nepal since secularism. 
While they were obviously concerned about the increase in violence, they emphasized 
the importance of the inter-religious dialogue that has now emerged in the country. All 
this is of course in sharp contrast to the claims the Hindutva leaders keep making about 
the consequences of secularism. 
One additional reason for people wanting to keep Nepal a Hindu state was also the fact 
that the issue of secularism received very little attention in political discussions leading 
to the declaration. Political parties did not explain what they meant by the concept, even 
though it was included in the campaigns of many (Jha 2008). The Sanskrit term dharma 
nirpeksha that was used in the interim constitution as the translation of the word 
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“secular” has proved to create even further confusion around the issue. Translating the 
word “dharma” into English is difficult, because it does not simply mean religion. In 
fact, it should be understood more in the sense of moral code, rather than religion in its 
Western sense, as it also means “essential or inherent quality; attribute; duty;” and 
“prescribed course of conduct” (Raker and Shukla 2002). Chintamani Yogi, the founder 
and director of the Hindu Vidyapeeth School in Lalitpur was of the opinion that the 
term used in the interim constitution was not appropriate and neither was the concept of 
secularism: “The term should be revised. Is there some other word that could be used? 
(---) In fact, it (dharma nirpeksha) means avoiding or ignoring dharma. Freedom of 
religion is more important, perhaps the word dharma should be replaced by something 
that means sects” (Interview 4). In his view, secularism is not needed in Nepal because 
“there was no conflict between religious communities”. In a similar manner, Keshav 
Chaulagain, the general secretary of the Inter-religious Council also questioned the 
rationale of secularism: “Secularism is not what should be strived for, but religious 
freedom. (---) Now, what is the difference between a secular state and a Hindu nation? 
It has not been clearly defined” (Interview 1.).   
The criticism on the lack of definition of secularism is perhaps valid. Secularism as a 
concept has been interpreted and implemented in different ways in different countries in 
the course of history. The roots of secularism go to the 16th century Europe and the idea 
of separation of church and state. This was a direct result of the religious wars that had 
been raging in Europe, and secularism was an attempt to bring the warring sides 
together and establish a feeling of religious non-alignment from the side of the states. In 
this sense, many have come to argue that secularism is an inherently Western concept 
that was imported to South Asia, and therefore it would be incompatible with the deeply 
religious nature of the Hindu society (for example Madan 1987). This is indeed an 
argument that has also often been used by the proponents of Hindu Rashtra in India and 
Nepal, and the Congress party of India has been often accused of being “pseudo-
secular” by the BJP. However, when one looks at the interpretation of secularism in 
India, it is clear that it is quite different from for example the French model of “negative 
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secularism” where religion has no place in the public sphere. In India secularism was 
from the very beginning taken in a “positive” sense to mean an equal treatment of all 
religions, and as Pantham (1997: 525) notes, while the opposite of the word “secular” in 
the West could be considered to be “religious”, in India this would be “communal”. The 
Indian state has hence always aimed to practice equal and balanced treatment of all 
religious communities, while it has actively regulated and institutionalized the practices 
of these communities, for instance through the introduction of different civil codes 
(Hansen 1999: 53). The reasons for adopting secularism in India were according to 
Chandhoke (2004) in fact very similar to those in Europe in the 16th century. It was the 
experience of Partition and division along religious lines that led to a need to re-
establish a sense of mutual belonging for all religious communities that were to 
somehow co-exist in a newly independent India.  
What the interim constitution of Nepal, in fact, says about secularism is that “Nepal is 
an independent, sovereign, secular, inclusive and fully democratic State”, which 
according to the UNDP’s “Simple Guide to the Interim Constitution of Nepal” is to 
mean that the state “is not attached to one particular religion (---). This does not mean 
that it is against religion - just that religion is a personal not a government matter” 
(UNDP 2008: 12). The right to practice one’s religion is guaranteed, which already is 
an example of the state’s recognition of the fact that religion constitutes an important 
part of many of the citizens’ lives. Despite all of this, it remains unclear as to what kind 
of a version or interpretation of secularism the interim constitution means and more 
importantly, what the interpretation will be in the new constitution. Obviously, no 
matter what interpretation Nepal chooses, it will not mean that religion is going to be 
banned or even discouraged, as the Hindu nationalist groups have started to claim. 
Making the practice of religion illegal has, of course, no place in an inclusive, 
democratic state – something that Nepal is now striving to be.  
Despite the interim constitution’s clear commitment to secularism, it still falls short of 
completely protecting the freedom of religion by not extending the right to practice 
one’s religion to people who have converted. Similarly, the interim constitution also 
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explicitly forbids proselytizing, as in the past. This is not much of a consolation for the 
Hindu nationalists, as they fear this last remaining hope for them is going to be 
scrapped from the law soon as well. Furthermore, they are constantly accusing the 
present government of not having the political will to implement this law, and this has, 
of course, been true ever since the 1990s. Why this formulation has then been left in the 
constitution is an interesting question. Most probably, many (though most certainly not 
all) of the high caste political leaders still harbor fears of conversions, even though from 
a study conducted by the International IDEA, it becomes strikingly clear that there was 
almost complete unanimity in the interim government in 2007 about the secular status 
of the country, as 94 percent of the parliamentarians were in favor of secularism 
(Hachhethu, Kumar and Subedi 2008: 86).  
Because the meaning of secularism in Nepal has not been clearly defined, the Hindutva 
groups have sensed an opportunity to exploit the confusion. The fact that the Maoists 
were at the forefront of  demanding a secular state and that they should in an ideological 
sense be atheists helps the Hindu right in spreading its propaganda about the 
government’s supposed anti-religious stand. An instance such as the Maoists’ attempt at 
expelling the traditionally Indian priests of Pashupatinath is also seen as a sign of this, 
although the incident probably had more to do with the Maoists’ anti-India stance. In 
the interviews I conducted, many Hindutva activists seemed to deliberately 
misunderstand the term “secularism” to mean something completely anti-religious. 
Swami Prapannacharya, a prominent Sanskrit and Hindu scholar who is closely 
associated with royalists and Hindutva groups is a perfect example of this with his 
views about the true nature of secularism: “There will be conflict between the religions 
in a secular state. This is because secularism doesn’t believe in religion, which is the 
meaning of dharma nirpeksha. This will be written in the law of the land, the 
constitution. The government makes the laws and people have to live by these laws. 
This means people will not follow religion. There will be two sides: those against 
religion and those for it (---). The religious people will hence be breaking the law and 
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they will be against it”7 (Interview 7).  Damodar Gautam of the World Hindu 
Federation and Inter-religious Council also tried to present secularism as being against 
the practice of religion: “Hindus are not satisfied with the secular state because 
secularism is anti-religious, anti-righteous. It is wrong.” (Interview 2)  In a similar vein, 
Akileshwar Singh, the president of Nepal Janata Party tried to argue that the state is 
trying to force people to live without religion. He went on to state that “ours is the true 
secularism”, because in a Hindu Rashtra “all religions can be practiced” (Interview 14).   
The underlying logic of such a statement returns to the notion of the supposed tolerance 
of Hindus and the intolerance of Muslims and Christians. Since the secular state gives 
more rights to these “intolerant expansionists”, the existence of Hindus and of tolerance 
itself becomes threatened. As Govinda Sah of the HSS remarked, “We cannot simply 
lose our people because of secularism” (Interview 6). The Hindutva advocates believe 
that it is the Muslims and especially Christians’ conspiracy to convert the entire Hindu 
population and to rule them according to their own intolerant ways in a state where 
there will be no space left for Hindus to live (Basu et al. 1993: 74-5). Indeed, Sah also 
talked about how “Christianity should not be used as a tool of ruling this country” 
(Interview 6).  A Hindi language pamphlet of the Nepalese HSS called “Rashtriyata aur 
vaishvik avadharna” (Nationalism and the global conception) spreads propaganda about 
how Islam and Christianity are on a quest to conquer the world. According to the 
pamphlet, these two religions are in a constant state of rivalry about which one of them 
can boast the highest number of converts and thus rule the entire world with their 
manpower (Mishra n.d.: 31-32). The Hindu right again speaks in veiled majoritarian 
terms: while they claim to advocate the freedom of religion, in their view this freedom 
can only be guaranteed by restricting the rights of the minorities. Thus, secularism 
becomes an evil conspiracy to subjugate the Hindu majority, and true secularism can 
only come into being in a “tolerant” Hindu Rashtra that does not let intolerance take 
over the world. The “true secularism” of Hindutva hence has nothing to do with 
secularism itself, but with the alleged tolerance of Hindus, which is rather understood in 
                                                            
7 My translation from Hindi. 
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terms of toleration, meaning that minority religions are allowed to be practiced – but 
only if the superiority of Hinduism is accepted.  
The Hindu Rashtra advocated by the Hindutva groups and parties hence represents the 
complete opposite of the inclusive and impartial nature of secularism by wanting to 
exclude the “religious Others” from this nation, thus rendering them to second-class 
citizens with limited rights. In Nepal, already the declaration of secularism seems to 
paradoxically have provided a basis for its crisis. The Sangh Parivar knows that the 
declaration was not received well by even some of the more moderate Hindus and it 
aims to exploit this feeling. Similarly, it hopes to be able to use the fear of conversions 
and the dislike of the Maoists that many middle class Hindus harbor. The manner in 
which the declaration was made also gives the Hindu right an advantage: it can present 
itself as a defender of democracy, while the Maoists and the Seven Party Alliance 
“illegally” decided to declare Nepal secular without taking into consideration “the will 
of the public”. Furthermore, many Hindutva advocates tried to claim in the interviews 
that nobody wanted to make Nepal a secular country, not even the religious minorities, 
and that the political parties behind the declaration were bribed. Such claims are of 
course needed to perpetrate the illusion that religious minorities were happy about their 
status in the Hindu kingdom and also to create an idea that secularism is an evil 
conspiracy of outside forces. The forces blamed for this conspiracy ranged anywhere 
from the Pakistani ISI to the king of Norway, who was claimed to be the “biggest agent 
of Christianity” and an “advocate of Vatican” (Interview 13), even though Norway of 
course is a secular, predominantly Protestant country with no connections to the 
Catholic Pope.  Naturally, no Nepalese (Hindu) would ever want to subject their 
country to the evil plans of Western and Islamic nations, and hence it must be insisted 
that Nepal has now become a victim of a huge international conspiracy in the guise of 
secularism. More than anything, hence, secularism seems to mean to the Hindutva 
advocates that Nepal’s doors have been opened to the expansionist and intolerant forces 
that they want to resist at all costs. 
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2.3.Political Mobilization  
2.3.1. A Hindu Andolan 
Despite the attempts of the NDA and Ranbir Sena to provoke communal tensions and 
polarize people’s religious sentiments, the situation has not radically changed for the 
Hindutva forces. The Hindu right still lacks public support at the grassroots level and it 
is very much aware of this. Govinda Sah of the Nepal Janata Party and HSS said that 
ever since secularism the Nepalese have shown more interest towards the Hindu 
nationalist cause, but there is uncertainty on how to take the movement forward (Field 
notes, 27.3.2011). As long as the masses are not mobilized for Hindutva, the violent 
attacks committed by extreme groups might, in fact, work against the Hindu nationalist 
cause by presenting a far too radical and violent image of the movement to the general 
public. This is precisely why most of the Hindutva organizations try to distance 
themselves from these groups by refusing to directly advocate violence and by arguing 
that the terrorist groups are “fundamentalist” while they themselves are more moderate. 
It is not entirely clear what happened to the WHF’s hints about armed struggle made in 
2008, because today the organization claims it never advocates violence and Bharat 
Keshari Simha’s remarks were simply made in his own name (E-mail communication, 
Vijay Prakash, 2.10.2010). It is probable that the organization realized it needs to adopt 
a softer line at least in public in order to appeal to a larger audience. The WHF is now 
even involved in the interfaith dialogue and one of its offices is right next door to that 
of the Inter-religious Council’s in Kathmandu, where a poster of the VHP was 
paradoxically hanging on the wall. Damodar Gautam is the president of the Inter-
religious Council and also the chairman of the Nepalese branch of the WHF. According 
to Parita Mukta (2000), the VHP of Britain has gotten involved in the inter-religious 
dialogue in the UK in order to project itself as the true representative of all Hindus of 
the world (ibid. 444). In Nepal, this is also most certainly a motivator for the WHF, but 
involvement in inter-religious dialogue also presents a softer image of the organization 
to the public. The importance of public support to the cause of Hindutva cannot be 
stressed enough, as the mobilization of the masses is crucial to the future success of the 
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ideology. Nevertheless, in Nepal this mobilization process was not seen to be necessary 
while the king was in power. The present situation, of course, is vastly different and the 
Sangh Parivar must now seek ways to rise to power through electoral politics.  
By and large, most of the Hindutva organizations I interviewed also appear to believe in 
democratic means to bring about a change. They talked about demanding a referendum 
on the issue of Hindu Rashtra and about political lobbying. Especially the younger 
leaders and activists were noticeably inspired by the Arab Spring – in particular the 
Libyan resistance movement which was currently unfolding at the time when the 
interviews were conducted. Vijay Prakash, the president of the youth wing of the WHF 
talked about an andolan, a movement, which would be launched in order to turn Nepal 
into a Hindu Rashtra (Interview 5.) He said that they would go to the streets and “fight 
the government like in Libya”. Govinda Sah also talked about the struggle for Hindu 
Rashtra turning into “a strong movement like in Libya” (Interview 6.). It seems that the 
comparison with Libya was mainly used in order to conjure up images of a just struggle 
against an oppressive government. Still, knowing that the WHF has already once issued 
a statement advocating an armed struggle, there is obviously no guarantee that they 
would not do this again, despite their current softer rhetoric. Swami Prapannacharya, 
aged 90, did not shy away from stating that he was prepared to use the force of “bombs 
and swords” in order to turn his dreams of the Hindu state into a reality. On the whole, 
however, it does not seem like armed resistance is something the Hindu right would 
want to pursue at the moment. The Sangh Parivar clearly realizes that it needs become 
more active in the political field and mobilize some support. In line with this, Vijay 
Prakash said that the WHF plans to spread awareness among the youth and aims to turn 
Hindu Rashtra into “a political issue” (Interview 5.).      
As Hansen (1999) argues, the success of the Sangh Parivar in India the late 1980s owes 
much to the wide dissemination of communal stereotypes about Muslims, but it was the 
prevailing political environment in the country that provided the framework in which 
the BJP could in the end gain momentum. The rapid rise in militant Hindu nationalism 
was partly aided by the shortsighted decisions made by Congress leadership, in 
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particular Rajiv Gandhi. He adopted much of the Hindu majoritarian discourse used by 
the BJP at the time, hoping to accommodate some of the Hindu nationalist sentiments. 
These tactics, however, only led to increasing Hindu-Muslim tensions and the 
subsequent electoral defeat of the Congress Party (ibid. 148-130). The simultaneous 
emergence of lower caste (especially the Other Backward Classes, the OBCs), farmer 
and regional assertions within a framework of majoritarian democracy where the 
middle-class upper castes had long occupied a dominant position, contributed greatly to 
the resonance of the Hindu nationalist discourse. These dominant groups had formerly 
provided the backbone of the Congress Party. The recommendations made by the 
Mandal Commission in 1980, that suggested that greater representation should be 
granted for the lower castes in the public sphere (mainly in the form of positive 
discrimination, i.e. reservations), caused these groups to increasingly turn towards the 
BJP (ibid. 144-5).  
The present situation in Nepal where the Janajati, religious and regional assertions have 
challenged the upper caste Hindu majoritarian state of the past represents a very similar 
situation to the 1980’s Mandal agitation in a sense that the formerly dominant sections 
of the society have started to feel threatened. The federalism debate that intensified 
leading up to the 27th of May 2012 caused Bahun and Chetri organizations to take to the 
streets to oppose identity-based state restructuring, and the UML and Congress party 
refused to accept a 10-state model, thus leading to the failing of the Constituent 
Assembly. Many of the Congress and UML politicians were uncomfortable with the 
changes this would have caused in traditional power structures (Jha 2012). The 
Congress and UML are obviously not right wing parties, but the federalism debate has 
clearly tilted them towards conservatism. Still, what makes the Nepalese situation quite 
different from the Indian is the fact that the only party that could at the moment be 
thought to channel both Hindu nationalist and anti-federal sentiments is the RPP, a 
party that is still advocating the reinstatement of monarchy. Monarchy, however, 
sharply divides the opinions of the people, and the results of the Constituent Assembly 
elections in 2008 did not bode well for the right-wing royalists’ aspirations. This is 
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precisely why a Hindu nationalist party that does not support monarchy was founded, 
namely the Nepal Janata Party, the Nepalese equivalent of the BJP. This party is still 
very new and small, but acting in close cooperation with the HSS it might yet manage 
to gain momentum. The royalist Hindu right will most probably direct its mobilization 
towards the groups that are opposed to identity- based federalism, in particular the 
Bahuns and Chetris and also Dalits, who do not have much to gain from state 
restructuring (Mulmi 2010). The present situation where the Constituent Assembly has 
been dissolved has, however, caused the RPP to demand the reviving of the 1990’s 
constitution and reinstatement of monarchy. The failing of the CA has been precisely 
what the Hindu nationalist right wing forces have been hoping for and it is unlikely that 
they would not try to use this situation to their advantage, leading up to the proposed 
new elections.  
2.3.2. The King, Democracy and Political Pragmatism 
After all the conferences and anxious calls to save the monarchy, it may indeed come as 
a surprise that many of the Hindutva-affiliated groups immediately backed down after 
monarchy was abolished and declared that they no longer supported the king. In fact, as 
Bharat Keshari Simha emerged from Yogi Adityanath’s conference in Balrampur in 
2008 and hinted on the possibility of taking up arms to salvage the Hindu state, he 
simultaneously said: “We don’t bother about the king’s support. Our aim is to restore 
Nepal’s status as a Hindu Rashtra” (S. Singh 2008 Express India). This comment is 
significant in the sense that it separates the Hindu king from the concept of a Hindu 
nation – something that would have been unimaginable in Nepal before. As Sudhindra 
Sharma has noted, the reason that kingship was so closely entangled to Hinduism was 
the fact that the Brahmins acted in alliance with the kings as advisors, and hence, “it is 
unlikely that Monarchy will be retained and Hinduism will not, or that Hinduism will 
be retained and Monarchy not” (S. Sharma 1992: 276). The fact that this breach with 
tradition is exactly what many of the former royalists are now demanding suggests a 
change in their political tactics.  
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Most organizations and Hindutva advocates I interviewed indeed emphasized the 
importance of the Hindu Rashtra over the king, and some even outright rejected the 
institution of monarchy, like the HSS. Very few in fact supported the reinstatement of 
monarchy and the only ones who stressed the utmost importance of the king were the 
leader of Shiv Sena Nepal Arun Subedi and Swami Prapannacharya (Interviews 3. & 7.) 
. The RPP and other royalist parties would also fall into this category. The WHF, an 
organization that was formerly extremely closely associated with the palace, now 
claims it has broken this political relation and “changed its memorandum about 
monarchy” (Interview 11). Nevertheless, some ambiguousness remains about the 
matter: Damodar Gautam, the chairman of the WHF’s Nepalese chapter said that “the 
World Hindu Federation is not so much in favor of the king. Monarchy is not the 
important issue but Hindu Rashtra is. We are not against the king either, but not 
actively fighting for him like some groups are” (Interview 2).  Even Madhav Bhattarai, 
the former Raj guru of the king, said that “If the people want the king it is the opinion 
of the people, through voting. But Hindu state has to be established” (Interview 13).  
Considering the historical relations between the king and the Hindutva groups and the 
centrality of Hindu monarchy to the construction of Nepali nationalism, this change of 
heart came somewhat unexpectedly. Yet, as the Sangh Parivar sees the mobilization of 
the masses now as its main priority in Nepal, the monarchy could be sacrificed with 
relative ease in the end. Some of the Indian leaders of the Sangh Parivar have even 
revealed their contempt of the former king and believe that it was due to Gyanendra’ s 
incompetence and a board of bad advisors that led to the demise of the Hindu state, 
according to an article written by Prashant Jha (2007b). King Gyanendra’s unpopularity 
among the Nepalese people especially after the coup of 2005 came to be the biggest 
reason for the Sangh Parivar to finally abandon his support. After all, it was this 
unpopularity that also in the end eroded the Hindu nationalists’ own credibility in the 
country as they were seen to be siding with anti-democratic forces (Mulmi 2011). 
Bharat Keshari Simha’s rally to oppose democracy in the name of Hinduism and the 
fact that he advocated the use of force against the protestors in April 2006 undoubtedly 
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made him an equally unpopular figure in the eyes of the public, which in turn affected 
the reputation of the WHF. Simha has now ceased to be the President of the federation 
and has been replaced by Hem Bahadur Karki.  
Of course, it was not so much the fact that the palace adopted an anti-democratic stance 
that bothered the Sangh Parivar, as it never has in the past, but rather the fact that 
Gyanendra was not willing to compromise in the face of a popular uprising so that he 
could still have saved the Hindu Rashtra. Despite its history of sidelining with the 
dictatorial rulers of Nepal, one of the Sangh Parivar’s tactics in the political field is 
paradoxically to present itself as a defender of democracy. The Hindu right’s 
understanding of democracy is, however, distinctively majoritarian: the Hindutva 
advocates argue that since the Hindus constitute the majority in both countries, their 
rights and privileges should always be put first (Hansen 1999: 157). For this reason the 
Hindu right sees any action or policy decision that aims to promote or safeguard the 
rights of the minorities (mainly of course secularism) as “appeasement” or as being 
“anti-democratic”. This is where the problem of the People’s Movement of 2006 for the 
Hindutva advocates lies: it would be difficult to argue that the popular movement 
opposing the king had been anti-democratic or against the wishes of the majority of the 
people. In line with this, the HSS today claims that it in fact supported the movement of 
2006 and says that “the Hindu king did nothing for the Hindus” (Kharel and Mulmi 
2011). The organization also now states that it believes Nepal should be called “the 
Hindu Republic of Nepal”, underlining its commitment to a republican form of 
government (Interview 6). 
The issue of monarchy seems to have created a conflict of interests inside the Hindu 
right. There are those who believe in maintaining ideological purity (i.e. supporting the 
monarch) and those who would rather opt for political pragmatism. The division 
between the ideologues and the pragmatists has become a common problem for the 
Sangh Parivar ever since its increased involvement in party politics and especially since 
the BJP rose to power (Hansen 1999; Jaffrelot 1996). The Indian Sangh Parivar, and 
more precisely the BJP, has learned to compromise - at least in public - in order to gain 
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political power. Nevertheless, the compromises taken by the party have often driven it 
into conflict with the mother organization RSS. The Sangh Parivar’s reaction to the 
coup of Gyanendra spoke of such conflicting interests: while the VHP and WHF 
supported it, many leaders of the BJP cautiously condemned it.  If the HSS’s claim 
about having supported the People’s Movement of 2006 is true, this of course speaks of 
even deeper rifts inside the Sangh Parivar on the issue of monarchy. The division to the 
pragmatists and the ideologues among the Nepalese Hindutva organizations is relatively 
clear: the ones that are more or less Nepalese outfits of the RSS and VHP are following 
their mother organizations’ line of letting go of the issue of monarchy. This is most 
certainly the case with the HSS and also the WHF. These two organizations are also 
most probably depending on Indian financing. Organizations and parties that are 
working more independently still support the king, for example the Rashtriya 
Prajatantra Party, made up of mainly Panchayat era politicians.  
Contrary to what is often believed, the importance placed on Hindu kingship is not 
peculiar to the Nepalese form of Hindu nationalism. Remembering the centrality of 
arthashastra to the Hindu Rashtra model, it can be concluded that at least on the 
ideological level, authoritarian monarchy is seen as an ideal way of governing the 
Hindu nation by the Sangh Parivar. Arthashastra is not the only clue pointing to this, 
however, as the glorification of the Hindu kings of the past and present has long been 
an important strategy of the Hindutva forces in India.  Shivaji, a 17th century Maratha 
king, from whom the Shiv Sena party takes its name,  is a central figure in the Hindutva 
ideology and much loved by the Hindu right because he managed to resist Muslim rule 
and establish a Hindu kingdom during the oppressive rule of the Mughal Emperor 
Aurangzeb. In fact, the saffron flag, which the RSS cadres salute in the beginning of 
each of their shakha and which the organization considers to be its guru is the flag of 
Shivaji. The Maratha king’s coronation is also an important date in the RSS’s calendar 
(Jaffrelot 1996: 36). 
The glorification of Hindu kings has more concrete examples in the history of Hindutva 
as well. It was already V.D. Savarkar and B.S. Moonje of the Hindu Mahasabha who 
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sought to form an alliance with the Hindu rulers of the princely states of India and the 
Ranas of Nepal. As Copland (2002) describes, this alliance was born out of common 
political interests, but also out of ideological reasons. First of all, the kings and princes, 
coming from the Kshatriya warrior caste, represented a perfect, strong and courageous 
model for the Hindu man. B.S. Moonje also saw the Hindu rulers as representatives of 
the “Hindu Raj of the past” and as containing in themselves the “traditions of dignity, 
suffering and fighting for maintain the Hindu Raj against foreign aggressors” (quoted in 
Copland 2002: 218). But since the princes of India did not wield any true power under 
the British Raj, the Mahasabha directed its interests towards Nepal. V.D. Savarkar 
continuously praised the “independent Hindu kingdom of Nepal” in his speeches to the 
Hindu Mahasabha and even suggested that the king of Nepal should be made the 
emperor of Hindu India (MacKean 1996: 90). The crowning of both Birendra and 
Gyanendra as “emperors of all the Hindus of the world” by the WHF and VHP has a 
striking similarity with Savarkar’s suggestion.  
Bearing in mind the concept of akhand bharat, the Greater India to which Nepal also 
belongs, the ultimate end on the ideological level seems to be the unification of all the 
Hindus under a single Hindu monarch and nation. The glorification of the oppressive 
Rana regime reveals a great deal about the Mahasabhaites views on what an ideal Hindu 
Rashtra should look like and how such a state should be ruled. Quite clearly it was not 
the “divine” or other religious aspects of Hindu kingship that were of interest to 
Savarkar and the rest of the Mahasabha, but rather the majoritarian way in which the 
Hindu kings and princes governed their states and placed the minorities on an inferior 
standing in the society.8 As Copland (2002) puts it, the Hindu princely states and Nepal 
“made the idea of Hindutva real” (ibid. 221). The importance of an authoritarian central 
figure for the Sangh Parivar is also clear in B.S. Moonje’s (who also happened to be 
K.B. Hedgewar’s mentor and one of the founding members of the RSS) comments 
                                                            
8 This is not to say that the Hindu rulers would have been in any way more intolerant than for example 
Muslim rulers at the time. For the Hindu nationalists, however, the fact that Hindus were able to rule over 
Muslims was what made the Hindu princes and the Ranas particularly admirable.    
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about wanting to bring about the standardization of Hinduism “with a Hindu as a 
dictator like Shivaji of old or Mussolini or Hitler” (quoted in Casolari 2000: 221).  
The BJP, identifying itself as a “people’s party”, is of course no advocate of monarchy 
in India, even though it has continuously demanded the establishment of a “Ram Raj” 
or Ram’s kingdom. The term was often used by Mahatma Gandhi, who separated it 
from its royal connotations – having seen it as synonymous with self-rule and relating it 
to religious transformation in the society. The BJP on the other hand intends to appeal 
to Hindu voters and uses “Ram Raj” as a synonym for a Hindu majoritarian state (van 
der Veer 1996: 258-9). The issue of monarchy would surely find very little resonance 
among the Indian voters. Instead of advocating authoritarian monarchy, the BJP 
supports a somewhat ambiguous idea of a “presidential system”, something which A. B. 
Vajpayee saw would produce strong governments, unlike the present “instability of 
parliamentary democracy” (quoted in Hansen 1999: 220-1). This is clearly still in line 
with the ideals the Hindutva ideologues had of a strong Hindu leader. Hence, even 
today it is not the religious implications of Hindu kingship that are of importance to the 
Sangh Parivar, as becomes evident in the abandonment of Gyanendra. The ideal Hindu 
ruler does not necessarily have to be a king; he can also be a strong president.   
For the Nepalese Hindu right abandoning the idea of a Hindu king might not be so 
simple, however, as can be observed from the ambiguous statements given by many 
leaders. First of all,  the institution was closely tied to state-propagated nationalism and 
national identity, and the fact that Nepal now no longer is the world’s only Hindu 
kingdom also means that the country cannot be presented as “more Hindu than India” 
anymore. Secondly, the king guaranteed the dominating position of much of the Hill 
caste elite in the society, and for some royalists this will most probably be a factor in 
continuing to hope for the king’s return. It must also be noted that kingship has a 
special place in Hinduism outside the political arena - even in India where the political 
institution has long since vanished. On the religious and social level the idea of a Hindu 
king still has a great deal of importance, even outside its Hindu nationalist 
interpretations, as a maintainer of order and protector of dharma (Fuller: 1992: 106-7). 
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The same importance is, of course, placed on the institution in Nepal as well. This 
highlights the fact that everyone who supports the reinstatement of monarchy does not 
automatically also endorse the Hindu nationalist agenda.  
It is relatively clear that most of the Hindu nationalist organizations calculated that 
supporting the king would be detrimental to their own aspirations. They decided to 
count on the fact that despite the ambivalence felt towards monarchy, a Hindu state still 
enjoys quite a lot of support among the Nepalese, especially the Madheshis. 
Nevertheless, as the RPP is now clearly trying to turn the post-CA situation to its 
advantage by increasing its demands for the reinstatement of monarchy, the stance of 
the Sangh Parivar may still change. If the pro-monarchy sentiments start to receive 
more support among the public, the first organization to again align itself with the king 
would probably be the WHF. Should the king manage to return to power, the rest of the 
Sangh Parivar would probably waste no time in jumping back to his support.  
2.3.3. Madheshi Movement and the Sangh Parivar 
As the Sangh Parivar has now seemingly abandoned the former king, it has 
simultaneously turned its interests towards a powerful potential support base in the 
Terai. This southern region of Nepal bordering India has long played an important role 
in the arena of Hindu nationalism and it has slowly grown into the center of religious 
extremism in Nepal, especially since the 1990s when the Hindutva activists from India 
took shelter there. As has been discussed, the protests against secularism were strongest 
in the Terai and all of the pro-Hindu kingdom attacks have been carried out by groups 
from this area. Most of the communal riots have also taken place in the Terai in the 
past. Clearly, the Hindutva ideology had already disseminated into the region quite 
widely even before the Sangh Parivar woke up to its need to mobilize the Nepalese 
people. For much of the past decade the Madheshis, the ethnic inhabitants of the Terai 
region, have, however, concentrated on much more pressing issues than the Hindu 
nationalist cause. Discrimination-related grievances led many of the region’s leaders to 
align with the Maoists during the years of the People’s War. It was the Madheshi 
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leadership’s fallout with the Maoists and the Madheshi Uprising of 2007 that brought 
the interim government to its knees and turned the situation again to Sangh Parivar’s 
advantage.  
The people living in the Terai make up about half of the country’s population and the 
majority of them call themselves Madheshis, a term derived from the Sanskrit word 
madhyadesh, meaning “middle country”, to make a distinction to the Nepali speaking 
Hill inhabitants or Paharis (ICG 2007: 2). The Madheshis share the cultures and 
languages of the Ganges plains of India, more specifically of the states of Bihar and 
Uttar Pradesh and they are often referred to as the “Indians of Nepal”. Because of the 
cultural and linguistic ties to the bordering Indian states, thousands of Madheshis have 
married to citizens from the other side, tens of thousands go across the border every day 
and many even possess dual citizenship.  Hindi is used as a lingua franca and is also 
more widely understood than Nepali. In addition, the Terai region is inhabited by an 
indigenous group known as Tharu and also by some Limbus and Nepali speakers who 
have migrated from the Hills. Muslims constitute a significant religious minority in the 
Terai and in some districts they are even in the majority. They, however, do not always 
want to be called Madheshis as is also the case with the Tharus, the Janajati group. The 
word “Madheshi” has a distinctively ethnic connotation, as the Pahari migrants living in 
the Terai do not become Madheshis over time, but instead they continue to be 
differentiated from the Madheshi community (ibid.). Madheshi identity, therefore, is not 
simply a regional identity. It is first and foremost based on the cultural differentiation 
that separates the community from the dominant Pahari culture which has long been 
promoted by the state, for example by imposing Nepali language education and by 
refusing to grant official status to Hindi. The Madheshis are, however, by no means a 
homogenous community. They are made up of Awadhi, Bhojpuri, Maithili, Urdu and 
Hindi speakers and their culture also varies depending on caste backgrounds and on the 
region they inhabit.  
The relationship all these non-Pahari groups living in the Terai have had with the 
Nepalese state is characterized by oppression and under-representation in almost all 
 77 
 
areas of national life (ICG 2007: 4). In this respect, the Madheshis share much with the 
Janajati groups and this was also a reason for the alliance with the Maoists. What makes 
the case of Madheshis unique, however, is their perceived Indian identity. Their loyalty 
to the Nepalese state is often questioned by the Hill inhabitants and it is often thought 
that the Madheshis are, in fact, not Nepalese at all, but Indian immigrants. They are 
frequently seen as agents of Indian “cultural colonization” (Mathema 2011: 46). This 
view has much to do with the construction of Nepali nationalism around Nepali 
language and Pahari culture, which obviously excluded the Madheshis (ICG 2007: 3). 
The Madheshis have also, by and large, been treated as foreigners in their own country 
for the largest part of the history, a good example of this being that they have faced a 
great deal of difficulties in obtaining Nepalese citizenship rights up until as late as 
2006. This of course made life very difficult for them, as they were not protected by 
Nepalese law (Mathema 2011: 47-8).   
The Madheshis, therefore, had all the reasons to feel angry with the state. It was the 
People’s War that provided the framework in which to express this anger, and the CPN-
(Maoist) was a major force behind the rise of militant Madheshi nationalism during 
these years. Madhesh National Liberation Front (MNLF) was formed as a front 
organization of the CPN-(Maoist) in the year 2000, and most Madheshis turned their 
loyalties towards the Maoists as the government had in 1999 declared that the use of 
any other languages besides Nepali was illegal in government offices (Mathema 2011: 
8). From 2004 onwards the Madheshi movement started to turn increasingly against the 
Maoists, however, especially once many different dissenting groups started splitting 
from the MNLF, the most significant one of them being the Janatantrik Terai Mukti 
Morcha (JTMM), an underground armed political party. These groups adopted the pro-
secular agenda of the MNLF and claimed the Maoists’ pro-Madheshi stand was not 
genuine (Hachhethu 2007: 7). The splinter groups were increasingly advocating 
autonomy for the region, and at the same time more and more armed organizations 
started emerging, some of which had secessionist agendas (ICG 2007: 9). Federalism 
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came to be the key demand of all Madheshi groups and simultaneously anti-Maoist 
sentiment started to increase (ibid.12).   
The Madheshi uprising that flared up in January 2007 was a response to the fact that the 
interim constitution, which had just been promulgated by the SPA and the Maoists, 
again completely ignored Madheshi grievances. The constitution was missing the word 
“federal”, and this angered most of the marginalized groups of Nepal (Mathema 2011: 
25). This was the backdrop of the ten days long bandh (strike) that was called in the 
Terai area. The bandh was backed by the Madheshi Janadhikar Forum (MJF), a 
previously unknown organization turned political party, and the JTMM. The main 
demands of the uprising were the abrogation of the interim constitution, declaration of 
federalism and inclusion of Madheshis in the state apparatus. The protests turned 
violent, and government and party offices were attacked. Even though Paharis living in 
the Terai were also among the targets, Pahari-Madheshi violence was not the factor that 
defined the uprising. In fact, it was the state response that was particularly harsh with 
the police killing more than 30 and wounding 800 people (ICG 2007: 12) As a result of 
the January uprising, the government was forced to amend the interim constitution and 
add the word “federal” into it, although heavy debate about this topic continues. Later 
in the 2008 CA elections the MJF became the fourth largest national party and 
Madheshis were chosen as ministers and Ram Baram Yadav even became the President 
of Nepal. However, as Mathema (2011) points out, the Madheshi parties people voted 
for have now become “weak and divided”, and the political vacuum that the uprising 
created has remained largely unfilled by them. This has created a favorable 
environment for the Hindu right (ibid. 11).  
It was, however, already during the uprising that the Sangh Parivar and royalists were 
accused of being behind the protests, especially by the Maoists (ICG 2007: 13). This, of 
course, is not entirely true, as the protests were led by Madheshi groups. The Sangh 
Parivar nevertheless sensed an opportunity in the anti-Maoist nature of the unrests and 
it has ever since tried to turn the Madheshi movement into a pro-Hindu Rashtra 
movement. As it happens, the Maoists of course constitute yet another enemy of the 
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Hindutva-forces by representing the extreme end of anti-religiousness and pro-
secularism. The BJP MP Yogi Adityanath from Gorakhpur in particular has been vocal 
in opposing the Maoist movement both in India and in Nepal. In fact, the Maoists of 
Nepal became a crucial part of Adityanath’s campaign in 2007 for the Uttar Pradesh 
assembly elections in that he encouraged people to vote for his candidates to defeat the 
Nepalese Maoist influence in the border region, which according to him was expanding 
to the Indian side (Jha 2007a). The Maoists pose a serious obstacle for spreading the 
Hindutva agenda in Nepal, and as Adityanath owns a sub-temple of his Gorakhnath 
math in the Nawalparasi district of the Terai, countering the Maoist influence is crucial 
in order to secure his own influence in the area (Srivastav 2007). Adityanath himself 
denies having yet actively supported the Madheshi movement, although he does admit 
to having met with some of its leaders (Jha 2007a).   
The connections seem to work both ways, as some MJF’s leaders have past associations 
with Hindutva groups, and the party has even used some inflammatory Hindu 
nationalist material in its publicity (ICG 2007: 11). Some Madheshi leaders have met 
the RSS in Delhi and while they have also openly sought for help in India across the 
political spectrum, it is only the BJP that has direct interests invested in the movement 
(ibid. 27). All in all, the Hindutva-connections do certainly exist within the Madheshi 
movement, but it is hard to say how much influence the Sangh Parivar has over parties 
like MJF and how deep the connections actually run. Despite the unreligious nature of 
the Madheshi uprising (both Hindus and Muslims took part in the protests) and the 
secular stance adopted by most Terai -based political parties and armed groups, it is true 
that the majority of the people belonging to the Madheshi Hindu castes were in favor of 
retaining the Hindu state and monarchy. It was after all in the Terai where the largest 
anti-secular protests took place and where armed pro-Hindu kingdom groups have 
emerged. Many interviewees explained this as being the result of the more religious 
nature of the Terai Hindus and the region’s closeness to India. It is relatively clear that 
the Terai region has long been fertile ground for the growth of Hindu nationalism, and 
the Hindutva groups would certainly like to exploit the Madheshi movement in order to 
 80 
 
expand their own influence in the area. Hindutva leaders seem to see the Madheshi 
uprising of 2007 as a model that can be followed for re-establishing the Hindu state. 
According to Mathema (2011), some Terai-based Hindutva groups hope to be able to 
provoke an attack from the Muslims or Maoists that would then make the Hindus 
awaken to their Hindu identity, leading to a “Hindu revolt” (ibid. 88).  
By looking at the demands of the Madheshis, it seems, however, that the issues the 
2007 uprising brought to the fore, i.e. federalism and Pahari-domination, were 
considered far more important by the people than the question of Hindu state. The 
Madheshi uprising itself had no religious undertones and the Madheshi groups have by 
and large advocated secularism. Nevertheless, a Hindu dimension clearly exists below 
the surface and it might become more pronounced now as the movement has become 
increasingly fragmented along religious- and caste-based lines in response to the high 
caste Hindu leadership’s failure to address the Muslims and Dalits’ grievances (ibid. 
81-84). While linking the entire Madheshi leadership directly with Hindu nationalism is 
problematic to say the least, the appeal of the Hindutva ideology for many Madheshis 
seems to be undeniable. In the course of my research, it became apparent that 
Madheshis are well represented in most of the Hindu nationalist organizations of Nepal, 
in particular the HSS.  The rhetoric of the Pahari and Madheshi Hindutva advocates was 
largely identical in the interviews and no great differences could be identified between 
them. The Madheshi Hindutva advocates are, however, often also supporters of 
federalism and do not hide their contempt of the Paharis, even of the Pahari Hindutva 
supporters, whom they blame for not having resisted the Maoists enough and thus being 
responsible for the fall of the Hindu kingdom (Mathema 2011: 88-9). It seems that the 
Hindutva ideology appeals especially to the younger generation of Madheshis, an 
example of this being that the HSS has more members in the Terai than in any other 
regions of Nepal.  
Patriotism or nationalism as defined by the Hindutva groups seems to contradict the 
way Madheshi nationalism is constructed: Hindu nationalism precisely concentrates on 
removing all divisions and promotes the unity of all Hindus, while Madheshi 
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nationalists often emphasize their linguistic and cultural differentiation from the 
Paharis. The history of Pahari domination hence raises a tricky question about the 
popularity of a Hindu Rashtra and the Hindutva ideology among the Madheshis. The 
Hindu state was, of course, mainly a Pahari institution where the Madheshis had little 
representation. Why would the Madheshis want to retain something that has been 
responsible for their exclusion? And more importantly, why are the Madheshis even 
keener to retain it than the Paharis themselves? These are both issues that need to be 
studied more in the future, but first of all it must be noted that the aim of most 
Madheshis is not to secede from Nepal, but rather to be included in it, to expand the 
definition of Nepalese nationalism (Mathema 2011: 49). Secondly, it seems that the 
religious question needs to be separated from the Madheshis’ demands for inclusion. 
After all, it was not the Hindu-ness of the state that alienated them, but the Nepali 
language and Pahari culture that were imposed on them (Hachhethu 2007: 5). Similarly, 
Dastider (2007) notes that the Muslims and Hindus of the Terai are united when it 
comes to opposition to Pahari domination but religious identities are what often divide 
them, especially among the more conservative or orthodox Hindus and Muslims (ibid. 
135-9). As the issue of Madheshi representation has now been solved it seems that 
religious divisions might now come increasingly to the fore. The “Hindu Andolan” or 
movement many of the Hindutva leaders talked about might be on the cards next in the 
Terai.  
Regardless of what happens in the politics of Nepal next, the Terai region will most 
probably continue to play an important role in the Sangh Parivar’s plans, it seems. 
Monarchy still has quite a lot of support in the region, so even if the king returns and 
the Sangh Parivar chooses to support him, this will probably not alienate most of the 
Madheshis who are sympathetic to the Hindutva cause. Opposition to federalism is the 
only thing that has the potential to do this, so a more Pahari-focused form of Hindutva 
that opposes ethnicity or identity -based federalism, as spearheaded by the RPP, will not 
be an option for the Madheshis. In this sense, federalism has come to create an even 
larger rift among the Hindu nationalists of Nepal than the issue of monarchy. Many 
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royalists and Paharis can often be staunch supporters of an idea of akhand Nepal 
(undivided Nepal), whereas the HSS has even made statements that are favorable 
towards federalism (Mulmi 2011). Interestingly, it is precisely identity-based federalism 
that might lead to Hindutva’s rise among the Paharis in the future as it threatens the 
position of formerly dominating sections of the society. Nevertheless, the identity 
assertions of Muslims in the Terai may similarly lead to the increasing popularity of 
Madheshi-centered Hindutva, as might the political vacuum in the area. It remains to be 
seen which form of Hindu nationalism in the end manages to find more resonance 
among the Nepalese. At the moment it seems, however, that the Sangh Parivar is more 
likely to continue to place its trust in the Madheshis, rather than the Paharis. 
3. The Threat 
3.1.Stigmatization and Emulation  
3.1.1. The Enemy and Hindu Victimization in Hindutva Propaganda 
Stigmatizing the enemies that can be seen as posing a threat to Hinduism is of utmost 
importance to the success of Hindutva mobilization. Simultaneously, an idea of a 
“Hindu unity” must also be created in order to emphasize a “we” against “them” 
dichotomy. Focusing on the religious minorities as the enemies and at the same time 
upholding an idea of Hindu unity can hence divert the attention away from the divisions 
in the Nepalese (Hindu) society. As Appadurai (2006) argues, the increasing 
mobilization of minorities can start to threaten the constructed majority identity when 
the minorities are seen to be aligning with global movements, and so the national 
minority community comes to be seen as an agent of outside forces. This perception of 
a threatening small group is then exploited by groups that claim to represent the 
majority. The Hindutva strategy of stigmatizing and simultaneously emulating the 
enemies, as described by Jaffrelot (1996), presents a perfect example of this: the 
Hindutva groups claim to represent all Hindus by constructing a standardized version of 
Hinduism, and they constantly emphasize the Otherness of the minorities by connecting 
them to global forces. For example, the Muslim mobilization around the Shah Bano 
case in India was seen by the Hindutva forces as proof of the Indian Muslims’ link-up 
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to international Islamic revivalism finding expression in the Iranian revolution, Saudi 
financed Islamist movements etc. (ibid. 338-9). Similarly, there is a constant attempt in 
the Nepalese Hindutva rhetoric to present the religious minorities in connection to 
international forces and thus to question their allegiance to the nation. The Nepalese 
Christians are seen as being part of worldwide missionary networks acting on the 
commands of Western countries, and Muslims are mentioned only in connection to the 
increasing money flows from the Gulf countries, and the Pakistani ISI or Bangladeshi 
madrassas. As Govinda Sah remarked, “We believe that you cannot believe in 
patriotism if you don’t believe in Hindu gods or the Buddha” (Interview 6). Hence, the 
foreign origins of Christianity and Islam are seen as proof of the alleged anti-
nationalism of the Christians and Muslims themselves. 
To induce the feeling that these minorities pose a threat to the Hindus and thus need to 
be resisted, the Sangh Parivar has to be able to spread its ideology among the public. 
The Hindutva propaganda’s main function is first and foremost to evoke a response 
from the majority community (Bacchetta 2004: 97).  Like its Indian counterparts, the 
Hindu right of Nepal uses pamphlets, books and newspapers, in addition to public 
rallies, as its medium for achieving this goal. As Paola Bacchetta (2004) notes, “the 
RSS has created a powerful machinery for the production and dissemination of its 
ideology. It possesses publishing companies which produce a wide array of textual 
materials in English and most vernacular languages, and has its own distribution 
network and bookstores” (ibid. 95-6).  The HSS, for example, has at least two 
Kathmandu publishing companies at its use for producing its pamphlets in Nepali and 
Hindi. The organization also publishes a biweekly newspaper called the Himal Dristi. 
The Sangh Parivar’s propaganda publications are often distributed in order to incite 
violence in communally tense localities and situations, as was also done in the post-
Ayodhya period in Nepal (Dastider 1995: 92). The exhortations to violence are 
sometimes more direct and sometimes more candid, as the propaganda often generates a 
narrative that condones the use of force against minorities, or even encourages it (van 
der Veer 1996: 268). The HSS’s pamphlet “Rashtriyata aur vaishvik avadharna” for 
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example recounts the story of how the gods Ram and Krishna slaughtered the demons 
Taraka and Putana in the Ramayana. The pamphlet then likens the demons to Christians 
and Muslims: “aaj hamare saamne taraka aur putana ke roop mein islam aur isai 
missionary khare hain” (today Islam and Christian missionaries are standing in front of 
us in the form of Taraka and Putana9) (Mishra n.d.: 32-3). The propaganda can often 
take on a much grimmer character by directly asking the Hindus to kill all the Muslims, 
as, for instance, a pamphlet distributed during the Gujarat carnage did: “Wake up 
Hindus, there are still (Muslims) alive around you” (quoted in Nussbaum 2007: 186). 
These incitements are both meant seriously and also taken so, as becomes apparent 
from the death toll of the massacres against Muslims in India. In 2004 after the attack 
on Muslims in Kathmandu the Nepalese home minister Purna Bahadur Khadka from 
the Congress party had in fact instructed intelligence officers to keep an eye on the 
Hindutva organizations’ publishing houses that were (and are) spreading this kind of 
inflammatory propaganda in Nepal (Ghimire 2005). The message of this propaganda is 
clear: the enemies of Hinduism must be eliminated. 
The Hindutva propaganda machinery relies heavily on communal stereotypes that are 
generated in order to instill hatred and suspicion into the minds of the Hindus. While 
these stereotypes do not offer any direct motivators for violence as such, they contain in 
themselves the overall idea that the minorities need to be taught a lesson and shown 
their place (van der Veer 1996: 268). In order for the propaganda to work, however, 
some concrete examples of the enemies’ actions need to be cited as proof of these 
stereotypes’ truthfulness. In addition to linking the minorities to larger global 
movements, these examples are also sought from the past (ibid.). While on the one hand 
the Hindutva narrative has always concentrated on emphasizing an idea of a  glorious 
Vedic past, the perceived historical victimization of Hindus is equally a driving force 
behind the ideology in contemporary India, where the propaganda attack has indeed 
mainly concentrated on revising the more recent history to suit the Sangh Parivar’s 
political agenda. The Hindu right has often mobilized the public around historical 
                                                            
9My translation from Hindi. 
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symbols of “Muslim tyranny” such as the Babri Masjid. This idea of historical 
humiliation of the Hindus is extremely important for the Sangh Parivar because it seems 
to legitimize what Parita Mukta (2002) calls the “politics of vendetta”. It is precisely 
from this narrative that slogans such as “garv se kaho ham hindu hain” (proudly say we 
are Hindu) emerge and mosques built centuries ago are suddenly razed to the ground by 
outraged Hindu mobs. The “wounded civilization” of Hindus may now be free of the 
conquerors of the past, but foreign tyranny is never too far from taking over India again 
as  the secular state continues to appease the minorities and lets them grow in numbers, 
thus perpetuating the humiliation of Hindus in their own country.  The propaganda of 
the present is thus heavily built on the propaganda of the past. With this “historical” 
proof the Hindu right can first of all claim that Muslims have made no positive 
contribution to the history of the Subcontinent and that it is in their nature to always 
subjugate the Hindus, if allowed to rule the country (Nussbaum 2007: 213). In the 
history of Nepal, however, the Hindus have little to feel outraged about. Since the 
country obviously lacks all the convenient symbols of historical victimization that can 
be used as calls for popular mobilization, the attention of the masses must be drawn to 
symbols representing future threats.  
One such symbol has recently been found in the form of Shleshmantak forest. This 
forest, situated on the opposite side of the Pashupatinath temple, has long been used as 
a burial ground by Hindus for  whom cremation is not allowed, such as infants and 
Yogis, but also by the Janajati Kirant community who mostly do not consider 
themselves Hindus but nevertheless believe in the sacredness of the Pashupatinath. Ever 
since the 1990s the Kirants have increasingly been converting to Christianity, and the 
sacred forest of the Hindus is now dotted with Christian gravestones. This has caused 
much furor among the orthodox Hindu community and especially within the Pashupati 
Area Development Trust (PADT), an organization formerly closely linked to the palace. 
In 1998 the PADT started removing the gravestones, which resulted in many protests 
by the Christian Kirant community. Subsequently, the PADT banned all burials of non-
Hindus in the forest, but it was quickly decided that the burials could continue until an 
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alternative solution was found. Some twelve years later, in December 2010, a ban was 
again put in effect with protests following in its wake. In March 2011 the Supreme 
Court decided that the ban should be lifted, although a Hindu activist quickly filed a 
counter petition that again stayed the ban (Mulmi 2011). The government of course 
finds itself in a difficult position in this debate: if the Hindus feel the state does not do 
enough to protect their rights, it will most probably translate into an increase in the 
support of the Hindutva forces. On the other hand, failing to take into account the 
minorities’ legitimate concerns over burial places will also have negative repercussions 
on the government.  
Meanwhile, the Shleshmantak controversy is almost a dream come true for the Sangh 
Parivar’s propaganda purposes. For the Hindutva activists it represents the invasion of 
Christianity into the sacred grounds of Hinduism. It is an incident that can always be 
evoked as an example of all the negativities that the Hindu right associates with the 
secular state and the religious minorities’ demands. More importantly, it fits perfectly 
into the Hindutva narrative about how the religious minorities would start disturbing or 
disrespecting Hinduism in a secular state, thus leading to Hindu outrage. The 
inconvenient truth for the Hindu right is, however, that when the gravestones first 
appeared in the forest Nepal was still very much a Hindu Kingdom. The controversy, 
hence, has nothing to do with secularism itself. Nonetheless, the Hindu right will 
undoubtedly aim to create fear among the public, and if the government decides to 
allow for the Christian burials to continue, the Hindutva advocates will interpret this as 
proof of the alleged anti-Hindu stance of the secular state. Such symbols of future 
threats might not be as easy to find as historical monuments representing Hindu 
victimization, however. In India symbols of “Muslim tyranny” are always there for the 
Sangh Parivar’s use, whereas there is no knowing when, or if, another case such as 
Shleshmantak will arise in Nepal. History may, thus, be easier to exploit as 
legitimization for the “Hindu vendetta”. This leaves the Hindu right of Nepal somewhat 
disadvantaged in comparison to its southern neighbors.   
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The victimization narrative is where the differences in the Hindu nationalist experiences 
of India and Nepal become most apparent: while in India the Hindu right is busy 
constructing a collective history of Hindu subjugation, in Nepal the recent history is 
that of glory, of brave Hindu resistance to expansionist outside forces. Nepal, the last 
remaining bastion of Hindu rule, was the pride of Hindus worldwide, as the propaganda 
goes. The last Hindu kingdom has, however, now fallen and its purity is becoming 
defiled as it is “being attacked by enemies, evil doers, sinners, secularists and 
communists”, as an E-mail circulated by the Sanatan Dharma, Sanskrit and Nepali 
Center from New York says (“Help Restore Hindu Rashtra Nepal”, 11.8.2007). The 
Hindu psyche has in the Hindutva advocates’ view only now become humiliated in 
Nepal and the former glory of the nation tarnished. “This has been going on for a long 
time in India and now Nepal is being attacked”, the E-mail continues (ibid.). Again, a 
comparison to India is used as a warning of what might be the future of Nepal, if the 
Hindus do not rise to protect their country in unison: “Today this holy land needs your 
help to defend and protect her, from the enemies who wish to crush and grab the soul of 
the nation”(ibid.). When looking at the propaganda that is being spread about the 
“enemies” of the Hindu nation, namely the Christians and Muslims, this difference to 
the Indian narrative becomes all the more apparent: the Nepalese narrative is mainly 
focusing on supposed threats in the future, on something that might now happen as the 
Hindu-ness of the state is no longer protected.  
3.1.2. The Christian Threat 
While it is true that in India the Sangh Parivar has largely concentrated its attacks on the 
Muslim minority, in the past ten years or so the Hindutva groups have started to 
increasingly target also Christians, for example in the violence that occurred in 2008 in 
Kandhamal, Orissa or in the burning alive of Western missionaries in the late 1990s. 
Attacks against Christians have occurred especially in Eastern India where the Adivasis 
have converted to Christianity. Hence, the Nepalese context where the Christians are 
singled out as the number one enemies of the Hindu nation is by no means unique. A 
driving force behind the Hindutva ideology has from the beginning been its fear of 
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conversions, whether to Islam or Christianity, and this has resulted in the need to 
reform Hinduism in a way that keeps the lower castes and Adivasis in the Hindu fold. 
Similarly, the defensive type of Hinduism that the rulers of Nepal brought with them 
from the plains of India has been characterized by this fear, apparent first in the ban on 
foreigners’ entry into the country and then in the law prohibiting conversions. It is 
interesting to note that the Malla dynasty, that ruled the valley of Kathmandu before the 
unification of Nepal, had an entirely different approach to missionaries. The first 
Capuchin missionaries had come to Nepal in 1715 from Italy, and the kings seemed to 
have no apprehensions towards their work and were not trying to stop people from 
changing their religion. In fact, the kings seem to have been particularly ecumenical in 
comparison to the Shahs and Ranas (Toffin 2006: 223). Under the Gorkhali rule both 
conversions and proselytizing were punished quite heavily by six and three years of 
imprisonment respectively, and when the first census of Nepal was conducted in the late 
1950s, there were officially less than 30 Christians in the country (Fricke 2008: 35). 
The law banning conversions subsequently became a manifestation of the Hindu-ness 
of the state and, though not implemented since the 1990s, in 2011 the government of 
Nepal announced it was again planning to impose a ban on proselytizing. This law 
would, however, only apply to Protestants who are allegedly involved in coercing the 
Nepalese to change their religion. This underlines how deeply rooted the fears of 
conversions have become, especially among the educated middle class Hindus. 
According to Sudhindra Sharma (2002), the Nepalese press was long publishing stories 
about Christianity that solely concentrated on narratives about poor people being lured 
to change their religion with promises of free education, medical treatment etc. (ibid. 
34). The Hindu right of course makes use of these same arguments and is also quick to 
point out how the number of Christian converts in the country has been increasing in 
recent years. Indeed, the estimates have changed quite a lot since the 1950s and today 
the number is put closer to a million or even two million, depending on who one 
chooses to believe (Fricke 2008: 35-6). Some sources even argue that eight percent of 
the Nepalese population is already Christian, while the official census of 2001 puts the 
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percentage at only 0.5. The census data produced by the government has always been a 
matter of debate from all sides, but the fact is that the number of Christians has been 
increasing quite rapidly and it can be expected to be even larger in the 2011 census once 
it is published. However, when looking at the growing numbers of Christians in the 
country, it must first of all be taken into account that prior to 1990 Christians were 
systematically persecuted by the state. Ever since the 90s the fear of imprisonment has 
no longer forced people to hide their religious identity, so the increase in numbers is 
also probably a result of the change in the atmosphere. Most of the Nepalese converts 
are found among the Janajati groups, more specifically those that have continued to 
practice their animistic religions. Hence, it is the groups that have not been integrated 
into Hinduism, making up about 20 % of the Nepalese population, that seem to be more 
attracted to Christianity than the more Hinduized Janajati communities or the lower 
castes. As Gaborieau (1994) points out, the part of the population that seems to be, in a 
sense, vulnerable to conversions is, thus, merely a fraction (ibid.68). 
The narrative about conversions offered by the Hindutva advocates is designed to instill 
fear into the Hindus’ minds about a rapidly growing Christian population that is soon 
going to turn the present Hindu majority into a minority. It paints a picture of the 
Christians as aggressive zealots out to convert the entire population of Nepal into 
Christianity through bribery and coercion. In the Hindutva advocates’ imagination the 
conversions are explicitly tied to the Christians’ alleged global connections and 
financial assets that are then contrasted to the poverty and “helplessness” of the 
Nepalese. The missionaries are thought to be specifically targeting poor people from 
lower castes and ethnic minorities. For example, Vijay Prakash of the WHF and Nepali 
Dharma Sansad (Nepali Religious Parliament) said that “Christians go to the poorest 
lower caste people and create fear among them (---) they should not sell religions” 
(Interview 5). These alleged activities get also linked to NGOs and human rights 
organizations that are accused of working in collaboration with the missionaries: “If 
some Christian missionaries get arrested for trying to convert people, these 
organizations will try to secure them. At the moment NGOs in Nepal are more powerful 
 90 
 
than the government.” (Interview 6, Govinda Sah).  Western countries and churches are 
also thought to be backing Christianity’s spread in Nepal: “May be, there [sic, they] are 
in minority in Nepal, but they have support [sic] of Big Churches of Western countries 
and had been provided lot [sic] of money and power by international politics. Due to 
which Christianity is spreading in Nepal. It may take enormous form in far future. We 
are aware of this.” (E-mail communication, Vijay Prakash, 2.10.2010). Western 
countries are hence branded agents of Christianity, and their alleged interest in the 
religious affairs of Nepal is explained through the supposed expansionist drive of the 
religion: “[They want to] establish one world order which is norms [sic] of Christianity. 
Bible has ordered it’s [sic] follower to make all world population [sic] believe in 
Yahoba (father of Jesus). So Western nations would want to interfere in the affairs of 
Nepal.” (ibid.)  
In this way, the conversions happening on the Nepalese soil become part of a much 
larger global conspiracy of Christianity and the West to wipe out Hinduism, and the 
small minority suddenly starts to seem extremely threatening and powerful. The global 
connections are indeed emphasized so much that simply by listening to the Hindutva 
activists it would start to seem like it is only the foreigners who are engaging in 
missionary activities in the country. This is of course not true, as Nepalese Christians 
have themselves also been active in spreading the religion inside the country (for 
example, Fricke 2008: 38).  Nevertheless, in the Hindutva rhetoric the emphasis on the 
role of foreign missionaries is needed to reinforce the idea of the foreignness of 
Christianity itself (Zavos 2001: 87-8). In India the Hindu right also links the Christians 
to colonialism and Western imperialism, making references to the times when 
missionaries were converting increasing numbers of Indians in order to “civilize” them 
and to erode Indian resistance to the colonial state. The vilification of Hinduism thus 
became an important strategy of domination for the colonial forces (ibid. 81). British 
rule in itself is also seen as Christians’ rule over Hindus, and the VHP has vowed to 
resist conversions as “valiantly” as the Indians fought colonialism (ibid.). The linking 
of the present situation with the victimization narrative of the past, thus, continues in 
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the Indian context. Again, as the Hindu right of Nepal has no such history in its use, it 
must exclusively concentrate on trying to convince the public of the international links 
of the Christians of Nepal, and that the conversions might pose a threat to the Hindus 
“in far future”. What worries the Hindu right even more is the fact that the marginal 
groups it would like to win over to its own side are now increasingly attracted to 
Christianity. This, for the Hindutva advocates, represents “de-nationalization” since 
Christianity is seen as an agent of outside forces and its spread is, thus, seen as a form 
of neo-colonialism (ibid. 85). A change of religion must then amount to a change of 
loyalties, in the Hindutva advocates’ imagination. The Hindutva rhetoric has indeed 
tried to connect Christian conversions to secessionist and separatist movements in 
India, in particular by citing the example of the Naga insurgency in the North-East 
where the vast majority of the population has converted to Christianity (Jaffrelot 1996: 
197-8). Such arguments were, however, not made by the Nepalese Hindutva advocates. 
Indeed, the Nepalese Hindutva propaganda concentrates on making the converts seem 
like victims of outside aggression, thus perpetuating a common paternalistic view of the 
lower castes and Janajatis where they are denied agency and simply viewed as 
“recipients” of a foreign religion, as Fricke (2008: 59) puts it.  
The conversion pattern is, of course, not as straightforward or black and white as the 
Hindutva advocates would like the public to believe. First of all, it is extremely difficult 
to obtain any kind of evidence of forced conversions happening in Nepal, although the 
Hindutva advocates claim to be aware of many individual cases. When asked to meet 
these people, it was quickly declared that they had moved out of town or that their 
contact details could not be obtained. The Christian leaders I interviewed firmly refuted 
the claims of forced conversions and said that the Hindutva groups are misinterpreting 
their charity work. MC Matthew, the co-pastor of Birgunj Church, originally from the 
Indian state of Kerala, also pointed out that “outsiders think the people became 
Christians because of the money, although they were Christians already before” 
(Interview 10).  This kind of a (perhaps deliberate) misunderstanding could also be at 
the heart of an example, given by Govinda Sah, of the “manipulation” the Christians 
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allegedly engage in. He recounted a story of how Christian missionaries had come to 
his door and tried to “manipulate” him. When asked if he had been offered any money 
in exchange for conversion, he changed the topic and stated that “I have a friend whose 
school fees are paid by Christians” (Field notes, 27.3.2011). It then turned out that this 
friend had been Christian all along and had not converted simply because of promises 
of financial aid.   
Of course, the missionary activities of Christians in Nepal are a fact, and these activities 
have surely increased in recent years. The Christians do not try to deny this, as 
spreading their religion’s message is an important part of Christianity: “We are very 
active in preaching. (---) We are just obeying Jesus’ command”, as Peter Kamaleshwar 
Singh, the pastor of Birgunj Church, said (Interview 10). The presence of Western 
missionaries in Nepal is of course also a fact. Many of these missionaries also represent 
evangelical strands of Christianity that can certainly be quite persuasive in their work, 
and as Sudhindra Sharma (2002) argues, they can also sometimes be uncompromising 
and hence anti-pluralist which might indeed lead to confrontations (ibid. 34). Some of 
these missionaries’ agendas might even be as extreme as the Hindutva advocates claim, 
and they may indeed be harboring hopes of converting the entire population of Nepal 
into Christianity. Such fundamentalist Christian projects have in fact been seen in India 
in late 90s, for example in the form of AD2000, the aim of which was to spread the 
gospel to every person in the world by the year 2000. This and other similar projects 
had, however, little influence in India (Bhatt 2001: 198). The fundamentalist Christians’ 
presence in Nepal is also probably quite small, and it is unlikely that their actions would 
have any serious consequences. The Sangh Parivar, however, believes that there is a 
global alliance between the Pope and these fundamentalist organizations (ibid.). The 
Nepalese Hindu right also repeatedly used this argument. Such claims are most likely 
made because of the fact that the Pope’s centrality to Catholicism is seen by the Hindu 
nationalists as proof of the unity of all Christians, which again is supposed to be the 
source of their alleged strength in comparison to the weak Hindus (Jaffrelot 1996: 196-
7). Scattered small fundamentalist organizations would of course not seem as 
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threatening on their own, and they must, thus, be linked to the supposedly all-powerful 
Vatican, which indeed was even accused of being behind the declaration of Nepal as 
secular.  
Hence, the fact that the Christians of Nepal can be accused of undermining the Hindu 
society by “alluring” the ethnic minorities and lower castes, and that they seem to be 
backed by institutions far more powerful than the poor Hindus, makes them the perfect 
enemy for the Hindu right of Nepal. The rapid increase in conversions since 1990 
seems to be the main reason for singling out the Christian community, aided by the fact 
that throughout Nepal’s history it has been the prohibition of conversions that has been 
the main expression of the Hindu-ness of the state. Also the fact that even many 
moderate Hindus see conversions as a threat to Hindus will undoubtedly contribute to 
the resonance of the Hindutva rhetoric in Nepal in the future. In comparison, the 
Muslims of Nepal have not been accused of engaging in proselytizing, thus leading to 
them being viewed with less paranoia by the Hindutva advocates of Nepal.  
3.1.3. The Muslim Threat 
The Muslim population of Nepal, constructing the third largest religious group of the 
country with 4.2 %, is mainly concentrated in the Terai region, having their origins in 
different parts of Northern India. There are, however, also Muslims inhabiting the Hill 
area whose ancestors migrated from Kashmir and some even from Tibet (S. Sharma 
2004: 108-110). The Muslim population is at least officially considered larger than the 
Christian population (0.5 %), although these official estimates are heavily contested as 
already pointed out, and many suggest that the real percentages are much larger - in the 
Muslims’ case actually somewhere closer to 8-10 % (Siddique 2001: 333). Regardless 
of what the real number of Muslims in Nepal is, they are still most probably a larger 
community than the Christians. Hence, it is interesting to note that the Hindu right of 
Nepal does not see the Muslims as such a large threat to the Hindus as the Christians. 
Indeed, the Muslims were not mentioned nearly as often in the interviews, and 
conversions to Christianity were clearly made out to be the main threat to Hinduism, 
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and thus responsible for disrupting the inter-religious relations of Nepal. As Sudhindra 
Sharma (2004) points out, the Muslims, unlike the Christians, have always by and large 
complied with the state’s prohibition on conversions (ibid.116). This is undoubtedly the 
main reason that the Hindutva advocates of Nepal decide to direct most of their 
attention towards the Christians. 
The Muslims are reserved a special place in the Hindutva propaganda of India due to 
mainly historical reasons. The history Islam in South Asia, which starts from the 
Afghan and Turk invasions in 11th century and culminates in the Delhi Sultanate and 
Mughal Empire that ruled in India from the 13th to 16th century and 16th to 18th century 
respectively, builds the backbone of this propaganda for the Hindu right. The violence 
that accompanied the erstwhile invasions is often exaggerated and the times of inter-
religious harmony, like that of Akbar’s rule in the 16th century, are significantly 
downplayed in order to induce the idea of Muslim tyranny over the Hindus.  Another 
important aspect of this particular view of history is the emphasis it places on an idea of 
a unified Hindu nation that existed in the past, until the Muslims came and disrupted 
everything by bringing violence and separatism with them (Nussbaum 2007: 213). Of 
course, such claims of Hindu unity are highly contested by scholars, as the Hindutva 
account of history does not take into consideration the societal divisions and tensions 
that existed in ancient and medieval India, resulting from for example caste, class and 
gender (ibid. 214). The Partition of British India and the creation of Pakistan in 1947 
have also contributed significantly to the stereotypical image of Muslims that the Hindu 
right often puts forward. As the Muslim population started to increasingly assert its 
identity and subsequently to demand a separate homeland in the 1930s and 40s, the 
Hindu nationalists felt increasingly threatened by this minority. The massive communal 
violence that erupted as a result of the Partition, especially in the divided state of 
Punjab, left deep marks in the psyches of both newly independent nations, and gave a 
new international dimension to the formerly domestic conflict (Gaborieau 1985: 8). 
Ever since the creation of Pakistan, the Muslims that decided to stay on in India have 
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been viewed with suspicion by the Hindu nationalists who see that they identify 
themselves more with Pakistan than with India.  
These “historical” claims are thus used to reinforce the idea of the inherent violence, 
intolerance and anti-nationalism of the Muslims in contrast to the supposedly more 
peaceful Hindus, and to invoke outrage in the unjustly victimized majority community. 
This historical dimension is again absent in the Nepalese context, of course. The 
Muslim population of Nepal has from the beginning been relatively small and 
unassertive, and has thus provided little reason for worry for the Hindu nationalists – 
except when the community has started to demand its rights (Dastider 2007). The 
Hindutva organizations of Nepal have not spared the Muslims from violent attacks, 
provocation and propaganda during such times, as has already been discussed. Despite 
the fact that the Indian Hindutva rhetoric draws a great deal from one sided views of 
history, it also bases its propaganda on the alleged global connections of the Muslim 
population. It periodically accuses the Muslims of supporting Pakistan-based terrorist 
groups, of aligning with global revivalist movements and of only being loyal to their 
religious community, rather than to India, as already pointed out. These claims have, of 
course, been increasingly easy to make in the post-9/11 world and also in the light of 
Pakistan’s role in sending the mujahedeen to Indian administered Kashmir. The 
Hindutva narrative focuses on emphasizing the role of foreign militants in the escalation 
of the Kashmir conflict, with the purpose of again externalizing the “threat of Islam” 
and questioning the loyalty of Indian Muslims (Zavos 2001: 88). 
The Hindu right of Nepal also attempts to link the Muslim community to outside forces. 
Interestingly, however, many interviewees also stated that the Nepalese Muslims 
themselves are “good” but “outside influence is bad” (Interview 9). This could be 
interpreted as meaning that the Muslims do not pose a threat to the Nepalese Hindus as 
long as they remain unassertive and accept their second-class status in the society. As 
soon as they are seen to be organizing themselves, this is interpreted as “outside 
influence”, which again must mean expansionism, fundamentalism and terrorism. An 
increasing number of madrassas being built with foreign financing and the Muslims’ 
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alleged links to the Pakistani ISI or terrorist organizations such as Lashkar-e-Toiba 
were indeed the main issues that the Hindutva advocates addressed in the interviews 
with regard to the Muslims. As already mentioned earlier, since the 1990s there has 
been an increasing turn amongst all religious communities of Nepal towards more 
literal interpretations of their religion, and the same has of course been true with the 
Muslims as well. Most Muslims of Nepal are Sunnis of the Hanafi school of law, but 
there is also a small minority of Shias in the South West of the country (Sijapati 2011: 
656). Historically, Sufism and the veneration of saints constitute an important part of 
the Islamic traditions throughout the Subcontinent, all the way from Pakistan to 
Bangladesh, and this is also something that is very visible among the Muslims of Nepal 
(ibid. 657). Sufism tends to be very inclusive and pluralistic in its practices and it also 
incorporates many elements from Hinduism. According to Sijapati (ibid.), the Muslims 
in the Hill region are mainly followers of saint oriented strands of Islam, such as 
Barelwi and, indeed, Sufism. The Terai Muslims, however, are more influenced by 
reformist strands, such as Deoband, Ahl-e Hadis and Jamaat-i Islami or Salafi schools 
of thought that are often branded “Wahabi” because of their conservative and literal 
interpretations of religion.  
It is true that most of the madrassas are concentrated in the Terai region, and that the 
Nepalese Muslims who advocate more conservative views of Islam have in fact often 
studied abroad, for example in Pakistan or in the Indian city of Lucknow. These 
Muslims are also the ones who are particularly active in the present identity politics of 
Nepal. Organizations such as Millat-e-Islamiya Nepal, Islami Sangh Nepal and All 
Nepal Ittehad Sangh represent these reformist strands of Islam, but they are also very 
active in charity work and the overall improvement of the condition of the Muslim 
community (ibid. 658). It is therefore true that the Muslim community of Nepal is 
influenced by global developments of Islam, and that they are increasingly also 
traveling to the Middle East to either work or receive education. Nevertheless, such 
developments can hardly be directly linked to terrorist organizations or the Pakistani 
ISI. There is, nevertheless, at least one quite radical Muslim organization active in the 
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Terai, called the Islami Ekta Sangh, that has often clashed with Hindutva groups in the 
past (Dastider 2007: 164). Largely the Muslims of Nepal have been peaceful, however, 
and there hasn’t been a single incident of Islamist terrorism in the country. In fact, as 
the precious chapters show, it has been overwhelmingly the Hindutva oriented groups 
that have engaged in such activities in Nepal ever since secularism.  As the Muslims are 
now increasingly demanding that the new constitution would also take their community 
into consideration, the Hindutva rhetoric is likely to grow more hostile towards them.  
At the moment, however, it is clearly the activities of Christians that occupy the Hindu 
right’s attention in Nepal.  
3.1.4. Creating a United “Hindudom” in Nepal 
Probably the most difficult task ahead for the Sangh Parivar is the unification of all the 
Hindus of Nepal – or rather, all the religions and ethnic groups it considers Hindus. 
This would include all the Janajati groups, Buddhists, lower castes and Dalits, and also 
in theory the Sikhs and Jains, although there are very few of them in Nepal. The most 
significant aspect of this process is to create a nationalized Hinduism through the 
homogenization of the religious and cultural diversity of Nepal and evoke national and 
international “Hindu solidarity” by concentrating on symbols that all Hindus can accept. 
Again, all this has little to do with the religious dimensions of Hinduism as such, as the 
mission is explicitly to bring a nationalist flavor into religious identifications (Hansen 
1999: 102). One of the main aims of the Hindutva ideology has always been to erase the 
divisions and differentiations that are abundant in the Hindu society, and considered the 
reason for its weakness by the Hindutva advocates. To overcome this weakness, the 
Hindutva forces seek to imitate the Muslims and Christians whose supposed unity is 
thought to be their greatest strength (Jaffrelot 1996: 347).  
The VHP was founded precisely for this task. The organization indeed claims to 
represent all Hindus, while it simultaneously dictates a code of conduct, a set of 
practices all the Hindus are to abide by, the purpose of which is of course to unify them 
(ibid. 348). The WHF, sharing the agenda of the VHP and indeed being almost one and 
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the same with it, states its aim to be “to create awareness for the protection of cows and 
eradicate orthodox discriminatory social practices and anomalies of custom, beliefs and 
rituals without infringing the basic principles enumerated in the Holy Scriptures” 
(worldhindufederation.com, emphasis added). The WHF, like the VHP, clearly wants to 
be an authority that can prescribe what is considered an anomaly and what standard 
Hinduism, although standard Hinduism as such can hardly be argued to exist. It is also 
debatable whether Hinduism can even be thought to construct one single religion, since 
there is so much variation inside it in the form of local practices, different sects, 
traditions and castes. It was indeed only in the colonial times that the English term 
“Hinduism” started to be used mainly for administrative purposes, and it was most 
probably coined by Christian missionaries in the 19th century (Madan: 1997: 177). 
Hence, the standardization and unity of Hinduism must be constructed and constantly 
strived for. One such attempt at promoting “Hindu unity” was the VHP’s ekatmata 
yagna (sacrifice for unity) in 1983. It was a procession of three caravans carrying the 
water of the Ganges, all traveling from one holy place to another along common 
pilgrimage routes, utilizing two symbols that all Hindus could venerate: the holy river 
and bharat mata (Mother India). These caravans were joined by 69 others on the way 
and all met in Nagpur where the headquarters of RSS is (Jaffrelot 1996: 360-1). One of 
these caravans in fact started off from Kathmandu, having first been blessed by King 
Birendra and Queen Aishwarya, and headed off for Rameshvaram in Southern India 
carrying the king’s portrait (McKean 1996: 121). As Chetan Bhatt (2001) points out, 
the linking of Nepal and South India, two sites that historically represent different 
religious traditions, was quite significant in that it “was a displacement of their distinct 
traditions by the symbols of territorial Hindutva” (ibid. 1990).  
Since the Hindutva advocates consider themselves the authorities on declaring what is 
proper Hinduism and what is not, they also consider it their duty to “civilize” and 
“modernize” all “misguided” groups. This in practice means imposing a Sanskritized 
Hinduism on all the indigenous groups who may or may not consider themselves Hindu 
(Hansen 1999: 107). In Nepal Shaktism, or village Hinduism, in which animal 
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sacrifices and goddess worship play a crucial part, has always been widely practiced, 
and the religious practices popular among the common people have been inclusive and 
syncretistic, incorporating folk beliefs and local traditions. According to Sudhindra 
Sharma (2004), this pluralism has been precisely the factor that has brought ethnic 
Janajati groups into the fold of Hinduism (ibid.121-2). Thus, it seems that Hindutva’s 
version of Hinduism might not work so well in the Nepalese context, at least among the 
Janajatis. In fact, it has been precisely the orthodox, state propagated interpretations of 
Hinduism that have often caused the greatest deal of alienation in them (S. Sharma 
2002: 27). The difficulties in attempting to unify all the Nepalese caste and ethnic 
groups under a single understanding of culture and religion are thus already evident in 
the history of the country and the recent emergence of identity politics. Unlike in India, 
the ethnic minorities and Buddhists of Nepal already know what a Hindu majoritarian 
state is like, and mobilizing them for the cause of Hindutva will be a difficult task. As 
Prem Bahadur Shakya, the president of a Buddhist organization Nepal Boudha Samaj, 
said: “So many years of Hindu Kingdom. What did it achieve?” (Interview 12.) It 
seems, thus, that the Buddhists and most of the Janajatis would see little sense in 
returning to the situation of the past. This will not stop the Sangh Parivar from trying to 
convince them otherwise, however.  
All the Hindutva leaders I interviewed indeed remembered to emphasize that Buddhists 
and all Janajatis are also Hindus, and that they can only be protected from becoming 
victims of Christian missionaries in a Hindu Rashtra. Rhetoric alone is, of course, not 
enough, and this is where the Hindutva advocates turn into Hindu missionaries. The 
VHP has indeed been targeting the Adivasis (indigenous people) of India by adopting 
largely similar tactics to the Christians active in the country. One of its projects has 
been to establish an organization known as Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram (Tribal 
Development Center) that coordinates social work and conversion activities in the 
Adivasi heartlands in emulation of the many education institutions and medical 
facilities started by Christian missionaries (Hansen 1999: 103). Such projects have also 
been started in Nepal: the HSS, for example, has altogether almost 50 schools in the 
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country and it runs a Janajati Kalyan Ashram in Teku, Kathmandu, where it schools 
children from the ethnic minorities. The aim of the ashram, according to Govinda Sah, 
is “to develop the Janajatis by conserving nature, saving their indigenous practices and 
by bringing them into modern line.” He also added that “All Janajatis see themselves as 
Hindu and even if not, it doesn’t matter. As long as they are not Christian or Muslim” 
(Field notes, 27.3.2011). What this clearly implies is that the Janajatis’ self-
identification is of no importance to the HSS, because the organization sees them as 
Hindus anyway. “Saving their indigenous practices” would mean acknowledging their 
cultural and religious differentiation, so indigenous seems to mean “Hindu” to the HSS. 
“Bringing them into modern line” on the other hand seems to be understood in terms of 
eradicating “anomalies of custom, belief and rituals”, as advocated by the WHF, since 
the HSS also trains the Janajatis in Hindu philosophy – or rather its own interpretation 
of it. All this seems to construct is exactly the kind of forced “cultural uplift” that 
Hansen (1999) describes, where the ethnic minorities are turned into “respectable” 
Hindus, so that they would not face discrimination from the society (ibid.104-6). Such 
discrimination would, of course, render these groups vulnerable to the Christians. The 
Sangh Parivar also has a rescue plan for those that have already converted: it regularly 
conducts re-conversion ceremonies where large numbers of Christians, and sometimes 
also Muslims, abandon their religion and are taken back into the fold of Hinduism 
(Bhatt 2001: 198). According to Vijay Prakash of the WHF, such ceremonies have been 
conducted in Nepal as well (Interview 5.). 
While the Indian Sangh Parivar has all these strategies ready for the Nepalese Hindu 
right’s use for countering conversions, the problem presented by the Buddhists is in a 
sense unique to Nepal. First of all, the Buddhists constitute the second largest religious 
group of Nepal with around 10.7 %, while in India they make up only around 0.8% of 
the population. The Buddhists have received fairly little attention in the Hindutva 
discourse, although there seems to have been some ambivalence towards them in the 
past. As already mentioned, V.D. Savarkar was quite hostile towards the religion in the 
beginning because of its rejection of violence. Today, however, Buddhism is regarded 
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as a sect of Hinduism, and the VHP has even invited the Dalai Lama to open one of its 
conferences in 1979 (Jaffrelot 1996: 347). Secondly, the Buddhist population of Nepal 
is predominantly found among the Janajatis, for example the Newars, Sherpas and other 
groups whose origin is mainly believed to be in Tibet (Dastider 1995: 53-64). In India, 
however, most of the Buddhists are converts, mostly of Hindu Dalit origin. According 
to Leve (2011), many Janajatis of Nepal have increasingly been trying to reclaim their 
Buddhist roots that they believe to have had before assimilation into Hinduism (ibid. 
515). Hence, asserting a Buddhist identity seems to have come to be used as a way to 
express opposition to the majoritarian Hindu state. Buddhist organizations have, of 
course, been at the forefront of demanding secularism in Nepal ever since the protests 
in 1990 and it also seems that the Buddhist community by and large shares these 
sentiments. According to the survey conducted by International IDEA, 69 % of the 
Buddhists in 2004 supported secularism. In 2007, however, this percentage had risen to 
78 (Hachhethu, Kumar and Sen 2008: 86). Compared to Muslims and Christians this is 
an opposite development, as the support for Hindu kingdom had in fact increased 
among these two communities. This is something that can probably be largely put down 
to the fact that the Buddhists have not been at the receiving end of violent attacks, 
whereas Muslims and Christians have been targeted. The Buddhists, hence, do not seem 
to be affected by the fear that the state would not protect them from violence if they 
increase their demands for their rights.  
The Hindutva advocates do not seem to have any concrete plans for the recruitment of 
the Buddhists, even though on the rhetorical level they are constantly made out to be 
Hindus. It seems that the Buddhists are a lost cause for the Hindu right in Nepal: 
Buddhists cannot be seen as enemies of the Hindus because their religion is indigenous 
to the Subcontinent, and the “cultural uplift” strategies do not seem to suit to their case 
either. Converting to Buddhism has come to be used as a tactic especially by the Dalits 
of India, as advocated by Bhimrao Ambedkar, the architect of the Indian constitution 
and a Dalit leader, because it seems to provide an escape from the caste discrimination 
of Hinduism. Today it also saves the Dalits from becoming targets of Hindutva wrath, 
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which they would no doubt have to face if they converted to Christianity or Islam. The 
Hindu right has attempted to appropriate Amdedkar in its rhetoric and to portray him as 
an opponent of Islam and Christianity, because he chose to convert to Buddhism instead 
(Hansen 1999: 226-8). As the Buddhists of Nepal are not converts, such a tactic cannot 
be applied to them (Bouillier 1997: 97). The Buddhists do not seem to be easily scared 
by Christian missionary activities either: Prem Bahadur Shakya, for example, did not 
see the activities of Christians as posing a threat to the Buddhists and he in fact said that 
“People should be free to convert by themselves” (Interview 12.). The Buddhist 
leadership (and for the most part the community as well) seems to be united with both 
Christians and Muslims in their demands for holding onto secularism. The Hindutva 
activists of Nepal were thus simply forced to claim that the Buddhist leaders who 
support secularism do not represent the true sentiments of their communities, and that 
all Buddhists want to live in a Hindu Rashtra (Interview 11.). The problems related to 
Buddhists are, thus, completely denied by the Nepalese Hindu right. Beyond rhetoric, 
there seems to be little that the Hindutva groups can do, as the Buddhists cannot be 
attacked and it is also very difficult to recruit them. 
On the whole, the political climate in Nepal may not be ideal for the kind of “Hindu 
unity”, as imagined by the Hindutva groups. The recent years have brought too many 
divisions to the fore in the form of language, ethnicity and religion. The Janajatis of 
Nepal have been particularly active in asserting their cultural, religious and ethnic 
identities. One of the most significant problems is posed by the fact that all these 
minorities whose support the Hindutva forces wish to gain have already seen many 
years of majoritarian Hindu rule, and Buddhism has been used as a way to assert their 
separate identity and to oppose the Hindu state. Nevertheless, as it is exactly these 
minority assertions that might lead to moderate Hindus increasingly turning towards 
Hindutva, the Hindu right of Nepal does not have to worry about the Buddhists and 
Janajatis so much. Hence, the real hope of the Hindutva forces remains on the one hand 
in the Madheshis and on the other in those disillusioned by the federalism debate. The 
Dalits and lower castes, as already mentioned, do not seem to have much to gain from 
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ethnicity-based federalism, so they form another potential support base for the Hindu 
right – both in the Terai and in the Hills. These are groups that will most likely be 
targeted by the Hindutva parties that oppose the formation of states along ethnic lines, 
such as the RPP. The more India-leaning groups such as the HSS will most likely 
continue to put their faith in the Madheshis. Nevertheless, the conflict between Paharis 
and Madheshis will of course hinder the aspirations for a unified Hindu Nepal, but if the 
Hindu right can use the situation in the Terai to launch a strong movement for a Hindu 
Rashtra, this division will probably not play such a large role anymore. Rather than the 
Buddhist or Janajati problem, the federalism debate is, thus, the largest obstacle 
standing on the way of consolidating an idea of Hindu unity which could translate into a 
single “Hindu vote”.  
III. Conclusion 
Ever since the historical relations between the militant Hindu nationalist groups of India 
and the rulers of Nepal came to an abrupt end in 2006 when Nepal was declared secular, the 
rhetoric of the Nepalese Hindutva groups has turned more hostile than ever before. The 
initial reaction to secularism was seen in the form of protests, especially in the Terai region, 
and in comments that seemed to be veiled threats towards the religious minorities. The 
Hindutva groups’ argument was, and continues to be, that if Nepal is not a secular country, 
inter-religious relations will suffer because the minorities’ activities will no longer be 
controlled by the Hindu state. Because it is believed that it is in the Christians and 
Muslims’ nature to be intolerant, expansionist and violent, the tolerant and peaceful 
Hindus’ existence will become threatened in a secular state. Thus, the Hindus cannot be 
expected to tolerate this and they must retaliate to these perceived threats in order to protect 
their religion. These verbal threats quickly turned into reality in the form of bomb attacks 
targeting mosques and churches, carried out by fringe groups demanding a return to a 
Hindu kingdom.  
The second reaction came after 2008 when monarchy was finally abolished in Nepal. The 
Sangh Parivar realized it needed to mobilize the people of Nepal, as its most important ally 
in Nepal was finally gone. If the pro-Hindutva forces want to rise to power, they now need 
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to contest elections. The Hindutva advocates of Nepal, who had been drawing up strategies 
with their Indian allies, decided to abandon advocating the reinstatement of the Hindu 
kingdom, realizing that continuing to sideline with an unpopular ruler could hinder their 
attempts at political mobilization. Instead, they decided to concentrate on simply 
demanding a Hindu Rashtra, which still has quite a lot of support among people. A Hindu 
Rashtra is justified by arguing that Hindus, Buddhists and Janajatis can only be secure if 
they are protected from the invasion and intolerance of Islam and Christianity - something 
that for the Hindu right seems to manifest itself in the form of conversions. Secularism, as 
it represents this invasion and a conspiracy of neo-colonial forces, must be resisted above 
all else, even if this means making some compromises on the ideological level. The strategy 
of abandoning the former king was, however, not adopted by all, in particular some Pahari 
Hindutva advocates, mainly found among royalist, Hindu nationalist parties such as the 
RPP and Shiv Sena Nepal. The groups most closely associated with the Indian Sangh 
Parivar (mainly the HSS and WHF) seemed to prefer a strategy of political pragmatism 
over ideological purity. 
The third reaction went hand in hand with the second one. As the king was largely 
abandoned, the Sangh Parivar simultaneously turned towards the Madheshis, trying to turn 
an anti-Maoist sentiment into a pro-Hindu Rashtra one. As the Madheshi uprising largely 
attained its goals, a strong Hindu movement might emerge next in the political vacuum of 
the Terai. The Terai is the area of Nepal where the largest Hindutva influence can be seen, 
coming from across the border. Also being home to the Muslim minority, this is where the 
most communal violence in the past has taken place. The Madheshi movement, hence, 
seems to present the largest potential for the Hindutva forces at the moment, something 
which can also be seen in the fact that the HSS has adopted a pro-federalism stand. 
Nevertheless, as the present political chaos might also provide a favorable environment for 
the royalists, it remains to be seen which form of Hindutva will end up resonating more 
among the Nepalese.  
The Hindutva propaganda that is being spread about the religious minorities chooses the 
Christians as its main targets. Conversions, seen as being the result of bribery and coercion, 
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are depicted as the conspiracy of Western, Christian nations. NGOs and international 
development aid are seen as proof of the global connections of this small minority. 
Simultaneously, this minority is said to be growing at an alarming rate, soon turning into a 
majority. The Muslims, a historically unassertive community in Nepal, are not spared 
either. They are also presented as having connections to international movements and 
networks, such as Lashkar-e-Toiba or the Pakistani ISI. These claims about the minorities 
are, however, not as easy to make as in India, where the stereotypes can also be linked to 
the Hindu victimization narrative. Historical symbols of “Muslim tyranny” such as the 
Babri Masjid are easy to exploit and use as calls for mobilization, whereas Nepal lacks all 
such monuments, having been under Hindu rule throughout its history. For this reason, the 
evidence of these threats and stereotypes must be found in the present, leading to agitations 
such as the Shleshmantak forest case, representing alleged Christianity’s invasion to the 
sacred grounds of Hinduism. In addition to stigmatizing the enemy, a unified “Hindudom” 
must also be created in Nepal. This process includes on the one hand rhetorical tactics 
where Buddhists and Janajatis are referred to as being Hindus, but on the other hand also 
practical tactics are used in emulation of the enemies. The Hindutva forces try to counter 
the threat of conversions by themselves engaging in similar activities. 
The current situation in Nepal where the religious and ethnic minorities have challenged the 
state-propagated nationalism, based on Hinduism, Nepali language and the king, might 
indeed prove to present a situation where the popularity of the Hindutva ideology will rise. 
Nevertheless, the unification of all Hindus will be a problem for the Hindu right. The 
largest obstacle seems to be the Pahari-Madheshi conflict, but even if these two groups are 
divided on the issue of federalism, Hindu identity seems to be what unites them. Hence, if 
the religious identity of Hindus is mobilized to feel threatened, these two groups will most 
likely stand united. On the other hand, if the issue of federalism is not solved, these two 
strands of Hindutva will continue to drift further apart.  The general opinion of the people 
that seems to be in favor of a Hindu Rashtra might also be turned to the Sangh Parivar’s 
advantage, especially if the Hindutva groups manage to convince the public that Hinduism 
is “under siege” like in India in the 1980s. Generally, it seems that every time the Christians 
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and Muslims have started to demand their rights, the majoritarian Hindu identity has started 
to feel threatened. This can be seen in the form of increased violence, or the state’s apparent 
unwillingness to protect the minorities’ rights. Much of what can be expected to happen in 
the future has, hence, to do with political developments in Nepal, especially with regard to 
federalism. As the entrance of the formerly marginalized communities into power happened 
very quickly, the majority identity’s response may take some time to take its concrete 
shape. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that a strictly Pahari-centered form of Hindutva would 
manage to mobilize as many people in Nepal as a more Madheshi-focused one.  
My hypothesis that the fall of the Hindu Kingdom is causing the Hindutva groups to feel 
threatened and, thus, to turn more radical, was proven correct.  The second hypothesis that 
the Hindutva groups’ increased use of intimidation through violence and propaganda has 
the potential to harm the inter-religious relations in the country, was, however, only partly 
proven right. The extremist Hindutva groups, such as the NDA and Ranbir Sena, have not 
managed to significantly disturb the inter-communal relations through their terrorist 
attacks. It is only once the masses are mobilized to feel they are threatened by the 
minorities that the popularity of Hindutva can be expected to rise, thus leading to increased 
communal clashes. The success of popular mobilization, again, depends on the political 
climate in the country, which, in fact, seems to closely resemble the time of the Mandal 
agitation in India. If the Hindu right of Nepal manages to launch a popular movement that 
diverts the attention of the masses away from ethnic and regional divisions, like the rath 
yatra of L.K. Advani did, Nepal could witness a similar saffron wave as India did in the 
1990s. This will, however, require that the Paharis and Madheshis find a common ground – 
something that can only happen if their attention focuses on the religious minorities as the 
enemy, rather than each other.  
Secularism and the attempt to build a more inclusive state in Nepal have, thus, 
paradoxically provided a fertile ground for the growth of Hindutva. As the minorities have 
won more rights, the Hindu majoritarian identity has at the same time started to feel it has 
become unjustly victimized and humiliated. Imran Ansari, the President of Millat-e-
Islamiya Nepal described the situation from the minorities’ perspective by saying: “There is 
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a sense of improvement. For example, many inter-religious platforms have come up. The 
future looks very good, because now there can be dialogue. Still, at the same time very bad 
forces are showing their heads” (Interview 8.). Now, as the most inclusive institution in the 
history of Nepal, the CA, has been dissolved, the future looks perhaps more uncertain than 
before.   
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Abstract 
Hinduism has been used as a source of legitimacy by the kings of Nepal since this nation 
was first unified in the 18th century, while Hindu nationalism, also known as Hindutva, 
crystallized as a political ideology in the 1920s in India, drawing substantially from 
extreme European nationalisms and socio-religious movements inside Hinduism. Hindutva 
found its expression in an idea of a mono-cultural Hindu Rashtra (nation) that excludes the 
followers of religions originating outside of South Asia. While Nepal isolated itself from all 
outside influences up until the 1950s and continued to exist as a Hindu majoritarian state, 
India was declared secular after its independence. The rulers of Nepal and the Hindu 
nationalists of India, however, created a mutually beneficial relationship that protected the 
monarchy and allowed the Hindutva groups of India to spread their networks to Nepal, thus 
leading to a steady rapprochement of these two strands of Hindu nationalism, as will be 
shown in this thesis. Hindutva experienced a tremendous rise to mainstream politics of 
India in the late 1990s, followed by some of the worst instances of violence against 
religious minorities after independence. As Nepal was declared a secular state after a ten-
year-long Maoist conflict in 2006, Hindutva militancy has started to raise its head in this 
country where religious violence has been a relatively rare occurrence, coinciding only with 
periods of increased minority mobilization. Based on fieldwork conducted in Nepal, this 
thesis studies the reactions of the Hindutva groups to secularism in the country, 
distinguishing between different tactics that aim to restore the Hindu state. These tactics are 
then examined in relation to the current political climate in Nepal where minority assertions 
(ethnic, regional and religious) have challenged the state-propagated nationalism. The 
central question is, hence, whether the popularity of Hindutva can be expected to rise in 
Nepal now. Several reactions could be identified in the course of the research: violent 
attacks, aggressive Hindutva rhetoric and attempts at political mobilization have intensified 
since secularism. There has been a clear increase in violence against Christians and 
Muslims after 2006, with attacks carried out by extremist Hindutva groups. At the same 
time, the Hindu right has tried to mobilize the Nepalese Hindus by abandoning the 
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extremely unpopular, now dethroned king, and by concentrating on using the Madheshi 
movement, a popular uprising of the people living on the border of India against the 
dominating Paharis, to its own ends. Simultaneously the royalists still argue for the 
reinstatement of Hindu monarchy and oppose the demands for ethnicity-based federal 
states. Hence, it will be shown that the minority assertions on the one hand present a 
problem for the Hindutva cause by hindering its project of unifying all Hindus, but at the 
same time this might create exactly the kind of situation that leads to the increasing 
popularity of Hindu nationalism, as minority mobilization threatens the constructed 
majority identity. Looking at the Hindutva rhetoric that has emerged in post-2006 Nepal, a 
perception of small groups linked to global forces that threaten the Hindu majority can be 
clearly identified. Hindutva propaganda sees the Christian minority of Nepal as its number 
one enemy, while the second place is reserved for the Muslims. The Hindu right argues that 
the re-establishment of a Hindu majoritarian state is the only way to prevent religious 
conflicts in Nepal, and it sees secularism as a conspiracy of outside forces, out to weaken 
the Hindus by giving too many rights to the minorities. Since an opposite experience of 
history leaves the Hindu nationalists of Nepal disadvantaged compared to their Indian 
counterparts who legitimize their politics of vendetta through an idea of Hindu 
victimization, the Nepalese Hindu right must create an idea of future threats for its popular 
mobilizations. It must also attempt to unite the Hindu Madheshis and Paharis against the 
religious minorities in order to win more support.  
Key Words: Nepal / Hindutva / Hindu nationalism / India / Violence / Politics / Inter-
religious harmony / Religious minorities 
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Zusammenfassung 
Die Könige Nepals haben die Legitimität ihrer Herrschaft aus dem Hinduismus bezogen, 
seit sich diese Nation im 18. Jahrhundert vereinigte. Hindunationalismus, oder auch 
Hindutva, kristallisierte sich als politische Ideologie in den 1920er Jahren in Indien heraus  
und ließ sich vom extremen europäischen Nationalismus und sozio-religiösen Bewegungen 
innerhalb des Hinduismus beeinflussen. Hindutva fand seinen Ausdruck in einer Idee von 
einem monokulturellen Hindu Rashtra (Nation), der die Religionen außerhalb von Südasien 
ausschließt. Während Nepal sich von äußeren Einflüssen bis zu den 1950er Jahren isolierte 
und als ein Hindu-mehrheitlicher Staat fortbestand, wurde Indien nach der Unabhängigkeit 
als säkular erklärt. Wie diese Arbeit zeigt, haben die Herrscher Nepals und die 
Hindunationalisten Indiens eine gegenseitig nützliche Beziehung kreiert, die die Monarchie 
beschützte und es den indischen Hindutva Gruppen erlaubte, ihre Netzwerke nach Nepal 
auszubreiten. Dies erlaubte den beiden Strängen des Hindunationalismus auch, sich stetig 
anzunähern. Hindutva erlebte in Indien einen enormen Anstieg zur politischen Mitte in den 
späten 1990er Jahren, was einige der schlimmsten Fälle von Gewalt gegenüber religiösen 
Minderheiten im unabhängigen Indien als Folge hatte. Als Nepal 2006 nach einem 10-
jährigen Maoistischen Konflikt zu einem säkularen Staat erklärt wurde, hat die Hindutva 
Militanz angefangen, sich zu zeigen. Religiöse Gewalt war bis dahin relativ gering und 
zeigte sich nur im Zusammenhang mit den zunehmenden Mobilisierungen der 
Minderheiten. Basierend auf die Feldforschung, die in Nepal durchgeführt wurde, befasst 
sich diese Diplomarbeit mit den Reaktionen dieser Hindutva Gruppen zu Säkularismus in 
Nepal und unterscheidet zwischen verschiedenen Taktiken, die die Restoration des Hindu 
Staates als Ziel haben. Diese Taktiken werden dann in Bezug auf  die jetzige politische 
Stimmung in Nepal untersucht, wo die Versuche der ethnischen, regionalen und religiösen 
Minderheiten sich durchzusetzen, den vom Staat geförderten Nationalismus infrage stellen. 
Die zentrale Frage ist daher, ob es zu erwarten ist, dass die Popularität des Hindutva in 
Nepal steigen wird.  Einige Reaktionen konnten im Laufe der Forschung identifiziert 
werden: Gewaltangriffe, aggressive Hindutva Rhetorik und Versuche nach politischer 
Mobilisierung haben sich nach dem Säkularismus vermehrt. Es hat  einen klaren Anstieg an 
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Gewalttaten gegen Christen und Muslimen nach 2006 gegeben, welche von den Hindutva 
Extremisten durchgeführt wurden. Zur gleichen Zeit haben es die Hindu-Rechten versucht, 
die nepalesischen Hindus zu mobilisieren, indem sie sich von dem extrem unpopulären und 
mittlerweile enthronten König abwendeten und sich auf die Madheshi Bewegung 
konzentrierten, welche ein populärer Aufstand der Menschen an der Indischen Grenze 
gegen den herrschenden Paharis ist. Gleichzeitig sprechen sich die Royalisten immer noch 
für die Wiederherstellung der Hindu Monarchie aus und lehnen die Forderungen nach einer 
auf Ethnizität basierenden föderalen Struktur ab. Die Forderungen der Minderheiten 
können ein Problem für den Hindutva darstellen, indem sie das Einigungsprojekt aller 
Hindus hindern. Allerdings könnte genau dies gleichzeitig zu einer steigernden Popularität 
des Hindunationalismus führen, weil sich die konstruierte Identität der Mehrheit bedroht 
fühlt. Beim Betrachten der Hindutva Rhetorik, die sich nach 2006 in Nepal entwickelte, 
kann eine Annahme kleiner, global vernetzter Gruppen erkannt werden, die die Hindu 
Mehrheit bedrohen. Die Hindutva Propaganda sieht die christliche Minderheit Nepals als 
ihren schlimmsten Feind an, gefolgt von den Muslimen an zweiter Stelle. Die Hindu 
Rechten behaupten, dass die Wiedereinführung eines Hindu-mehrheitlichen Staates der 
einzige Weg sei, religiöse Konflikte zu verhindern und sieht Säkularismus als eine 
Verschwörung von außen an, die die Hindus schwächen soll, indem den Minderheiten zu 
viele Rechte gegeben werden. Eine verschiedene Auffassung der Geschichte lässt die 
Hindunationalisten Nepals benachteiligt gegenüber denen in Indien, wo die Idee einer 
Hindu-Viktimisierung die Rachepolitik begründet. Für ihre populäre Mobilisierung müssen 
die Hindu Rechten Nepals eine Idee von zukünftigen Bedrohungen erschaffen und die 
Hindu Madheshis und die Paharis gegen die religiösen Minderheiten vereinigen, um an 
Unterstützung zu gewinnen.  
Schlüsselwörter: Nepal / Hindutva / Hindunationalismus / Indien / Gewalt / Politik / 
Interreligiöse Harmonie / Religiöse Minderheiten                      
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